The role of the value-form in the labour theory of value by Taylor, Calvin Francis
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Taylor, Calvin Francis (1991) The role of the value-form in the labour 
theory of value.  
 
PhD thesis 
 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3503/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 THE  ROLE  OF  THE  VALUE-FORM  IN  THE 
LABOUR  THEORY  OF  VALUE 
CALVIN  FRANCIS  TAYLOR 
SUBMITTED  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
FACULTY  OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCES 
C.  F.  TAYLOR  SEPTEMBER  1991 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This  research  was  funded  by  the  E.S.R.C.  Thanks  are  due  to  Scott 
Meikle  for  supervising  the  work  undertaken.  I  also wish  to  thank 
Sally  Hughes  and  Maryam  Najand  for  the  kind  encouragement  which 
they  have  given  me  over  the last  few  years  and  a  debt  of 
gratitude is extended  to  Liz  Tunaley  who  typed  the  script  through 
innumerable  amendments. 
,  ' 
, " 
•.  v;  , CONTENTS 
Summary  l 
Preface  II 
1.  The  Labour  Theory  of  Value  In  The  Wealth  of Nations  1 
(I)  Introduction 
(II)  Money,  Price  and  Value 
(III)  Value  and  Utility 
(IV)  Value,  Labour  and  Labour-Time 
(V)  The  Problem  of Labour-Heterogeneity  and  Some 
Possible  Solutions 
(VI)  Smith's Contribution 
1 
3 
12 
18 
26 
32 
2.  Ricardo  On  The  Labour  Theory  of  Value  49 
(I)  Introduction  49 
(II)  'Labour  Embodied'  And  The  Fallacy of  'Labour  Commanded'  51 
(III)  Utility  And  Demand  and  Supply  (Scarcity)  62 
(IV)  Embodied  Labour  And  The  Invariable  Measure  of Value  70 
3.  The  Law  Of  Value-Substance  99 
(I)  Introduction  99 
(II)  Marx:  The  Starting Point  103 
(III)  From  Exchange-Value  to  Value  106 
(IV)  The  Substance  of Value  117 
4.  The  Form  of  Value  142 
(I)  Introduction  142 
(II)  The  Value-Form  And  Method  147 
(III)  The  Relative  and  Equivalent  Forms  of Value  154 5.  The  Measure  And  Magnitude  of  Value  195 
(I)  Introduction  195 
(I I)  Labour-Time  198 
(111)  Social  Labour  and  Labour-Time  204 
(IV)  Bohm-Bawerk's  Critique of Marx  216 
(V)  A Non-Empirical  Concept  of Labour-Time  224 
(VI)  The  Circularity Critique  - Some  Conclusions  234 
6.  Conclusion  252 
7.  Select  Bibliography  257 SUMMARY 
It  1S  repeatedly  claimed  that the  labour  theory  of value  1S  fatally 
flawed.  Whether  as  a  result of this claim,  or  as  1S  more  likely  a 
change  1n  the  intellectual atmosphere,  there  has  1n  recent  years  been 
little  debate  of the merits  and  weaknesses  of the  labour  theory  of 
value. 
The  principal objective of this thesis is to  re-examine  a  number  of 
the  flaws  more  widely  debated  in  an  earlier period  and  to  show  that 
the  claim that the  labour  theory  of value is  flawed  is false. 
The  thesis claims  that  the  work  of Marx  represents  thus  far  the  single 
most  important contribution  to  the  development  of the  labour  theory  of 
value.  This  contribution 1S  contrasted with  that of  the  Classical 
political economists,  most  notably  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo. 
An  examination  1S  made  of the  works  of  Smith  and  Ricardo  which 
demonstrates  that the  flaws  within  their  labour  theory  of  value  are 
attributable  to  the  shortcomings  of  their  wider  theoretical 
endeavours.  In  particular,  they  fail  to  identify the  nature of value-
creating  labour;  examine  the  role of  the  value-form  and  explain 
cogently  the  quantitative determination of value. 
Marx's  work  1S  then  examined  with  each  of these  points  as  a  pivot  of 
reference.  The  thesis  concludes  by  drawing  the  three  strands  of 
analysis  together  to  demonstrate  that,  against  a  history  of criticism, 
Marx's  theory  presents  a  structured coherent  whole,  largely  immune  to 
the  criticisms made  of it, both  from  without  and  within  the  Marxist 
tradition of political economy. 
1 PREFACE 
The  subject  of  this  thesis is the  labour  theory  of  value  (1). 
Throughout  this  term  is taken  to refer  to  the  un1que  theoretical 
principle  which  states that  labour is the  substance of the  value  of 
commodities  and  that its measure  is the  labour-time  taken  to  produce 
them.  These  characteristics distinguish the labour  theory  of  value 
from  both  the  utility and  relative value  theories  (2)  of  modern 
economic  thought.  However,  specifying  the  substance  of value  was  not 
the  only  concern  of  labour  theorists.  Throughout  its  history 
proponents  of the  labour  theory  of value  have  contributed  enormously 
to  the  development  of cogent  theories of the  commodity,  exchange  and 
of  value  itself  (3).  This  history  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
concludes  with  the  seminal  contribution across  this range  of questions 
made  by  Karl  Marx.  For it was  Marx  who  provided  both  a  systematic 
analysis  of commodity  exchange  and  its characteristics of  equivalence 
and  commensuration,  and  formulated  appropriate  concepts  of labour  with 
which  to  produce  an  integrated  labour  theory  of value.  The  objective 
of  this  thesis  therefore is to  demonstrate  the  coherence  of  this 
theory. 
One  of the  characteristics of the  labour  theory,  shared with  greater 
or  lesser  degrees  of commitment  by  different  contributors,  1S  a 
conception  of  the  exchange  process  as  essentially  one  which  1S 
objective  in  nature.  Objective  1n  this  context  means  that  the 
structure,  objects  and  relationships which  make  up  that  process  exist 
independently  of what  the  exchange  participators might  be  thinking  or 
intending.  This characteristic differentiated the  labour  theory  from 
the  subjective conception  subscribed  to  by  utility  theorists,  who 
11 do  import  the  thoughts  and  intentions of the  participators  into  the 
structure of exchange itself (4). 
Having  identified that  the  exchange  process is an  objective one,  it is 
then  necessary  to  identify  the structure  of  which  it  consists, 
culminating  in the  appropriate concept  of value  and  a  specification of 
its  substance.  In  an  early  work  of  twentieth  century  political 
economy,  Maurice  Dobb  argued  that this theoretical process  could  be 
described  as  identifying a  concept  of value  and  its  substance  which 
satisfied the  formal  conditions which  should  be  applied  to  any  theory 
of  value  regardless of its specific character.  Principally,  these 
conditions  are  that  the  theory  must  be  capable  of  arithmetical 
formulation,  and  that  the  substance of value  should  be  expressible  In 
a  manner  such  that it is capable  of determining  for  any  glven  quantum, 
a  configuration  of  economic  terms;  prices,  wages  and  profits. 
Subsequent  developments  of theory,  particularly in  methodology,  have 
departed  from  this  conception  of how  the  value  problem  should  be 
approached.  Whilst  the  labour  theory  of value  lS  a  particularly  rlpe 
subject  for  methodological  discourse,  it has  become  common  to  find 
amongst  advocates  of the  labour  theory  of value  in  the  last  twenty 
years  a  certain  mistrust,  if  not  profound  distaste  for  the 
philosophically positivist foundations  of Dobb's  conception  (5).  The 
strong  reaction  to  the  type  of treatment  advocated  by  Dobb  arises  from 
a  belief that  those  philosophical  foundations  are  not  only  weak,  but 
may  indeed  be  inimical  to  the  labour  theory  of value  itself (6). 
To  redress  this lack  of foundations,  the  efforts of the  last  twenty 
years  have  been  to create a  new  set,  new  at least to  twentieth  century 
iii political  economy,  and  In  many  instances  the  development  of those 
foundations  has  been  found  to  be  synonymous  with  a  wider  recovery  of 
Marxist  political economy  and  philosophy.  A noticeable characteristic 
of  this  recovery  is its proponents  eschewal  of  the  mathematical 
formalism  of the  positivist method  advocated  by,  for  example,  Dobb,  in 
favour  of  the  social  and  historical methods  of  dialectics.  These 
developments  have  also  had  an  impact  on  value-theory  and  in particular 
have  led to  a  much  closer  inspection of Marx's  own  work  on  value.  One 
of the  main  conclusions of this inspection  has  been  demonstrated  by  a 
growing  consciousness of the  distinction  between  the  labour  theory  of 
value  as it had  been  developed  by  the  Classical school  of  political 
economy  and  that of Marx. 
The  main  distinction  between  the  two  bodies of thought  lies In  their 
respective  conceptions  of how  labour  determines  value.  The  Classical 
school  is represented  by  a  labour  embodied  theory  in  which  values  are 
determined  linearly by  the  amount  of actual  labour  required  to  produce 
them.  In  the  Marxist  conception,  alternatively,  value  lS  the  form 
taken  by  labour  In  a  commodity-producing  economy  and  the  magnitude  of 
value  lS  determined  by  the  quantity  of social  labour  required  to 
produce  it  represented  by  a  quantity  of the  form  of  value,  money. 
Some  writers  have  gone  further  by  arguing  that  a  duality  exists  In 
Marx's  account  of value.  Insofar as  he  talks  about  quantities  of 
labour,  he  lS  regarded  as  Ricardian,  and  it is only  in his analysis  of 
the  form  of value  that  he  is seen  to  advance  beyond  the  Classical 
school  of political economy.  Representative  of this  view  is the  paper 
by  Eldred  and  Hanlon,  Reconstructing  Value-Form  Analysis  (7)  which 
argues  not  only  that Marx's  account  of the  relationship  between  value-
lV magnitude  and  value-form  lS  inconsistent  but  that it is contradictory. 
For  them,  all reference  to  temporally  measured  quantities  of  labour 
are  misleading  when  examining  the  magnitude  of value  which  cannot  be 
established  without  reference  to  the  conventional  measure  of value 
money. 
It  is  the  view  of this thesis  that  this  conception  inadequately 
expresses  the  relationship  between  the  quantitative  and  qualitative 
dimensions  of value.  In  inaccurately  presenting  that  relationship, 
the  quantitative  value  dimension  is suppressed,  giving  opportunity  to 
a  renewed  relativism.  The  view  put  forward  here  lS  that  this 
relationship  is carefully articulated in  Marx's  explanation of  value 
In  which  he  lS  particularly attentive to  the  shortcomings  of  the 
Classical  account  of the  labour  theory  of value  provided  by  Adam  Smith 
and  David  Ricardo. 
The  presentation of Marx's  contribution  broadly splits into  two  parts. 
The  first part  examines  the  principal  works  of Adam  Smith  and  David 
Ricardo  with  the  aim  of identifying their specific  contributions  to 
the  development  of a  labour  theory  of value.  To  claim  that  they  did 
make  an  identifiable contribution  lS  not  without  some  controversy 
which  lS  In  part addressed  as  a  subsidiary  concern.  The  conclusion of 
the  respective  chapters  on  Smith  and  Ricardo  lS  that  their 
contribution  lS  deeply  flawed  in  three  important  respects,  which  are 
the  three points  which  Marx  attacks in his  own  examination  of  their 
work: 
1.  A failure  to account  for  and  describe  the  nature  of value-creating 
labour. 
v 2.  The  absence  of any  analysis of the  value-form. 
3.  A  failure  to  identify the  relevant  value-determining  quantum  of 
labour  as  socially necessary  labour-time. 
Chapters  Three,  Four  and  Five  examine  Marx's  theory  of  value.  Each 
chapter  respectively  addresses  one  of the  points  enumerated  above, 
showing  how  Marx  developed  concepts  to  overcome  the  shortcomings  of 
the  Classical  labour  theory  of value. 
vi NOTES  TO  PREFACE 
1.  Whilst  the  term is almost  universally  recognised  in the  context  of 
such  theorists as  William  Petty,  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo,  it 
is  not  always  extended  to  Marx,  where  the  term  'law of value'  lS 
very  often  proffered instead.  The  term  'labour  theory  of  value' 
has  been  used  throughout  as  the  term  'law of  value'  begs  the 
question  of  the  nature of the  law  to  which  it refers.  As  such 
philosophical  questions,  mlnor  references  notwithstanding,  are 
beyond  the  scope  of this thesis, it employs  a  uniform 
to  refer  to  a  systematic  body  of  theory  to  which 
contributions  have  been  made. 
terminology 
different 
2.  These  are  the  theories  popular  in  the late Nineteenth  Century,  and 
are  represented  by  T.  R.  Malthus  and  S.  Bailey.  Their  principal 
characteristic  lS  their opposition  to  the  notion  of  'intrinsic 
value'.  See  Chapter  Three  below. 
3.  By  this  lS  meant  the  complex  of conditions which  necessitate  a 
value  category  in  the first instance  and  not  the  subsequent 
identification of its substance. 
4.  It  lS  not  intended that this point  be  elaborated  further  as  the 
relative merits of objective  and  subjective analyses is a  question 
to  be  properly settled by  philosophy,  not  political economy. 
5.  Cf  Pilling,  G.,  1972  and  Elson,  D.,  1979. 
6.  Initially working  very  much  within  the  Dobb  conception,  R.  L.  Meek 
attempted  to  demonstrate its scientific compatibility  with  the 
labour  theory  of  value.  On  realising  the  futility  of  this 
vii exerClse,  however,  Meek  duly  abandoned  the  labour  theory  of 
value.  Meek's  contribution is discussed  in  Chapter  Five  below. 
7.  Eldred  and  Hanlon,  1981. 
Vlll CHAPTER  ONE 
THE  LABOUR  THEORY  OF  VALUE  IN  THE  WEALTH  OF  NATIONS 
I.  Introduction 
The  a1m  of this chapter is to describe  the chief  characteristics  of 
Smith's  account  of the  problems  of the  source  and  measure  of the  value 
of  commodities.  Insofar  as it is possible to  speak  of  a  unified 
theory  of value  1n  The  Wealth  of Nations  (hereafter WN)(l),  it will  be 
argued  that it belongs  to that class of theories which  treat  labour 
and  labour-time  as  the  substance  and  measure  of  value  respectively. 
Whilst,  of course,  Smith's  thought  on  the  problems  of value-theory  1S 
interesting  enough  to  study  in its own  right,  the  purpose  of  the 
present  chapter is to explain his  views  as clearly as  possible  with 
the  a1m  of rendering  the  nature of Ricardo's  criticisms of them  more 
transparent.  A  comparison  between  the  theories of  the  two  major 
thinkers  of  the  Classical  school  of  political  economy,  whilst 
revealing  a  number  of pertinent divergences,  also  identifies  the 
parallel  components  of their thought,  which  when  taken  together  form 
the  subject of many  of Marx's critical remarks  upon  the  theoretical 
successes  and  shortcomings  of the  Classical  version  of  the  labour 
theory  of value.  The  chief characteristics of the  Classical  account 
are  identified 1n  this and  the  following  chapter  1n  preparation  for  an 
examination  of Marx's critical commentary. 
The  account  of Smith's theory  of value  which  it is the  purpose  of this 
chapter  to  develop is one  of which  historians of economic  thought  have 
traditionally disapproved,  disapproval  perhaps  borne  by  the  antipathy 
1 shown 
theory 
by  orthodox  economic  thought  to  the  very  notion  of 
of value  (2).  Indeed,  since  on  many  occasions  this 
a  labour 
has  extended 
antipathy 
to  a  denial  of the  category  of  value  altogether,  the 
advocate  of  the  labour  theory  of value  is  faced  with  the  task  of 
establishing  its  credentials,  category  by  category.  Similarly, 
therefore,  it will  be  necessary  to  show  how  Smith  proceeds  to  develop 
the  category  of value  and  the  stages which  his  thought  passes  through 
In  achieving  that objective.  It is not  universally  accepted  within 
economic  theory  that  'value'  itself represents  a  category  distinct, 
say,  from  either  'exchange-value'  or  'utility'.  For  many  schools  of 
thought,  the  category  'value'  means  little by  itself and  should  be 
viewed  In  conjunction with  one  or  other of these latter terms.  It  lS 
not,  however,  always  accepted  that  Smith  himself  employed  a 
distinction.  Thereafter  therefore,  the  chapter  examlnes  ways  in  which 
Smith  may  be  seen  to  possess  a  category  of value  which  lS  distinct 
from  either exchange-value  or  use-value,  (the categories, it ought  to 
be  noted,  customarily  employed  by  the  various  orthodox  schools  of 
thought),  and  why  he  thinks  that  the  substance  and  measure  of  value 
are  labour  and  labour-time. 
Additionally,  Smith  considers  a  further  candidate  for  the  role  of 
measure  of  value;  the  standard  of  'labour  commanded' .  The 
overwhelming  majority  of commentators  argue  that this is Smith's  main 
theory  of value  and  minimise  or  deny  altogether  the  theory  of  labour-
embodied.  Part  of  the  task of this chapter is to  show  that  this 
enthusiasm  for  the  labour-commanded  theory  is not  wholly  supported  by 
Smith's  work.  Indeed  much  of it can  be  shown  to  be  misplaced  by 
demonstrating  that  Smith's  arguments  subtly,  but  unmistakably,  perform 
2 a  theoretical shift  from  labour  embodied  to  labour  commanded  in  order 
to  avoid  the  consequences  of his failure  to  properly  formulate  and 
solve  the  problem  of commensurability  which  he  implies  In  a  number  of 
places  lS  the  foundation  of  any  coherent  theory  of  value. 
Commentaries  on  Smith  have  failed  to  note this shift and  consequently 
find  it difficult to explain  why  Smith  bothers  with  labour  commanded 
at  all,  when  any  other  commodity,  particularly  money,  would  serve 
equally  as  well.  It shall  be  argued  that  Smith  discovered,  albeit  In 
a  primitive  manner,  the  important  problems  of  equivalence  and 
commensurability,  but,  unable  to  surmount  the  obstacle  of  labour 
heterogeneity,  reneges  on  the  promise of his  theoretically  superlor 
conception  of value  for  the  theoretically inferior device  of  labour 
commanded.  This  chapter  therefore divides  broadly  along  these  lines. 
The  second  part  examines  Smith's implicit treatment  of  value  as  a 
separate  category,  to  be  glven  a  distinct  identity  from  either 
exchange  value  or  utility.  Section  III  proceeds  to  give  further 
consideration  to  how  Smith  distinguishes  value  from  utility  and 
considers  how,  in  failing  to properly  draw  the  distinction  between 
use-value  and  utility,  the latter can still be  ascribed  to  his  theory 
as  one  of its theoretical ambivalences.  The  fourth  section  examines 
Smith's  explanation of the  relationship  between  value  and  labour  and 
the  firth  concludes  with  an  account  of his  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
deal  with  the  problem of labour  heterogeneity. 
II.  Money,  Price  and  Value 
Smith  tackles  the  problem  of value  for  the  first  time  in  Chapter  Four 
(WN)  which  is entitled Of  the Origin  and  Use  of Money.  The  location 
3 of  this  discussion  in  the  conclusion of this  chapter  lS  generally 
interpreted  as  a  matter  of convenience,  being  simply  a  preparatory 
exercise,  clearing  the  ground  for  Chapter  Five,  which  explains  the 
distinction  between  the real  and  nominal  price of  commodities  (3). 
There  lS,  however,  a  more  concrete explanation  for  its  location  In 
Chapter  Four. 
It has  already  been  indicated that it is part of the  interpretation of 
Smith  to  be  developed  here  that  he  thought it necessary  to  draw  a 
distinction  between,  on  the  one  hand,  value  and  exchange-value  and,  on 
the  other,  value  and  use-value.  Like  any  other  theory  of  value, 
Smith's  lS  composed  of several  elements  developed  with  specific 
theoretical  objectives  In  mind.  And,  as  in  the  case  of  many  early 
thinkers,  the  work  of cohering  those disparate theoretical elements  lS 
the  task of subsequent  workers  in  the  field.  However,  it is part  of 
the  argument  of this chapter that to  the  extent  that  Smith's  work 
possesses  any  inherent  coherence,  the  elements,  taken  one  with 
another,  imply  the  distinctions outlined.  Furthermore,  having  made 
these  distinctions  he  then  proceeds  to explain  the  substance  and 
measure  of this third term  by  labour  and  labour-time.  Although  there 
are  two  problems,  Smith's  account  of the  derivation of the  category  of 
value  and  of a  concept  of labour  as its substance parallel one  another 
in that  they  both  proceed  from  his  account  of the origin of money  and 
the  necessity  of its creation  following  the  development  within  the 
division of labour.  Perhaps at the  expense  of sacrificing some  of the 
elegance  of Smith's explanation,  it is proposed  to separate  out  the 
two  problems  and  treat them  independently  for  the  purpose  of  clarity. 
Firstly,  an  explanation of how  Smith  develops  his concept  of  value 
4 from  his concept  of money  is offered,  and  secondly,  an  explanation  of 
how  he  arrives at  the  labour  theory  of value.  Since  both  conceptions 
are  derived  by  Smith  from  his  theory  of the  division of labour,  it  1S 
necessary  to  begin  with  this  and  consider  the  reasons  why  he  thought 
that  the  development  of money  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
division of labour. 
Smith's  explanation of the initial cause  of the  division of labour  1S 
notorious.  The  limitations of arguing  from  exchange  to  the  division 
of  labour  are  obvious,  but  since  this method  is attacked  by  Marx  1n 
his criticisms of the Classical  school  as  a  whole,  it is proposed  not 
to  say  too  much  about it here  (4).  In  any  case,  although  Smith 
initially explains  the  original  development  of the  division of  labour 
by  the  'propensity  to  truck,  barter  and  exchange  one  thing  for  another 
(5),  its subsequent  widening  and  increasing differentiation 1S  seen  by 
Smith  more  as  a  product  of mankind's  desire  to  improve its  condition 
than,  as  one  would  be  led to  believe  by  some  commentators,  as  the 
fulfilment  of  a  psychological  necessity  (6).  This  'improving' 
explanation of the  division of labour is besides  more  consistent  with 
the  views  expressed  1n  WN  1.IV.I.  The  most  important  point  to  grasp 
about  the  division  of labour is that  once it  'has  been  thoroughly 
established,  it is but  a  very  small  part of a  man's  wants  which  the 
produce  of  his  own  labour  can  supply'  (7) .  Restricted  to  the 
performance  of  a  few  or  maybe  only  one  productive  activity,  the 
individual  producer  is compelled  to  exchange  his  own  products  for 
those  of others.  Exchange,  explains  Smith,  is the  act  of  obtaining 
things  required  for  needs: 
5 He  supplies  the  far  greater part of them  by  exchanging  that 
surplus part  of the  produce  of his  own  labour,  which  is over 
and  above  his  own  consumption,  for  such  parts of the  produce 
of other  men's  labour  as  he  has  occasion  for  (8). 
A  society  which  routinely  supplies its needs  through  the  exchange  of 
the  products  of independent  producers  connotes  a  specific  type  of 
society:  'Every  man  thus  lives by  exchanging,  or  becomes  1n  some 
measure  a  merchant,  and  the  society itself grows  to  be  what  1S 
properly  a  commercial  society'  (9).  Exchange  1S  the  form  of  social 
connection  which  exists  between  the  members  of  a  society  of 
independent  producers.  It might  have  been  more  appropriate if  Smith 
had  explained  exchange  in this way  directly,  instead  of  speculating 
upon  man's  supposed  propensity  to barter.  But,  since  the  point  1S 
eventually  established that it is the  refinement  of the  division  of 
labour  into  independent  private production  which  necessitates  the 
exchange  of products,  this may  be  passed  over  for  the  time  being. 
The  development  of exchange,  however,  does  not  proceed  unhindered; 
'when  the division of labour  first began  to  take  place,  this power  of 
exchanging  must  frequently  have  been  very  much  clogged  and  embarrassed 
1n  its operations'  (10).  The  source  of the  clogging  and  embarrassment 
1S  the  tricky  circumstance  that  exchange  can  only  take  place  where 
individuals require  each others'  products: 
One  man,  we  shall suppose,  has  more  of a  certain  commodity 
than  he  himself has  occasion  for,  while  another  has  less. 
The  former  consequently  would  be  glad  to  dispose of,  and  the 
latter to  purchase,  a  part of this superfluity.  But  if  this 
latter  should  chance  to  have  nothing  that the  former  stands 
in  need  of,  no  exchange  can  be  made  between  them  (11). 
The  simple  circulation of products  1S  subject to  the  contingency  of  a 
mutual  desire  on  the  part of the exchangers  for  the  produce  of  the 
6 other.  What  each  has  to offer the  other is simply  the  product  of  his 
own  particular  activity.  The  differences  between  the  products  are 
complemented  by  the  differences  between  the  needs  of  the  producers. 
It is as  the satisfier of a  particular need  that  the object  1S  wanted 
and  its correspondence  to  a  particular need,  from  the  point of view  of 
he  who  wants  it,  distinguishes  that  object  from  others.  This 
frustrating  circumstance,  Smith  suggests,  1S  resolved historically  at 
an  early  stage  by  the  individual  producer  endeavouring  to  always 
possess  some  object  which  1S  universally  acceptable  and  can, 
consequently,  be  exchanged  for  every  other  commodity.  The  development 
of  exchange  is restricted to direct barter  unless  some  object  can  be 
found  which  possesses  the  specific useful quality  of acceptability  1n 
exchange  for  any  other  product.  Cattle are said to  have  been  just 
such  a  commodity: 
In  the  rude  ages  of society,  cattle are said to  have  been  the 
common  instrument  of commerce;  and  though  they  must  have  been 
an  inconvenient  one,  yet in old  times  we  find  things  were 
frequently  valued  according  to  the  number  of cattle which  had 
been  given  in  exchange  for  them  (12). 
Homer,  Smith  reports,  says that  the  armour  of Diomede  cost  nine  oxen 
to  purchase,  but  that of Glaucus  one  hundred.  If measured  in  cattle, 
the  value  of the latter is more  than  eleven  times  that of the  former. 
Oxen,  1n  this case,  are  the  medium  in which  the  price of  armour  1S 
measured.  Salt,  shells,  dried  cod,  tobacco,  sugar,  hides,  dressed 
leather  and  nails have  been  or  are  used  in exactly  the  same  manner. 
Each  serves as  a  measure  of the  value  of other  commodities  and  this 
capacity  allows it to serve as  a  medium  of exchange. 
Universal  acceptability,  however,  1S  not  the  only  qualification  which 
7 a  particular  commodity  must  possess  in order  to  serve  as  a  general 
medium  of exchange:  'The  man  who  wanted  to  buy  salt,  for  example,  and 
had  nothing  but cattle to  give  In  exchange  for it,  must  have  been 
obliged to  buy  salt to  the  value  of a  whole  ox,  or  a  whole  sheep  at  a 
time'  (13).  Livestock,  besides  the  inconvenience  of  their  size, 
limit  their  owner  to  purchases  measured  in whole  units of  livestock. 
A  beast  cannot  be  divided  and  reconstituted as  appropriate.  If  his 
'currency'  is cattle or  sheep,  their  owner  is restricted to  purchases 
which  are  the  equivalent of whole  cattle or  sheep:  'He  could  seldom 
buy  less than  this,  because  what  he  has  to give  for it could  seldom  be 
divided  without  loss;  and  if he  had  a  mind  to  buy  more,  he  must  for 
the  same  reasons  have  been  obliged  to  buy  double  or  triple  the 
quantity,  the  value,  to wit,  of two  or  three  oxen,  or  two  or  three 
sheep'  (14). 
developments  In 
To  digress  a  little,  In  anticipation  of  later 
WN  Chapter  Four,  Smith  introduces  the  notion  that 
exchange  is a  quantitative relationship in  which  there  is a  determined 
regularity  between  the quantities of the  objects exchanged.  Although 
the  point is incidental this marks  the  origin of Smith's consideration 
of  the  quantitative dimension  of the  value  problem,  an  orlgln  which 
will  ultimately  lead  him  into seemingly  insuperable  problems.  The 
problem  with  employing cattle as  a  medium  of exchange  is that,  as  a 
measure  of value,  they  restrict their  owner  to  the  purchase  of objects 
in'quantities which  are  In  some  sense  proportionate,  or equivalent  to, 
one  or  two;  etc.,  cattle or  sheep.  This  problem,  however,  lS  not 
encountered  in the  use  of precious metals  as  a  medium  of exchange. 
The  metals,  gold  and  silver,  Smith  suggests,  are naturally suited  to 
employment  as  a  measure  of value  and  medium  of exchange: 
8 Metals  can  not  only  be  kept  with  as little loss as  any  other 
commodity,  scarce  anything  being  less perishable  than  they 
are,  but  they  can  likewise,  without  any  loss,  be  divided  into 
any  ~umber of. parts,  as  by  fusion  these  parts can  easily  be 
re-unlted  agaln;  a  quality  which  no  other  equally  durable 
commodities  possess,  and  which  more  than  any  other  quality 
renders  them  fit  to  be  the  instruments  of  commerce  and 
circulation  (15). 
Unlike  livestock,  which  possess  the  drawback  of  perishability,  the 
precious metals  are  relatively stable and  enduring.  More  importantly, 
unlike  livestock,  they  can  be  divided  and  reconstituted  as 
appropriate.  The  owner  of  precious  metals  can  purchase  other 
commodities  in  the  desired quantities because  he  can  'proportion  the 
quantity  of the  metal  to  the  precise quantity of the  commodity  which 
he  had  immediate  occasion  for'  (16).  This  introduces  a  new  concern 
into Smith's  enquiry.  It is as  this point  that  he  first broaches  the 
problem of value  beyond  the  recognition  that  exchange is essentially  a 
relationship of quantitative equivalents.  Commodities,  Smith  argues, 
exchange  on  the  basis of equality.  This  equality,  however,  lS  only 
established  if  the  commodities  are  exchanged  In  the  appropriate 
proportions.  Where  the  objects to  be  exchanged  are different,  it  lS 
impossible  to  concelve of their  being  proportioned  to  one  another 
unless  they  are first  reduced  or  translated into  some  common  term. 
What  Smith  lS  working  towards  lS  the  concept  of  value;  not  as 
exchange-value  or  use-value,  but  as  a  distinct category  from  either, 
In  terms  of which  commodities  are  simply  quantitative  representations 
of  the  same  homogeneous  item.  However,  his  conception  lS  extremely 
undeveloped  at  this  stage.  His  identification  of  a  chief 
characteristic  of the  exchange-relation,  viz.  quantitative  equality, 
lS  still  bound  in  an  exogenous  way  with  money  and  its  development. 
9 Smith  is never  to  be  in  a  posit1"on  to  develop  th  1  t"  h"  b  t  e  re  a  lons  1p  e  ween 
value  and  money;  that is a  task  that is taken  up  with  Marx. 
Smith's elementary  conception  does  undergo  some  development. 
However, 
The  greater part of the  rest of Chapter  Four,  WN  1.IV.5  to  10  1S  taken 
up  by  Smith  in  a  brief review  of the  history of the  monetary  use  of 
the  precious  metals  from  their earliest use  by  the  Romans  to  their 
modern  coined  forms.  Though  most  of this discussion is irrelevant  for 
the  purposes  of this description of the characteristics  of  Smith's 
theory  of  value,  one  part of his  discussion,  at  WN  I.IV.7,  1S 
essential. 
This  paragraph  contains  Smith's explanation of the  transition  from  the 
primitive  bar  form  of money  to its modern  publicly  coined  form.  The 
purpose  of publicly  coined  money  is to  prevent  the potential  fraud  and 
abuse  associated  with  the  use  of crude  forms  of gold  and  silver  as 
money.  In  order to  prevent  such  abuse,  the  precious  metals  had  to  be 
first  weighed  and  then  assayed  for  their  purity,  both  operations 
entailing some  unavoidable  inconvenience: 
The  weighing  of gold  in particular is an  operation of  some 
nicety.  In  the  coarser metals,  indeed,  where  a  small  error 
would  be  of  little consequence,  less  accuracy  would,  no 
doubt,  be  necessary.  Yet  we  should  find  it excessively 
troublesome,  if every  time  a  poor  man  had  occasion either  to 
buy  or sell a  farthing's  worth  of goods,  he  was  obliged  to 
weigh  the  farthing.  The  operation of assaying is still  more 
difficult,  still  more  tedious,  and,  unless  a  part  of  the 
metal  is  fairly  melted  in  the  crucible,  with  proper 
dissolvants,  any  conclusion that can  be  drawn  from  it  is 
extremely  uncertain  (17). 
Precision in  the  weighing  and  assay1ng  of gold  and  silver is necessary 
because  in their crude metallic  forms  there  must  always  have  been  the 
possibility  of  fault;  'people  must  always  have  been  liable  to  the 
10 grossest  frauds  and  impositions,  and  ... might  receive  1n  exchange  for 
their  goods  an  adulterated composition of the  coarsest  and  cheapest 
metals,  which  had,  however,  in their outward  appearance,  been  made  to 
resemble  those  metals'  (18).  Maintaining  accuracy  and  consistency  when 
dealing  with  the  precious  metals  1S  necessary  because  'a  small 
difference  in  the  quantity  makes  a  great difference  1n  the  value' 
(19).  It  1S  interesting to note  the  use  Smith  makes  of  an  implied 
relationship  between  value  and  weight.  It does  not  occur  to  him, 
however,  to  question  how  value  comes  to  be  expressed  1n  weight  or 
indeed  how  that  operation  1S  effected,  but  he  does  extend  his 
discussion of quantitative equivalence.  Protection  from  fraud is  to 
ensure  that  exchanges  between  commodities  and  the  precious metals  are 
conducted  on  the  basis of equality,  that whatever  is  exchanged  for 
gold is exchanged  for  gold of equal  value  (20).  The  gold itself  1S 
not  value,  but  1n  possess1ng  value it is qualified  to  measure  the 
value  of  other  commodities.  In  a  very  elementary  form  this  1S  the 
origin  of  a  distinction which  is to  become  crucial  for  Marx.  The 
values  of commodities  expressed  in  gold,  or  whatever  other  material 
performs  the  function  of the  measure  of value,  are  not  their  'values', 
but  their prices.  This  distinction 1S  to  be  found  in  an  elementary 
form  1n  Smith,  and  Ricardo  after him,  where  it takes  the  form  of  a 
distinction  between  the  natural  values  of  commodities  and  their 
nominal,  fluctuating  prices.  In  Smith's explanation of value,  it  1S 
as  'values'  that  commodities  are of like substance  and  can  on  the 
basis  of  the  quantities of value  they  contain  be  compared  and  so 
appear  as  equivalents of each  other  in proportions  corresponding  to 
those  equal  quantities of value  (21). 
11 Having  made  in  an  elementary  form  the distinction between  real  value 
and  money  price,  Smith  now  proceeds  to  explain  the  next  item  on  his 
agenda,  disposing of,  in  the  process,  the  erroneous  view  that  it  1S 
money  (or their exchange  for  money)  which  makes  commodities  values: 
'What  are  the  rules which  men  naturally  observe  1n  exchanging  them 
either  for  money  or  for  one  another,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  examine' 
(22).  One  of these rules  has  already  been  established,  V1Z.;  that 
commodities  must  exchange  as  quantitative  equivalents.  They  are 
equivalents  because  they  contain  equal  quantities  of  value.  This 
value  has  to  be  distinguished  from  that  for  which  they  exchange,  which 
1S  their  value-expression.  Discovering  the  nature  of value,  it  1S 
then  possible  to explain  the  rules  which  determine  why  one  particular 
kind  of commodity  exchanges  in specific proportions,  and  not  just  any 
proportions,  for  any  other.  'These  rules  determine  what  may  be  called 
the  relative  or  exchangeable  value  of goods'  (23).  The  next  task 
which  Smith  now  sets  for  himself is to  discover  the  cause  or  substance 
of value itself,  and  the  first step in this direction is to  dispose  of 
the  view  that  use-value  constitutes the  value  of commodities. 
III.  Value  and  Utility 
Smith  briefly  discusses  a  utility theory  of value at  WN  1.IV.13,  a 
paragraph  held  1n  some  notoriety  in  the  history of economic  literature 
for  what  1S  seen  as its reckless  disregard  for  the  sensibilities  of 
those  who  like the marginalist  school  prefer to  appear  circumspect  1n 
matters  likely to offend.  What  such  commentators  find  offensive  1S 
not  so  much  Smith's  argument  against utility,  which  they  think  can  be 
deftly  avoided  by  marginalism  anyway,  but  simply  the  peremptory  nature 
12 of his  comments.  Campbell  and  Skinner,  for  example,  feel  the  need  to 
supplement  Smith's  comments  with  passages  trawled  from  the  Lectures  on 
Jurisprudence,  ln order  to  temper  his apparent  rashness  ln  throwing 
out  utility altogether  (24).  Smith,  however,  has  good  argument  for 
throwing  lOt  out,  t  even  hough  this is bound  to  Jar  on  marginalist 
sensibilities. 
The  best  way  to  approach  this well-known  paragraph  lS  not  to  take  it 
all  ln  one  reading,  as  most  commentators  upon  its contents  seem  to 
insist,  but  instead break it down  and  take  each  idea as it occurs  and 
receives  expresslon.  There  are  basically  two  parts  to  the  paragraph. 
The  first,  and  perhaps  the  most  important,  contains  Smith's 
explanation  of  the  distinction  between  value  in  use  and  value  1n 
exchange,  the  second  the  famous  water  and  diamond  illustration of this 
distinction.  The  latter,  it  ought  to  be  noted,  1S  generally 
emphasised  more  by  economic  theorists  than  the  former.  Thus,  the 
first part: 
In 
'The  word  VALUE',  observes  Smith,  'has  two  different 
meanings,  and  sometimes  expresses  the  utility  of  some 
particular  object,  and  sometimes  the  power  of  purchasing 
other  goods  which  the  possession of that object conveys.  The 
one  may  be  called  "value  in  use";  the  other,  "value  1n 
exchange'"  (25). 
describing  his  thought  as  an  observation,  Smith  has  been 
deceptively  casual  about  his explanation.  He  could,  however,  afford 
to  be  casual,  Slnce  the  issue  before  him  was  straightforward. 
Unfortunately,  economists  and  historians of economlC  thought  with  the 
theoretical  predilections of the  Neo-classical  school  are  unable  to 
see  what  Smith  is getting at.  The  matter  is quite simple;  use-value 
13 1S  always  the  quite specific useful  quality  of  some  'particular 
object' .  Objects  which  are  exchanged  are  exchanged  because  they  are 
different.  They  serve different needs  and  their ability  to  do  so 
originates in the  describable collections of specific qualities  which 
makes  each  one  different  from  any  other.  However,  as  exchangeable 
objects  they  possess  one  quality which  they  share alike,  but  which 
paradoxically  1S  not  one  of  their  natural  qualities,  that  of 
possessing  the  power  of purchasing  other  goods.  This  power  originates 
not  in  the  object itself,  but  in its possession  by  its owner  and  the 
desire  for it by  another  in  a  legal  system of private property.  What 
distinguishes  this power  of purchasing  from  use-value is that  it  1S 
universal  in quality  where  use-value differs  from  product  to  product. 
The  former  is the  commodity's  exchangeability,  that quality  which,  1n 
addition  to  an  item's specific usefulness,  transforms  it  into  a 
commodity.  The  latter,  use  value,  is specific to  each  type  of  object 
and,  whilst  a  necessary  pre-requisite  for  the object's  transformation 
into  a  commodity,  is by  itself insufficient  for  that operation  to  take 
place.  Therefore,  commodities  are  both  use-values  and  exchange-
values.  By  virtue of one  they  are different  and  cannot  be  objectively 
compared,  by  the  other  they  shed their different  forms  and  present 
themselves  merely  as different quantities of value  (26). 
Schumpeter  and  Hollander  offer different  and  diametrically  opposed 
interpretations  of  Smith's thought  to that which  has  been  proposed 
here.  Whilst  recognising that  Smith  disposes of the  use-theory  of 
value,  Schumpeter is not  prepared  to  allow  him  to entertain any  other 
notion  of value  than  one  which  is entirely relative  (27).  Thus,  on 
the  grounds  that  Smith  says  his intention 1S  to  inquire  into  the 
14 rules  which  men  naturally  observe  in exchanging  goods  either for  money 
or  one  another,  Schumpeter  declares:  'This  means  he  was  not  primarily 
interested  1n  the  problem of value',  defined  in  the  sense  of  'the 
problem  of causal  explanation of the  phenomenon  of value'  (28).  As 
has  been  shown,  the  two  problems  are  intimately  related  Smith's 
thought,  not,  however,  because  he  confuses  the  problem  of value  with 
that  of exchange-value,  but  precisely  because  the  two  things  are  not 
the  same.  Smith  considers  the  exchange-relation  and  concludes  that it 
1S  a  necessary  aspect of that relation that the  things  exchanged  are 
commensurable.  They  are this,  he  says,  because  they  are  values. 
Therefore,  before  it  1S  possible to consider  that  aspect  of  the 
exchange-relation  1n  which  the  value  of one  kind  of  commodity  1S 
expressed  1n  another  kind  of commodity,  it is  necessary  to  first 
investigate  the  category  of  value  and  its  distinction  from  the 
category  of  exchange-value.  If  Schumpeter  had  followed  through 
Smith's  argument  from  the  beginning of  WN  Chapter  Four  this aspect  of 
his  theory  of  value  would  have  become  apparent,  and  would, 
consequently,  make  a  nonsense  of the  unsubstantiated claim that  what 
Smith  'wanted  was  a  price  theory  by  which  to  establish  certain 
propositions  that  do  not  require  going  into the  background  of  the 
value  phenomenon  at all'  (29).  It 1S  precisely this  background  which 
Smith  has  unearthed  implicitly  1n  turning  over  the  problems 
encountered  1n  his  analysis of money.  Schumpeter,  faced  by  the 
unfamiliar,  has  no  option  but  to resort  to  the  most  superficial 
interpretation of the contents of  WN  Chapter  Four  in  order  to make  it 
acceptable  to  the  Neo-Classical  economist,  but  which  would  render  it 
unrecognisable  to  Smith. 
15 Schumpeter  is not  the  only  economist  schooled  in  Neo-classical  theory 
to  have  attempted  to  make  Smith  amenable  to  that  tradition's 
sensibilities.  Hollander  equally  demonstrates  an  undue  haste  in  his 
assessment  of Smith.  He  too  examines  the  passage  at  WN  1.IV.13,  but 
unlike  Schumpeter  is not  prepared  to  admit  that  Smith  rejects the  use-
theory  of  value  outright.  Indeed,  argues  Hollander,  Smith  merely 
disposes  of one  definition of use-value,  not  the  notion  tout  court. 
According  to  Hollander,  'value  in  use'  referred  to  by  Smith  1n  the 
passage  1n  question  'must  be  understood  in  the  narrow  sense  of 
biological  significance  and  not  in  the  economist's  broad  sense  of 
desirability'  (30).  Arguing  that  the  general  significance  of  this 
passage  in  Smith's overall  theory  of value  has  been  overestimated,  he 
says:  'The  "paradox  of  value"  was  not  formulated  as  a  problem 
requiring  a  solution;  it was  rather  a  statement of fact  regarding  the 
irrelevance  for  exchange-value  of  the  physical  (biological  or 
cultural)  properties of commodities'.  And  then  in conclusion:  'Smith 
did  not  reject  utility in the  economist's sense  of the  term  as  a 
necessary  condition of exchange-value;  on  the contrary  he  accounted 
for  the  latter in  terms  of utility and  scarcity  1n  the  traditional 
manner'  (31).  However  much  Smith  employs  the  demand  and  supply 
apparatus  in other sections of the  WN,  it is always  used  with  respect 
to  pr1ce,  where  price, it is made  clear,  is  distinct  from  value. 
Although  Smith  does  not  deny  that  a  product's having  use-value  1S  a 
necessary  condition of its being  a  value,  Hollander  seems  to  take this 
to  imply  that it is possible to  dispense  with  value  altogether,  which 
1S  what  he  takes  Smith  to  do,  and  explain  prices  'in the  traditional 
manner. '  Whatever  remark  Marshall is reputed  to  have  made  about  'it 
16 all being  in Smith',  it is most  certainly  not  all in Marshall.  Smith 
tackles  the  problem of value  ln  terms  of quantitative equivalence  and 
commensurability,  problems  unknown  to  Marshall,  and  certainly 
unrecognised  by  Hollander,  who  appears  only  too  happy  to go  along  with 
Smith's  rejection  of one  concept  of utility, if only  to  saddle  him 
with  another,  l.e.,  demand. 
This  brings  us  briefly to  the  second half of  WN  1.IV.13,  the  so-called 
water  and  diamond  paradox: 
Nothing  lS  more  useful  than  water:  but  it  will  purchase 
scarce  anything;  scarce  anything  can  be  had  in  exchange  for 
it.  A diamond,  on  the contrary,  has  scarce  any  value  in use; 
but  a  very  great  quantity of other  goods  may  frequently  be 
had  ln  exchange  for it (32). 
It  lS  not  difficult to  understand  why  marginalist  commentaries  on 
Smith  emphasise  this part of the  paragraph  in  preference  to  the  first 
part  discussed  above.  Observing  Smith  in difficulties,  they  seem  only 
too willing to step in,  to  save  him  from  drowning  in  embarrassment  by 
throwing  out  the  marginalist lifeline:  'Needless  to  say',  offers 
Hollander,  helpfully,  'the  latter approach  (i.e.,  the  one  which 
Hollander  falsely  ascribes  to  Smith)  was  not  water-tight  because  of 
the  absence  of  an  explicit  incremental  conception,  but  this 
"deficiency"  did  not  preclude  an  explanation of price  ln  terms  of 
relative  scarcity'  (33).  The  absence  of an  'incremental  conception' 
should  not  come  as too  much  of a  surprlse.  Indeed,  the  very  reverse, 
reserving  any  surprise  for  the  unlikely  event  of  discovering  an 
'incremental  conception'  where  one  would  least expect  to  find it,  ln 
precisely the  kind  of theory  of value  which  Smith  is developing  (34). 
Smith's  elaboration of the  labour  theory  of value exercises  care  ln 
17 its use  and  development  of categories.  The  category  of value,  unlike 
that  of  exchange-value,  which  in orthodox  economic 
often  substituted 
marginal  ism  and 
for  it, does  not lie around  on 
related schools of thought  imagine. 
theory  lS 
the  surface, 
It  has  to 
very 
as 
be 
extracted  by  means  of analysis.  Part  of that process of extraction  lS 
the  recognition  that the  exchange-relationship is a  relationship  of 
equivalence  in  which  different commodities  can  be  substituted  for  one 
another  as  equivalents.  Furthermore,  in  order  to explain  how  things 
which  differ  materially  as  use-values  can  be  sUbstituted  for  one 
another  in  exchange,  it is necessary,  as  a  part of the  overall  process 
of analysing  exchange,  to  address  the  problem  of commensurability.  It 
lS  in  the  context  of  his solution  to  this  problem  that  Smith 
introduces  the  category  of value.  As  substitutes  for  one  another, 
commodities  differ  only  as  to  quantity  - i.e.,  how  much  value  they 
represent.  It  lS  only  by  representing  themselves  as  items  of  like 
substance  that it is possible to  explain  the  proportions  in  which  they 
exchange.  Identifying the  existence of the  value  category,  however, 
lS  only  the  first part of the  analysis;  it  lS  then  necessary  to 
explain  its magnitude.  The  first step  in  answerlng  this question  lS 
to  identify  the  'cause'  or  substance  of the  value  category  itself 
(35).  Smith  addresses his thought  to this problem  in  WN  Chapter  Five 
with  supplementary  consideration in Chapters  Six  and  Seven. 
IV.  Value,  Labour  and  Labour-Time 
It  occurred  to  Smith  that this part of his analysis might  appear  the 
most  obscure  to  the  reader,  if not  indeed  the  most  tedious.  Thus, 
begging  the  reader's patience  and  assuring  him  that  he  will  take  'the 
18 utmost  pains  that  I  can  to be  perspicuous',  Smith  begins  on  the 
elaboration  of  a  'subject in its own  nature  extremely  abstracted' 
(36). 
Most  commentators  agree  that it is possible to detect in  WN  something 
that  can  be  said to fall within the broad  description  of  a  labour 
theory  of  value.  Opinions differ,  however,  as  to  what  degree  of 
significance  this  'something'  has within  Smith's overall  theoretical 
concern.  Those,  like  Marshall  and  Schumpeter,  who  think  of  the 
theoretical  endeavours of the  Classical school  as possessing  no  small 
resonance  with  the character of their own,  have  unmistakably  sought  to 
minimise  the  importance of the  labour-embodied  theory,  trading  heavily 
on  the  labour  commanded  version  (37).  Hollander,  as can  be  deduced 
from  his earlier comments  on  utility,  does  not set too  much  store  by 
Smith's references to labour,  preferring to describe  the  labour  theory 
of  value  discovered  by  some  commentators  in  WN  as  the  product  of 
overworked  and  unscholarly  ideological  wishful  thinking.  The 
overwhelming  focus  of comment  is on  Smith's  use  of a  labour  commanded 
concept  of value. 
It is not  too difficult to see,  however,  that this  focus  is misplaced. 
The  labour  commanded  concept  can  be  seen  as  one  element  of  a 
theoretical partnership,  the  labour  embodied  concept  being  the  other. 
Sometimes  Smith  employs  these  two  concepts  in quite distinct ways  and 
ln  the context of different problems.  At  other times,  they  are  used 
interchangeably  as  if they  were  the  same  thing,  giving  an  overall 
appearance  of  arbitrariness  to Smith's  account.  This 
however,  should  be  seen as illusory.  Smith's  use  of the  two 
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j possesses  a  definite pattern.  Close analysis shows  that the  labour-
embodied  theory  takes  precedence  over  the  labour-commanded.  Given 
Smith's analysis of the  value  category  there should be little room  for 
surprise,  since the  labour-commanded  theory  would  contradict it  (38). 
What  has  to  be  explained,  therefore,  is not  the  customary  problem  of 
whether  or  not  Smith  employed  a  labour  theory of value,  but  why  he  was 
unable  to  do  so  successfully and  why  he  was  eventually  lead to  reject 
it in resorting to the expedient  but  theoretically inferior concept  of 
labour  commanded. 
Smith  sets  about  his analysis  of  the  'causes'  and  real measure  of 
value  1n  the first  few  paragraphs of  WN  Chapter Five,  and it is  here 
that  he  develops  the  labour-embodied  and  labour  commanded 
conceptions. 
The  advent of the division of labour is the  key  to Smith's explanation 
of the causes of value.  He  begins the chapter,  however,  not  directly 
with  the division of labour,  as one  might  have  expected,  but  with  a 
general  observation:  'Every  man  is rich or  poor  according  to  the 
degree  in which  he  can  afford to enjoy  the necessaries,  conveniences 
and  amusements  of human  life'  (39).  If Smith's intention  has  been 
interpreted correctly,  the question which  naturally  follows  is what  is 
the  determinant of the  degree  in which  these things  can  be  enjoyed? 
How  much,  1n  other words,  can  the  individual afford?  What  he  can 
afford depends  upon  the price he  must  pay  in order to acquire it.  The 
lower  the  price,  the more  he  can  afford and  enjoy;  the  higher  the 
price  the  less he  can  afford and  enjoy.  The  question,  therefore, 
which  must  be  answered,  is what  determines  price? 
20 Smith  answers  this question  1n  a  very  particular way.  The  original 
pr1ce  paid  for  everything is labour:  'The  real price  of  everything, 
what  everything really costs to  the  man  who  wants  to acquire  it,  1S 
the  toil and  trouble of acquiring it'  (40).  And  again:  'Labour  was 
the  first  price,  the original  purchase-money  that was  paid  for  all 
things'  (41).  The  cost of acquiring  any  particular  object  1S  the 
amount  of  labour  which  is required  to  produce it,  that  1S,  labour 
conceived  as  the objective cost of production  (42).  The  more  labour 
that  is required  to produce  an  object  and,  consequently,  the  greater 
the  cost of acquiring it, the  lesser the  degree  to  which  he  who  wants 
it  can  enjoy  'the necessaries,  conveniences  and  amusements  of  human 
life'.  The  less the quantity of labour  required  to  produce  things, 
the  greater  the  degree  in which  the  individual  can  afford  to  enjoy 
them.  Smith  is clearly employing  a  wider  definition of  'price'  than 
that  understood  by  modern  economic  theory. 
In  a  state of individual  isolation,  the  degree  to  which  the  individual 
can  enJoy  wealth is dependent  upon  how  much  labour  he  must  expend 
himself  1n  order  to acquire it.  Every  object of wealth  possesses  an 
objective  cost  of production,  calculated in  terms  of the  amount  of 
labour  required  to  produce it.  This,  however,  is  to  presuppose  a 
state of independence  in which  each  individual  disposes of his  labour 
1n  order  to acquire useful  items in  accordance  with  his  needs:  'But 
after  the division of labour  has  once  thoroughly  taken  place,  it  1S 
but  a  very  small  part of these with  which  a  man's  own  labour  can 
supply  him'  (43).  This  eventuality  does  not,  however,  contradict  the 
basic  prem1se.  If,  prior to  the  division of labour,  the  wealth  or 
poverty  of the  individual was  proportional  to  the  quantity of  useful 
21 objects  which  his  labour  could  procure  for  him,  his  new  need  for  the 
products  of others makes  his  wealth  or  poverty  proportionate  to  the 
quantity  of their labour,  as  embodied  in their products,  which  he  can 
now  command;  'and  he  must  be  rich or  poor  according  to  the  quantity  of 
that  labour  which  he  can  afford  to  command,  or  which  he  can  afford  to 
purchase'  (44).  It would  appear  that  Smith  has  already  abandoned  the 
labour  embodied  theory  of value  even  in  the  transition  from  a  state of 
isolated  independent  producers  to  a  state in  which  production  1S 
carried  out  according  to  a  division of labour  (45).  As  he  explains 
quite  unambiguously: 
The  value  of any  commodity,  therefore,  to  the  person  who 
possesses it, and  who  means  not  to  use  or  consume  it himself, 
but  to  exchange it for  other commodities,  is equal  to  the 
quantity  of  labour  which it enables  him  to  purchase  or 
command.  Labour,  therefore,  is the  real  measure  of  the 
exchangeable  value of all commodities  (46). 
On  the  evidence  of this passage,  the  labour-embodied  theory  of  value 
1S  written-out  of  many  accounts  of  Smith's  theory  of  value. 
Certainly,  it is possible to  agree  with  O'Brien  that  WN  Chapter  Five 
'is  arguably  (and  despite strong competition,  notably  from  Ricardo) 
the  most  convoluted  chapter ever  to  emerge  from  the  pen  of  a  great 
economist'  (47).  But  the convolution  occurs  because  the  ideas  which 
Smith  is grappling  with  are difficult.  One  of these  ideas is that  of 
equivalence  and it is his attempt  to tackle this problem  in  WN  I.V.2 
which  leads  to  the  suggestion  that restricting Smith  to  a  labour 
commanded  conception  of  the  measure  of value is to  say  the  least 
premature  and  at best  a  misunderstanding  of the nature  and  course  of 
his inquiries. 
It appears  that Smith's first  thought  1n  developing  a  'labour'  theory 
22 of  value  1S  the  relative one  of labour  commanded.  This  by  itself, 
however,  it not  enough  to explain  why  commodities  can  be  exchanged  1n 
equivalent  proportions.  What  is required is some  notion  of  their 
representing quantities of a  common  item.  This  seems  to  be  precisely 
what  Smith  is working  towards  when  he  says:  'What  everything  1S  really 
worth  to  the  man  who  has  acquired it,  and  who  wants  to dispose  of  it 
or  exchange it for  something  else,  is the toil and  trouble  which  it 
can  save  to  himself,  and  which  it can  impose  on  other  people'  (48). 
Smith  does  not  dispense  with  labour ~  se  but  the  particular  labour 
of producing  the  item  which  is to  be  acquired  through  exchange.  As  he 
points  out  in  the  very  next  sentence:  'What  is bought  with  money  or 
with  goods  1S  purchased  by  labour  as  much  as  what  we  acqu1re  by  the 
toil  of our  own  body'  (49).  The  possession  of money  or  goods  does 
not  do  away  with  the  necessity of labour.  They  represent  a  means  to 
acquire  the  product  of a  different  kind  of labour,  i.e.  through  their 
exchange.  But  their  exchange  presupposes  their  comparability  as 
commensurables.  And  it is only  as  commensurables  that  they  can  be 
exchanged  1n  definite proportions  (50).  Thus  Smith  concludes  that 
commodities  can  be  compared  and  exchanged  as  equivalents  because  they 
embody  equal  quantities of labour: 
It was  not  by  gold  or  by  silver,  but  by  labour,  that all  the 
wealth of the  world  was  originally  purchased;  and  its  value, 
to  those  who  possess it and  who  want  to  exchange it for  some 
new  productions,  is precisely  equal  to  the  quantity  of labour 
which it can  enable  them  to  purchase  or  command  (51). 
The  labour  embodied  and  labour  commanded  concepts  of the  measure  of 
value  appear  interchangeable  because  by  virtue  of  the  equivalence 
condition  they  are  by  definition of like magnitude.  However,  it  1S 
23 only  possible  to  think of the  labour  commanded  standard  because 
commodities  which  are  exchanged  in equivalent  proportions  embody  equal 
quantities  of labour.  Uppermost  in  Smith's  mind  is  the  proposition 
that  the  real  measure  of exchangeable  value  is the  amount  of  labour 
required  to  produce  things.  This  is in  turn  based  on  the  idea  that 
the  degree  to  which  the  individual  can  enjoy  'the  necessaries, 
convenlences  and  entertainments of human  life'  very  much  depends  upon 
the  quantity  of labour  which  he  has  to  expend  In  order  to  produce  or 
acquire  them.  This is the  real  or  original price  paid  for  all  things 
useful.  The  'labour  commanded'  standard  is a  derivation of this idea, 
and  its  definition  lS  initially  confined  simply  to  the  labour 
materialised  In  the  commodities  for  which  anything  exchanges,  the 
latter  representing  an  equal  quantity  of  embodied  or  materialised 
labour.  It  lS  not  until later that  this  definition  changes  to 
encompass  labour itself, i.e., living labour,  as  a  commodity,  and  one 
which  measures  the  value  of other  commodities. 
The  next  unambiguous  expresslon of Smith's  fundamental  concept  of 
value is contained  in the  opening  paragraph of  WN  Chapter  Six: 
In  that early  and  rude  state of society which  precedes  both 
the  accumulation  of stock  and  the  appropriation of land,  the 
proportions  between  the quantities of labour  necessary  for 
acquiring different objects  seems  to  be  the  only  circumstance 
which  can  afford  any  role  for  exchanging  them  for  one 
another.  If  among  a  nation  of hunters,  for  example,  it 
usually  costs  twice  the  labour  to kill a  beaver  which  it does 
to  kill  a  deer,  one  beaver  should  naturally  exchange  for  or 
be  worth  two  deer.  It is natural  that  what  is  usually  the 
produce  of two  days'  or  two  hours'  labour,  should  be  worth 
double  of  what  is usually  the  produce  of one  day's  or  one 
hour's  labour  (52). 
Taking  into  account  the  assumption  harboured  by  Smith's  'natural' 
supposition,  this illustration gives  full  account  of the  problems  of 
24 equivalence  and  commensurability  which  have  been  his  main  theoretical 
objective  thus  far.  It 1S  as  quantities of labour  that  commodities 
are  commensurables  and  as  equal  quantities of labour  that  they  are 
equivalents  (53).  From  a  quantitative point  of view,  the  magnitude  of 
value is the  same  whether it is expressed  in  terms  of the  quantity  of 
the  one  commodity  or  the  other.  Since  both  embody  the  same  quantity 
of labour it is equally  possible  to  say  that  the  real  value  of beaver, 
determined  by  labour-time  embodied,  is two  days,  or,  that it is  equal 
two  deer  or  two  days  of labour-time  commanded.  Smith  forcefully  makes 
this point  in  the  next  paragraph. 
Many  accounts  of Smith's  theory  of value  argue  that it contains  a  dual 
explanation  right  from  the start,  i.e.  both  the  labour  embodied  theory 
and  the  theory  that  values  are  measured  by  wages.  In  WN  1.V.3  Smith 
makes  it clear that this 1S  not  what  he  means.  The  exchange-value  of 
a  commodity,  it will  be  recalled,  was  defined  by  Smith  as  'the  power 
of  purchasing  other  goods  which  the  possess1on  of  that  object 
conveys' .  Reiterating  the  definition,  Smith  now  explains  that 
although  wealth  is power,  it is not  political power  which  1S  begot 
through  the  possession of wealth.  To  him  in  possess1on  of  wealth: 
'The  power  which  that possession  immediately  and  directly  conveys  to 
him,  1S  the  power  of purchasing;  a  certain  command  over  all  the 
labour,  or  over all the  produce  of labour  which  is then  in  the  market' 
(54).  This  passage  contains  one  of the  fundamental  antinomies  of 
Classical political economy.  In  his  attempts  to  explain profit,  Smith 
1S  unable  to  reconcile  the  labour-embodied  theory  of  the  value  of 
commodities  with  a  labour  theory  of the  value  of labour  - 1n  which  it 
appears  that  the  labourer  receives less than  what  he  glves.  The 
25 problem  which  Smith  cannot  resolve is how  the  value  of labour  can  be 
accounted  for  on  the  basis of a  labour  theory  of value.  He  lS  unable 
to  distinguish  the  peculiarity of labour  as  a  commodity  from  the 
generality  of commodities.  This  identity is further  reinforced  when 
he  goes  on  to  say:  'His  fortune  is greater  or  less,  precisely  ln 
proportion  to  the extent of this power;  or  to  the  quantity of  either 
of  other  men's  labour,  or,  what  is the  same  thing,  of the  produce  of 
other  men's  labour,  which  it enables  him  to  purchase  or  command'  (55). 
When  Smith  speaks  of labour  commanded,  it is  ambiguous  whether  he 
means  materialised  labour  or  living labour.  Labour  as  itself  a 
commodity,  l.e.  wage-labour,  has  not  yet  entered  the  theoretical 
picture.  Its  eventual  appearance  in  Smith's  account  occurs  ln  the 
context  of another  quite specific  problem  and  his  attempts  to  resolve 
it.  The  assumption  that  labour  commanded  refers  to  labour  as itself a 
commodity  from  the  outset,  runs  the  risk of not  fully  appreciating  the 
significance  either of its first  proper  appearance  or  the  problem  to 
which  it is addressed  as  a  possible solution  (56). 
V.  The  Problem  of Labour-Heterogeneity  and  some  Possible  Solutions 
Commodity-exchange  lS  a  relationship of equivalence.  But  the  nature 
of  this equivalence  poses  an  immediate  problem.  It cannot  arlse  out 
of the  natural  properties of the  objects  themselves  because  these  are 
not  homogeneous.  In  order  to  explain  as  what  commodities  are 
equivalent,  it  lS  first  necessary  to  explain  what  makes  them 
commensurable,  because  it  lS  as  quantities  of  what  makes  them 
commensurable  that  commodities  can  be  exchanged  as  equivalents.  This 
argument  is forcefully  stated by  practical illustration in  WN  I.VI.I. 
26 Commodities,  Smith  argues,  are  commensurable  because  they  are  the 
common  products of human  labour.  Containing  the  same  term,  they  can 
be  measured  and  consequently  exchanged  In  equivalent  proportions. 
This  lS,  however,  assuming  that all labours  can  be  measured  by 
conventional  units  of  time,  the  minute  hour  d  t  ,  ,ay  e  c.  This 
assumption  however  rests  In  turn  upon  another  that  of  labour-
homogeneity,  and  such  an  assumption  lS,  of  course,  unrealistic. 
Recognising  this,  Smith  identifies the  precise  problem: 
It is often difficult to ascertain  the  proportion  between  two 
different  quantities  of  labour.  The  time  spent  in  two 
different sorts of work  will  not  always  alone  determine  this 
proportion.  The  different  degrees  of hardship  endured,  and 
of ingenuity  exercised,  must  likewise  be  taken  into  account. 
There  may  be  more  labour  in  an  hour's  hard  work  than  in  two 
hours'  easy  business;  or  in  an  hour's application  to  a  trade 
which  it cost  ten  years'  labour  to  learn,  than  in  a  month's 
industry  at  an  ordinary  and  obvious  employment  (57). 
Labour,  Smith  explains,  differs not  only  as  to  kind,  but  also  in  the 
degree  of hardship,  ingenuity,  intensity,  and  skill with  which  they 
may  be  performed.  The  existence of  these  di fferences  cannot  be 
ignored  Slnce  to  do  so  would  simply  be  to  make  an  unrealistic 
assumption.  The  problem is,  how  are  they  to  be  taken  into account  In 
the  determination  of exchange-ratios? 
His  first  thoughts  on  the  problem  are  not  altogether  encouraglng; 
' ...  it is not  easy  to  find  any  accurate  measure  either of hardship  or 
ingenuity'  (58).  It  is  tempting  to  dismiss  this  simply  as  an 
observation  supported  by  common  sense.  There  is,  however,  more  to  it 
than  that.  Although  Smith  does  not  provide  us  with  any  clue  to  the 
argument  which  underwrites  this conclusion it is difficult to  believe 
that  he  would  not  have  contemplated  the  possibility of  there  being 
27 some  common  measure  for  labours of differing characteristics,  or  at 
the  very  least  some  shared characteristic which  overshadowed  their 
differences  and  established their essential unity  (59).  Even  if there 
were  some  characteristic,  however,  this would  still not  resolve  the 
practical  problem  of comparing  one  kind  of labour  with  another.  With 
this  practical conception of the  problem  in mind,  he  next  offers  for 
consideration  an  equally practical solution. 
In  exchanging  indeed  the different productions  of  different 
sorts  of labour  for  one  another,  some  allowance  is  commonly 
made  for  both.  It is adjusted,  however,  not  by  any  accurate 
measure,  but  by  the  haggling  and  bargaining of  the  market, 
according  to  that sort of rough  equality which,  though  not 
exact,  is sufficient  for  carrying on  the  business of  common 
life  (60). 
There  being  no  accurate  common  measure  of the  duration  of  different 
labours,  the  necessary  adjustment  has  to  be  made  in  the  market-place. 
For  a  number  of reasons this has  to  be  regarded  as  a  retreat  on 
Smith's  part.  Firstly, it fails  to  provide  a  coherent  account  of 
exchange-ratio  determination.  Hitherto  Smith  has  been  at  palns  to 
point  out  that  a  theory  of value  must  include  an  element  of  regular 
determination.  With  this solution that condition is broken  and  an 
indeterminable  random  element  lS  introduced  into  the  theory. 
Secondly,  in  the  way  that it is presented  by  Smith it  lS  inherently 
circular.  After  attempting  to  use  labour-time  as  an  explanation  of 
phenomena  In  the  market,  Smith is compelled  to  argue  In  reverse  In 
order  to  resolve  the  awkward  problem  of  labour-heterogeneity. 
Thirdly,  and  certainly  the  most  damaging,  is his introduction of  the 
living-labour  commanded  concept  of the  measure  of value.  The  superior 
value  of the  products of qualified labour,  he  explains, 
28 may  fr~quently be  no  more  than  a  reasonable  compensation  for 
the  t1me  and  labour  which  must  be  spent  in  acquiring  them. 
In  the  advanced  state of society,  allowances  of  this  kind 
~or  superior  hardship  and  superior skill,  are  commonly  mad~ 
1n  the  wages  of labour;  and  something  of the  same  kind  must 
probably  have  taken  place  1n  its  earliest and  rudest 
period  (61). 
Meek  1S  not  altogether convinced  that  the  charge  of circularity is one 
that  is borne  out  (62).  Smith,  he  argues,  does  not  suggest  that  the 
reduction  of  skilled  to  unskilled  labour,  and  pari  passu  of  more 
intensive  to less intensive,  'should  be  carried out  by  referring  to 
the  rewards  actually  received  1n  the  market  by  the  labourers 
concerned'  (63).  However,  what  Meek  has  failed  to  recognise is  that 
the  'rewards'  of  which  he  speaks  are  none  other  than  wages,  an 
element  which  1S,  this far  at least,  alien to  the  basic  model  of 
commodity  production  with  which  Smith  has  been  working.  As  the  above 
reference  taken  from  WN  1.VI.3  shows,  Smith  quite explicitly  suggests 
that  just as  adjustments  are  made  in the  wages  of labour  to allow  for 
differences  in skill 1n  the  advanced  states of society,  so  must  such 
adjustments  have  also taken  place  in its earliest states.  But  since, 
as  Smith  himself  points  out,  the earliest states  of  society  are 
defined  as  prior  to  the  accumulation  of stock  and  the  appropriation of 
land,  it is difficult to see  how,  without  either profit or  rent,  there 
can  be  wages.  The  result is not  just circularity,  but  anachronism 
(64). 
It  1S  difficult to say  whether  or  not  Smith  thought  in  these  terms 
about  his  proffered solution to  the  problem of labour  heterogeneity. 
That  he  was  dissatisfied with it is plain  to see, it being  one  of  the 
few  occasions  on  which  he  resorts to special  pleading  and  appeals  to 
29 'sufficiency'.  With  this general dissatisfaction In  mind,  on  Smith's 
part,  his  thought  now  turns  a  new  corner,  albeit  one  that  has  always 
been  In  view:  'But  although  labour  be  the  real  measure  of  the 
exchangeable  value  of all commodities,  it lS  not  that  by  which  their 
value  lS  commonly  estimated'  (65).  At  this point  Smith  begins  to 
tread  a  path  which  will  lead  him  away  from  his original conception  of 
the  measure  of  value,  i.e.  labour-time,  to  the  relative  concept 
favoured  by  virtually every  school  of orthodox  economic  thought  since: 
'Every  commodity  besides,  lS  more  frequently  exchanged  for,  and 
thereby  compared  with,  other  commodities  than  with  labour.  It is more 
natural,  therefore,  to  estimate its exchangeable  value  by  the  quantity 
of  some  other  commodity  than  by  that of the  labour  which  it  can 
purchase'  (66) .  However,  not  before  he  has  explained  what  lS 
preventing  him  from  coherently  formulating  the  labour  theory  of value: 
The  greater  part of people  too  understand  better  what  lS 
meant  by  a  quantity  of a  particular  commodity,  than  by  a 
quantity  of labour.  The  one  is a  plain  and  palpable  object; 
the  other  an  abstract notion,  which,  though it can  be  made 
sufficiently  intelligible,  is not  altogether  so  natural  and 
ob v  i 0 u  s  (67). 
Smith's  thought  lS  forced  to  make  this turn  because  he  can  see  no 
solution  which,  In  practice,  can  solve  the  problem  of  labour-
heterogeneity.  Homogeneous  labour is simply  an  'abstract  notion' 
which  appears  to  possess  no  counterpart in reality where  labours  are 
characterised  by  their particularities  (68). 
Following  this  expedient  shift in his  consideration  of  the  value 
problem,  Smith  devotes  the  greater part of the  rest of Chapter  Five  to 
a  preoccupied,  but  ultimately  frustrated  and  unsatisfying pursuit of a 
standard  measure  of value.  At  various  points money,  corn  and  labour 
30 are  considered  as  candidates  for  the  post.  But  his  presentation 
becomes  awkward  and  confused  with  different trains of thought  running 
counter  to  one  another.  For  example,  he  explains at  one  point:  'Gold 
and  silver  ...  like  any  other commodity,  vary  in  their  value,  are 
sometimes  cheaper  and  sometimes  dearer,  sometimes  of  eaSler  and 
sometimes of more  difficult purchase'  (69).  But  after rejecting gold 
and  silver on  the  grounds  of their variability,  he  proceeds  to qualify 
his  general  observation that commodities  as  a  whole  are  subject  to 
fluctuations  in  value  in  the  case  of labour:  'Labour  alone  ...  never 
varying  1n  its own  value,  is alone  the  ultimate  and  real standard  by 
which  the  value  of all commodities  can  at all times  and  places  be 
estimated  and  compared'  (70).  Henceforward,  the  'labour  theory  of 
value',  if such it can  be  called,  enjoys  at most  a  vestigial existence 
in the  concept  of  'labour  commanded': 
But  though  equal  quantities of labour  are  always  of  equal 
value  to  the  labourer,  yet  to  the  person  who  employs  him  they 
appear  sometimes  to  be  of greater  and  sometimes  of  smaller 
value.  He  purchases  them  sometimes  with  a  greater  and 
sometimes  with  a  smaller quantity  of goods,  and  to  him  the 
price  of labour  seems  to  vary  like that of all  things.  It 
appears  to  him  dear  in the  one  case,  and  cheap  in the  other. 
In  reality,  however,  it is the  goods  which  are  cheap  in  the 
one  case  and  dear  in  the  other  (71). 
It  1S  difficult  to see  in this  formulation  anything  other  than  a 
retreat on  Smith's part  from  his initial understanding  in  which  value 
1S  distinguished  from  exchange-value.  The  distinction  has  been 
collapsed,  obscuring  the  problems  of equivalence  and  commensurability, 
but  not,  it has  to  be  said,  reducing  ln  any  way  their  pertinence  to 
the  construction of a  coherent  theory  of value. 
31 VI.  Smith's  Contribution 
It can  be  argued  that  Smith  successfully identified the  crux  of value-
theory  ln  the  problems  of equivalence  and  commensurability,  rejecting 
ln  due  course  the  notion  of value  as  mere  prlce.  Armed  with  a 
distinct category of value,  he  then  identifies its substance  as  labour 
and  its magnitude  as  determined  by  labour-time.  This is the  theory  of 
value  for  which  there is textual  evidence  within  Smith's work.  It has 
been  necessary,  therefore,  to reject other  interpretations of the  same 
text  where  appropriate.  In  the  main  those  interpretations  which 
either  explicitly or  implicitly deny  the  presence  of  a  recognisable 
labour  theory  of value  in  Smith's work  have  been  rejected.  The  reason 
for  rejecting  them  is that  they  are  based  on  a  misinterpretation  of 
the  nature  of  Smith's  inquiry  and  of  the  questions  he  considers 
pertinent  to  the  development  of a  theory  of value.  Those  questions 
are of central significance in the  development  of  any  adequate  theory 
of  value  and  the  fact  of Smith's  failure  to  supply  satisfactory 
answers  to  them  ln  no  way  diminishes  the  importance  of  his 
contribution. 
period.  Many 
Smith's  influence,  however,  extended  beyond  his  own 
of  the  problems  which  he  addressed  and  some  of  his 
solutions  resurface  ln  the  work  of Ricardo,  and  it is to  this  work 
that it is now  necessary  to  turn. 
32 NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  ONE 
1.  Throughout  I  refer  to  the edition of  the  Wealth  of  Nations 
prepared  by  R.  M.  Campbell  and  A.  S.  Skinner  in  1976  for  the 
Oxford  pUblication  of  the  Glasgow  Edition  of  the  Works  and 
Correspondence  of Adam  Smith. 
2.  In  a  book  the  purpose  of  which  1S  to  explain  the  ma1n 
characteristics  of each  of Smith's  works,  Campbell  and  Skinner 
omit  from  their  account  of  WN  any  reference  whatever  to  the 
theory  of value  which  it contains.  Explaining  that  the  'first 
and  most  obvious  problem  in  the  context of the  exchange  economy 
1S  that  of price  and  its determinants'  (Campbell  and  Skinner, 
1982.  Emphasis  as  1n  original),  they  proceed  to  19nore  the 
material  in  WN  Chapters  Four  and  Five,  in which  Smith  explains 
the  necessity  of making  a  distinction  between  value  and  price,  in 
favour  of the  Neo  -classical interpretation of Smith.  One  of the 
principle  characteristics  of  NeD-classical  economics  1S  its 
treatment  of these  categories as  one  homogeneous  form,  resulting 
in,  amongst  other things,  a  travesty  of the  aim  of explaining the 
determinants of price. 
3.  Roll,  for  example,  notes  the peculiarity of  the  location  of 
Smith's initial probing  of the  problem of value  but  1S  unable  to 
make  anything  of it except  to  conclude  negatively  that  Smith  was 
simply  getting  'it out  of the  way  before  beginning  the  really 
important  work,  the  analysis of  exchange-value'  (Roll,  1966, 
136).  The  argument  of this chapter is that  Smith  considers  the 
distinction  between  the  two  definitions of the  term  value  where 
33 he  does  because  his examination  of money  has  led  him  to  conclude 
something  about  the  nature of value  which  cannot  be  said of  use-
value. 
4.  For  Marx's  critique of the  Classical School's unhistorical method 
of investigation see  Chapter  Three. 
5 .  WN  1. I I . 1. 
6.  'Every  man,  as  long  as  he  does  not  violate the  laws  of  justice, 
1S  left perfectly  free  to  pursue  his  own  interest his  own  way, 
and  to  bring  both his  industry  and  capital into competition  with 
those  of  any  other  man,  or  order of men'.  WN  IV.IX.51.  An 
obvious  corollary of this  freedom  would  be  to  pursue  one's  self 
interest through  specialisation. 
7.  WN.1.IV.l 
8.  Loc  Cit. 
9.  Loc  Cit. 
10.  WN.  1.IV.2 
11.  Loc  Cit. 
12 .  WN •  1. I V  . 3 
13 .  WN .  1. I V  . 4 
14.  Loc  Cit.  In  Leviathan,  Hobbes  explains  that  a  medium  of 
exchange  must  also  be  portable,  'as not  to  hinder  the  motion  of 
men  from  place  to  place;  to  the  end  a  man  may  have  in what  place 
34 soever,  such  Nourishment  as  the  place affordeth'.  Hobbes,  1976, 
300. 
15.  Loc  Cit. 
16.  Loc  Cit. 
1 7 •  WN.  1. I V  • 7 
18.  Loc  Cit. 
19.  Loc  Cit. 
20.  Smith's  treatment of money  as  a  commodity  with  a  value,  i.e.  like 
any  other  commodity,  is superior  to  the  subjective explanation  of 
the  'value'  of gold  offered  by  Hobbes:  'For  Gold  and  Silver, 
being  (as it happens)  almost  in all countries of the  world  highly 
valued,  lS  a  commodious  measure  of the  value  of  all  things 
between  nations;  and  Mony  (of what  matter  soever  coy ned  by  the 
Sovereign  of  a  Commonwealth),  is a  sufficient  measure  of  the 
value  of . all 
commonwealth' . 
things  else,  between  the  subjects  of  that 
Hobbes,  1976,  300.  It lS  the  discovery  of  the 
commodity-nature  of  money  that is one  of  the  achievements  of 
Aristotle  that  Marx  singles  out  for  inclusion  In  his  own 
theoretical work.  See  Chapter  Three  below. 
21.  Since  Smith  deals more  fully  with  the  distinction  In  WN  Chapter 
Five  further  exploration of his  views  on  this is  best  reserved 
until  the  appropriate  time. 
22 .  WN .  1. I V  . 12 
35 23.  Loc  Cit. 
24.  WN.  45n. 
25.  WN.  I.IV.13 
26.  Commenting  on  Smith's explanation of the  different  meanings  of 
the  word  value,  according  to whether it is taken  to  mean  'value 
in  use'  or  'value ln exchange',  Marshall  advises:  'But  experience 
has  shown  that  it lS  not  well  to  use  the  word  ln  the  former 
sense'.  The  reason  for  this reservation,  he  explains,  is because 
value,  or  as  he  uses  alternatively  price,  'is 
provisionally  to  represent  general  purchasing  power'. 
ln  the  special  sense  defined  by  Smith,  cannot  therefore 
taken 
Utility, 
be  the 
cause  of exchange-value,  which  lS,  as  Marshall  himself has  just 
explained,  something  general  by  nature.  Unfortunately,  Marshall 
does  not  recognise that it is impossible  to  speak  of  exchange-
value  without  first explaining  how  commodities  are  commensurable, 
l.e.  how  they  can  be  compared  for  the  purposes  of exchange.  As 
he  goes  on  to explain:  'The  value,  that is the  exchange-value,  of 
one  thing  ln  terms  of another  at  any  time  and  place,  lS  the 
amount  of that  second  thing  which  can  be  got  there  and  then  ln 
exchange  for  the  first.  Thus  the  term  value  is  relative,  and 
expresses  the  relation between  two  things at a  particular  place 
and  time'.  There  can  be  no  relationship between  two  commodities 
ln  exchange  unless  they  are  commensurable,  because it  lS  only 
after their commensuration,  i.e.  their  'translation'  into  quanta 
of  some  common  term  that they  can  be  compared.  Declining  to 
investigate  value,  Marshall,  echoing  Hobbes,  Locke  and  every 
36 shade  of mercantilist  thought  from  the  seventeenth century  to  the 
present  day,  opts  for  the miraculous  measuring  powers  of gold  and 
silver:  'Civilised countries generally  adopt  gold  or  silver  or 
both  as  money.  Instead of expressing  the  values of lead  and  tin, 
and  wood,  and  corn  and  other  things  in  terms  of one  another,  we 
express  them  in  terms of money  in  the first instance;  and  call 
the  value  of each  thing thus  expressed its  price'.  Marshall, 
1920,  II.ii.6.  The  circularity of this  reasoning  seems  to  have 
escaped  Marshall.  It did  not  escape  Marx,  from  whose  theory it is 
possible  to  develop  a  critique of the utility-theory.  See  below 
Chapter  Three. 
27.  Having  'distinguished value  in  use  and  value  in exchange',  Smith, 
says  Schumpeter,  'dismisses  the  former  by  pointing  to  what  has 
been  called  above  the  'paradox  of value'  - which  he  evidently  did 
believe  to  be  a  bar  to progress  on  this line  - thereby  barring, 
for  the  next  two  or  three generations,  the  door  so  auspiciously 
opened  by  his French  and  Italian  predecessors'. 
1954,  309. 
28.  Loc  Cit. 
29.  Loc  Cit. 
Schumpeter, 
30.  Hollander,  1975,  136.  He  continues:  'The  proposition  amounts  to 
an  insistence that physical  properties of commodities  are  quite 
irrelevant to  the  determination of exchange-value.  It lS  solely 
this  category  of  utility  which  Smith  rejected  as  a  value 
determinant  and,  indeed,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  exchange-
value'.  Loc  Cit. 
37 31.  Ibid,  137. 
32 .  WN .  1.  i v . 13 
33.  Hollander,  1973,  137. 
34.  'It  lS  sometimes  suggested that if Smith's attention could  have 
been  drawn  to  the  marginal  utility theory  of value  he  would  have 
welcomed  it  as  affording  the  basis  for  a  solution  of  the  so-
called  'paradox  of value'  which  was  exemplified  in  the  water-
diamond  illustration.  But  quite apart  from  the  fact  that  there 
lS  no  evidence  that  Smith  ever  looked  upon  the  apparent 
discrepancy  between  'value in use'  and  value  in  'exchange'  as  if 
it  were  a  paradox  requiring solution,  it cannot  be  too  strongly 
emphasised  that any  approach  to  the  problem  of the  determination 
of value  from  the  side of utility and  demand  (as  opposed  to  that 
of  cost  and  supply)  would  have  been  regarded  by  him  as  quite 
alien  to  the  general  outlook of the  Wealth  of  Nations',  Meek, 
1973,  73. 
35.  'In  order  to  investigate the  principles  which  regulate  the 
exchangeable  value  of commodities,  I  shall  endeavour  to  show, 
First,  what  is the  real measure  of this exchangeable  value;  or, 
wherein  consists  the real price of all  commodities,  Secondly, 
what  are  the  different parts of which  this real price is composed 
or  made  up.  And  lastly,  what  are  the  different  circumstances 
which  sometimes  raise  some  or all of these different  parts  of 
prlce  above,  and  sometimes  sink  them  below  their  natural  or 
ordinary  rate;  or,  what  are  the  causes  which  sometimes  hinder  the 
38 • 
market  price,  that is,  the  actual  pr1ce  of  commodities,  from 
coinciding exactly  with  what  may  be  called their natural  price'. 
WN.  I.IV.14-17.  The  overwhelmingly  quantitative  conception  of 
the  value-problem  held  by  Smith  1S  an  important  key  to 
understanding  why,  having  successfully extracted the  category  of 
value  from  the  random  appearance of the  exchange-relation,  he  1S 
unable  to  solve many  of the  subsequent  problems  which  ar1se  1n 
the  course of developing  the  category  further.  Some  aspects  of 
Smith's  thought  are criticised by  Ricardo,  but it is  not  until 
Marx  that  it becomes  clear how  the  further  development  of  the 
value-category is to  be  elaborated. 
36.  WN.  I.IV.IB. 
37.  The  absence  of this dual  conception  in Ricardo's  work  helps  to 
explain  why  economists  in  the  Neo-classical  school  favour  Smith 
rather  than  Ricardo.  The  latter's unambiguous  commitment  to  the 
labour-embodied  theory  of value  has  generally  put his work  at  a 
discount  in  the  twentieth century,  where  even  Sraffa,  his  most 
serious  defender,  particularly against  the  misinterpretations 
favoured  by  J.  H.  Hollander  and  E.  Canaan,  feels  unable  to  make 
anything  of the  labour  theory of value.  Robinson,  however,  1S 
simply  mischievous  when  for  altogether  different  reasons  she 
explains that the  difference  between  Marshall  and  Ricardo  is just 
a  matter  of scale! 
3B.  Labour  commanded  is a  commodity  like any  other.  For  that  reason 
it  cannot  be  the  value of any  other  commodity,  no  more  than  1n 
the  exchange  of shoes  for  money,  the  money  is the  form  of  value 
39 of the  shoes. 
39.  WN.  1. V .1. 
40 •  WN.  1. V  • 2 
41.  Loc  Cit. 
42.  Blaug  writes:  'The  "real value"  of a  commodity  1S  its  labour 
pr1ce,  meaning  by  labour  not  a  certain  number  of  man-hours  but 
units  of  disutility,  the  psychological cost  of  work  to  the 
individual,  and  meaning  by  value,  esteem  value  rather  than 
exchange-value'.  Blaug,  1968,  52.  Halevy,  in his study  of  the 
sources  of  the doctrine of Utilitarianism,  also  favours  this 
subjective  interpretation  of  Smith's  theory  of  value:. 'The 
"natural"  measure  of value  results,  according  to  Adam  Smith,  from 
the  comparison  made  between  the  amount  of pain  suffered,  or  if 
you  like,  of pleasure sacrificed,  to  produce  the object,  and  the 
amount  of  pleasure  which  1S  expected  to  result  from  the 
acquisition  of  the  object,  whether  this  acquisition  occurs 
directly  through  labour  or  indirectly  through  labour  followed  by 
exchange'.  Halevy,  1972,  94.  What  underlies  these 
interpretations  1S  the  marginalist  notion  of  labour  as 
'disutility'.  Clearly,  in the  context of Smith's  thought  on  the 
labour  commanded  measure  of value,  there is some  room  for  just 
such  an  interpretation.  However,  to  argue  that this is  Smith's 
only  conception is without  foundation.  In  his  working  out  of the 
idea  of  value,  Smith  explains  that  commodities  exchange  as 
equivalents  because  they  embody  some  item  in  the  same  amount. 
40 This  lS  an  objective conception  of value  which  does  not  coincide 
with  the  subjectivism of marginalist  thought  and  the  concept  of 
labour  as disutility.  It is difficult to  see,  for  example,  how 
Smith's  explanation  of  value  can  be  reconciled  with  the 
interpretation  recommended  by  Hollander.  The  concept  of 
'ultimate psychic cost'  is an  idea which  is as  alien  to  Smith  as 
the  concept of demand  which  Hollander  attempts  to  foist  onto  WN. 
I.iv.13.  Hollander,  1975,  129.  The  problem  with  these  kind  of 
interpretations  lS  that  they  fail to  recognise  that  'labour 
commanded'  lS  very  much  of secondary  importance  in  Smith's theory 
of  value.  What  has  to  be  explained  lS  the  process  or  chain  of 
reasoning  by  which  he  is led  to  abandon  his  primary  conception  of 
value  - 'labour  embodied'.  To  interpret  Smith  as  being,  from  the 
outset,  involved  in  a  search  for  a  solution to the  'index-number' 
problem,  as  Schumpeter,  Hollander  and  Blaug  would  have  him,  is to 
ignore  the  process  by  which  Smith  arrives at  the  category  of 
value,  and  having  arrived there,  proceeds  to explain  why  it  lS 
different  from  both  exchange-value  and  use-value.  The  index-
number  problem  lS  an  entirely  formal  invention  of  orthodox 
economic  thought  which  possesses  no  counterpart  In  Smith's 
political economy. 
43.  WN.  I.V.l 
44.  Loc  Cit. 
45.  To  speak  of  value  In  the  context  of  a  state  of  isolated 
independent  self-subsistent producers  would  be  inappropriate.  It 
is  only  with  exchange  that there arises the  need  to  compare 
41 products  as  'values'.  Despite Smith's unhistorical  understanding 
of the  relationship  between  value  and  labour,  the  very  fact  that 
he  makes  the  connection  between  them  distinguishes his political 
economy  from  that strand of economic  thought  which  has  to  yet 
distinguish  between  use-value  and  value.  An  example  of  such 
confusion  lS  cited  by  the editors  of  the  WN.  Criticising 
Smith's  identification of value  with  labour,  Pownall  says:  'We 
must  consider  also the objects  on  which  labour is employed;  for 
it  is  not  simply  the  labour,  but  the  labour  mixed  with  these 
objects,  that  lS  exchanged;  it is the  composite  article,  the 
laboured article;  some  part of the  exchangeable  value is derived 
from  the  object  itself •.. '  WN.  I.V.3n.  Pownall  does  not 
realise  that  it is necessary  to  draw  the  distinction  between 
value  and  use-value in the  explanation of  the  proportions  at 
which  commodities  exchange.  Consequently,  his  own  explanation of 
exchange-ratios  would  be  incoherent  Slnce  there is no  space  In 
his account  for  tackling the  problem  of commensurability.  Smith 
is also criticised,  on  the  same  grounds,  by  J-B  Say. 
points 
between 
out,  in Smith's defence,  it is necessary 
the  production  of useful  objects,  the 
to 
As  Ricardo 
distinguish 
substance  of 
wealth,  and  the  production of value,  into  which  no  physical 
properties of the object enter.  See  Chapter  Two. 
46.  Loc  Cit. 
47.  O'Brien,  1975,  82. 
48.  WN.  I.V.2 
49.  Loc  Cit. 
42 50.  At  this point  Smith  says:  'That  money  or  those  goods  indeed  save 
us  this toil.  They  contain the  value of a  certain  quantity  of 
labour  which  we  exchange  for  what  is supposed at  the  time  to 
contain  the  value  of an  equal  quantity'.  Loc  Cit.  Smith's 
reference to the  'value'  of labour,  in effect,  the  wage,  1n  this 
context  1S  a  product  of the  thought  that  all  commodities, 
including  labour,  exchange  as equivalents.  Thus  it 1S  possible 
for  him  to identify labour  as  a  commodity  with  the  quantity  of 
labour-time  which  is embodied  in commodities.  As  long  as  Smith 
presupposes  the  pre-capital  'natural state',  labour-embodied must 
equal  labour  commanded.  It  is then  only  a  short  step  to 
identifying the  wage  as  a  measure  of value  since by  definition it 
is the  equivalent of the  quantity of labour  actually embodied  1n 
the  commodities. 
51.  Loc  Cit. 
52.  WN.  I.VI.l 
53.  Schumpeter,  unlike  Hollander,  for  example,  is prepared  to  allow 
that  there  is sufficient ambiguity  in  Smith's  account  of  the 
problem  to  admit  an  interpretation 1n  terms  of  the  labour-
embodied  theory  of value.  However,  he  1S  only  prepared  to  admit 
that  this is a  product  of Smith's  ambiguous  presentation  rather 
than  of  his  conscious  design.  Smith,  Schumpeter  explains, 
'considers the quantity of labour  a  commodity  can  command  1n  the 
market  the  most  useful  substitute for its price 1n  money,  that is 
to  say  he  chooses  labour  for  numeraire',  Schumpeter,  1954,  310. 
43 This  account  ignores  an  important  factor  in  Smith's  explanation. 
In  that  explanation,  Smith  points  out  that  exchange  1S  a 
relationship  between  equivalents,  a  relationship which  moreover 
presupposes  the  commensurability  of  the  articles  exchanged. 
Commodities  are  commensurable  as  values.  The  quantity of  value 
which  each  commodity  represents is its natural  value  or  real 
value  as  opposed  to its relative value  as  expressed 1n  terms  of 
some  quantity of another  commodity.  Schumpeter  does  not  explain 
why  it should  have  occurred  to  Smith  to substitute anything  for 
the  money-price of commodities.  Smith,  however,  is adamant  upon 
this  point.  The  money-price  of commodities  is an  expression  of 
their  relative value.  If one  wants  to explain  why  commodities 
possess  relative  values of this magnitude  and  not  others  one 
needs  to explain their real  value,  which  is,  as  he  has  argued, 
their  values  as  determined  by  labour-time.  The  operation of  any 
numera1re,  in  Smith's  terms,  is problematical  because  it  would 
always  beg  the  question of its own  commensurability  with  the 
commodities  which it is supposed  to measure  the  value  of.  Not 
understanding  this aspect of Smith's  theory,  Schumpeter  finds  his 
own  account  of Smith  difficult to sustain;  Smith,  he  says,  'seems 
himself as little clear about  what  is and  what  is not  implied  1n 
choosing  something  for  numeraire'.  The  lack of clarity 1S  not  1n 
Smith,  but  in  Schumpeter's  attempt  to  shepherd  him  into the  Neo-
classical  fold.  Cf.  Hollander,  1975,  127-8.  Schumpeter's 
comments,  however,  might  apply  to  Ricardo.  See  Chapter  Two. 
54.  WN.  I.V.3. 
55.  Loc  Cit. 
44 56.  'In  a  society  characterised  by  the  division  of  labour,  the 
exchange  of  commodities  is in essence  the  exchange  of  social 
labour. 
started. 
This  was  the  simple  abstraction  from  which  Smith 
It might  have  been  thought,  therefore,  that  he  would 
have  concluded  that  the  'real measure'  of  the  value  of  a 
commodity  was  the guantity  of labour  embodied  in  the  other  goods 
for  which it would  exchange  on  the  market.  But  in actual  fact  he 
concluded  that  the  'real measure'  of the  value  of a  commodity  was 
the  guantity  of labour  for  which it would  exchange  on  the  market. 
It  was  in this decision  to make  commandable  labour  rather  than 
the  labour  embodied  in commandable  commodities  the  'real measure' 
of  value  that  most  of the difficulties associated with  Smith's 
theory  of value  had  their origin.'  Meek,  1973,  63-4.  This latter 
suggestion  lS  arguably  true.  But  at  this  stage  In  his 
presentation,  the  measurement  of the  value  of commodities  by  the 
quantity of living labour  which  they  can  purchase,  as  opposed  to 
materialised  labour,  lS,  whilst  present  In  Smith's  account, 
merely  a  source of ambivalence.  It could  be  argued  that  the  maln 
point  is not  at what  stage  Smith  introduced the  concept  of  the 
living  labour-commanded  measure  of value,  but  that  his  theory 
suffers  from  the  basic  flaw  of dualism.  This  lS,  for  example, 
the  view  of I.  I.  Rubin.  Rubin,  1979,  186-7.  It lS  important, 
however,  to  recognise  where it makes  its first real introduction, 
because  Smith  resorts to  the  living  labour-commanded  standard  in 
a  subtle but  unmistakable  re-definition of the  problem of  value 
as  a  means  of  resolving  the  awkward  problem  of  labour-
heterogeneity.  Arguing  that both  concepts of value  are  present 
45 all  along  and  that  therein lies the  source of Smith's  confusion 
obscures  the  basic contradiction which  Smith  introduces into  his 
theory  when  faced  with  the  necessity  of  accounting  for 
differences  between  one  kind  of labour  and  another,  and  of  their 
relative skill and  intensity. 
57 •  WN •  1. V  • 4 
58.  Loc  Cit. 
59.  Kay  and  Mott  argue  that a  theory  of natural equivalence  underlay 
the  Classical  labour  theory  of value  which  said  that  labours 
belonging  to different individuals were  naturally equivalent  by 
virtue  of the  individuals  common  humanity.  Kay  and  Mott,  1982, 
51.  The  natural equality of individuals was  as taken  for  granted 
by  the political economists  of the  eighteenth century  as  their 
natural inequality was  by  Aristotle: 
'There  was  ...  an  important  fact  which  prevented Aristotle  from 
seelng  that to attribute value to  commodities,  is merely  a  mode 
of expressing all labour  as equal  human  labour,  and  consequently 
as  labour  of  equal quality.  Greek  society  was  founded  upon 
slavery,  and  had,  therefore,  for  its  natural  basis,  the 
inequality of men  and  of their labour-powers.  The  secret of  the 
expression  of value,  namely  that all kinds of labour  are  equal 
and  equivalent,  because  and  so  far  as  they  are  human  labour  ln 
general,  cannot  be  deciphered,  until the  notion  of human  equality 
has  already  acquired  the  fixity  of a  popular  prejudice.  This, 
however,  is possible only  in  a  society in  which  the great  mass  of 
46 60. 
the  produce  of labour  takes  the  form  of commodities,  1n  which, 
consequently,  the  dominant  relation  between  man  and  man,  is  that 
of owners  of commodities.'  Marx,  1970,  65-6. 
WN.  1.V.4.  'If the  one  spec1es of labour  should  be  more  severe 
than  the  other,  some  allowance will naturally  be  made  for  this 
superior  hardship;  and  the  produce  of one  hour's  labour  1n  the 
one  way  may  frequently  exchange  for  that of two  hours  1n  the 
other.'  WN.  1.V1.2. 
61 .  WN.  1. V  1. 3 
62.  Meek,  1973,  76. 
63.  Loc  Cit. 
64.  'At  the  very  start  of its  enquiries  political  economy  was 
confronted  with  the  consequences  of its  naturalistic  prem1ses; 
attempting  to  explain exchange  (the  market)  in  terms of  labour, 
it was  forced  at the outset  to  go  into reverse  and  use  the  market 
to  determine  the  quantity  of labour.  This  problem  and  the 
attempt  at  a  solution recur  1n  all the writings of natural  law, 
where,  time  after time,  the origins  and  mechanisms  of  political 
society  are  explained pragmatically  in  terms  derived  from  the 
finished  forms  of this society.'  Kay  and  Mott.  loc  cit.  In 
his  defence  of  Smith's  explanation,  against  the  charge  of 
circularity,  Meek  1S  already  thinking of how  to  defend  Marx 
against  the  same  charge. 
65 •  WN .  1. V  . 4 
47 66.  WN.  I.V.S 
67.  Loc  Cit. 
68.  This  turn  1n  Smith's  thoughts is also identified  by  Wieser  who 
describes  it  as  the  substitution of an  'empirical'  measure  of 
value  for  a  'philosophical'  measure  of value.  Wieser.  Cited  1n 
Hollander,  1904,  23.  The  'philosophy'  in  Smith's  case,  being 
that  which  affirms  the  innate equality of human  labours,  if  only 
to  leave  their  heterogeneous  empirical  characteristics 
problematical  for  any  theory  of value.  Smith's adoption  of  an 
'empirical'  i.e.  in reality,  a  relative measure  of value,  1S  a 
retreat  from  his initial conception of value  which  is  formulated 
1n  terms  of their commensurability  and  equivalence.  Focusing 
exclusively  on  the  problem of discovering  the  measure  of  value, 
the  problem  of  the  'cause'  or  the  'substance'  of  value  1S 
eliminated  from  Smith's account  altogether.  Paradoxically,  it is 
precisely  in the context of the  problem of the  measure  of  value 
that  Ricardo  reintroduces the  notion  of the  'causes'  of value. 
69.  WN.  I.V.7 
70.  Loc  Cit. 
71.  WN.  I.V.8.  Ricardo's  critique  of  this  passage  1S  an 
important  component  of  his  own  contribution  to  the 
development  of the  labour  theory  of value.  See  Chapter  Two. 
48 CHAPTER  TWO 
RICARDO  ON  THE  LABOUR  THEORY  OF  VALUE 
I.  Introduction 
The  greater part of Ricardo's  thought  on  the  labour  theory  of value is 
devoted  to  the  discovery  of a  measure  of value  which  is  consistent 
with  the  basic principle of labour  embodied  (1).  In this chapter,  it 
lS  the  intention to examine  the  content of this  thought  and  where 
possible  offer  some  assessment  of its results in  terms  of  Ricardo's 
stated  objectives.  Part  of  those  objectives  and  the  means  for 
attaining  them  are  derived  from  the  tradition of  political  economy 
which,  it could  be  said,  culminates with  Ricardo.  The  purpose of this 
chapter is to  examine  Ricardo's  thought  as  the  theoretical  high  point 
of  political  economy  with  a  Vlew  to  identifying  its  principal 
problems. 
Much  of what  Ricardo  has  to offer  on  the  problem  of value  itself  lS 
transmitted  via  a  review  of  the  work  of  his  predecessors  and 
contemporaries,  most  notably  Smith,  Say,  de  Tracy,  Lauderdale,  Malthus 
and  Torrens.  Although  often polemical  In  tone,  these  reVlews  are 
analytical in substance  and  provide  a  rich source  from  which  the chief 
characteristics of Ricardo's  own  thought  on  the  nature of value  can  be 
distilled.  Of  particular  importance  In  the  development  of  his 
conception  of  value  are his critiques of,  In  turn,  Smith's  dual 
conceptions  of  the  value  substance,  Say's  utility  theory,  and 
Lauderdale's  demand  and  supply  explanation. 
Upon  extracting  the  category  of value  from  the  encumbrances  placed 
49 upon  it by  his predecessors,  Ricardo  proceeds  to  analyse  the  problem 
of its measurement.  At  this point,  the  progress  of Ricardo's  thought 
is  brought  to  a  halt by  the  problem previously  encountered  by  Smith. 
In  order  to  measure  the  'real'  values of commodities  by  reference  to 
labour-time it 1S  necessary  to discount  the different  characteristics 
of  each  kind  of  labour.  Practically admitting  that  this  1S  an 
impossible  theoretical  operation to  perform,  Ricardo  1S  forced  to 
retreat  into  the expedient,  but 
'invariable  measure  of  value'. 
admittedly  theoretically  inferior 
Whilst  the  structure  of  Smith's 
account  of value  possessed an  inherent  dualism,  thus  allowing  a  re-
definition  of  the  value-problem in  terms  of  relative-value,  albeit 
problematically,  no  such  dualism exists in  Ricardo's  account,  and 
consequently  he  1S  forced  into an  inconsistency  which  reveals  the 
weakness  of the  Classical account  of the  labour  theory  of value  as  a 
whole. 
In  the  first part of the  account  given  here of Ricardo's  contribution 
to  the  development  of the  labour  theory  of value,  his  critiques  of 
Smith  and  Malthus  in which  he  extracts the category  of labour-embodied 
from  labour-commanded  are  examined.  This  takes  place in  part  two. 
The  third part examines  how  he  secures this theory  in  his 
against  the  utility  and  scarcity theories  of  Say  and 
respectively.  The  fourth  part  exam1nes  his  thought 
arguments 
Lauderdale 
on  the 
'invariable measure  of value',  concluding that this falsely  conceived 
problem is nothing  other  than  an  unsuccessful  formulation  of the  real 
problem  of  value-theory,  viz.,  the  nature of  value-creating  labour 
itself. 
50 II.  'Labour  Embodied'  and  the Fallacy  of  'Labour  Commanded' 
In  Chapter  One,  section  one  of the  Principles  (2),  Ricardo  proposes  an 
explanation of exchange-ratio  determination  which  is indistinguishable 
from  Smith's original conception of labour-embodied: 
In  the  early stages of society,  the  exchangeable  value  of ... 
commodities,  or  the  rule  which  determines  how  much  of  one 
shall  be  given  in exchange  for  another,  depends  almost 
exclusively  on  the  comparative  quantity of labour  expended  on 
each  (3). 
Citing  Smith's authority,  1n  particular the  passages at  WN  I.V.2  and 
I.VI.l,  he  adds: 
That  this is really the  foundation  of the  exchangeable  value 
of  all things,  excepting  those  which  cannot  be  increased  by 
human  industry,  is a  doctrine of the  utmost  importance  1n 
political  economy;  for  from  no  source  do  so  many  errors  and 
so  much  difference of opinion in that science  proceed,  as 
from  the  vague  ideas  which  are  attached  to  the  word  value 
(4). 
The  larger  part of PPE  Chapter  One,  section one,  is taken  up  1n  an 
examination of some  of those errors,  differences of opinion  and  vague 
ideas,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  theories  of  Smith  and 
Malthus  which  are  reviewed  in turn.  The  object of the  reV1ew  1S  to 
clarify  the  nature  of the  problem of value,  and  to  establish  the 
conditions  which  any  acceptable  solution must  satisfy.  As  if  to 
dispel  any  doubts  as  to the  nature  of  his  own  theory,  Ricardo 
explains:  'If the quantity of labour  realised 1n  commodities,  regulate 
their  exchangeable  value,  every  increase of the  quantity  of  labour 
must  augment  the  value of that  commodity  on  which  it is exercised,  as 
every  diminution  must  lower it'  (5).  Ricardo,  we  can  say,  shares  the 
view  held  by  Smith  that  commodities  exchange  in  proportions  determined 
51 by  equivalent  quantities  of labour.  The  greater  the  quantity  of 
labour  that  lS  required  to  produce  a  particular commodity,  all  other 
things  being equal,  the  greater  the  quantity of other  commodities  for 
which it will  exchange  and  vice-versa. 
Ricardo  distinguishes  his theory  from  Smith's by  formulating  it  In 
more  quantitatively  coherent  terms  (6).  Thus,  midway  through  his 
presentation  of  Smith  and  Malthus  he  glves  the  following  curt 
explanation  of the object of a  theory  of value:  'Two  objects  vary  In 
relative value,  and  we  wish  to  know  In  which  the  variation has  really 
taken  place'  (7).  From  the outset,  one  circumstance  stands in  the  way 
of  a  direct  solution  to  the  problem.  An  examination  of  the 
proportions in which  commodities  exchange  does  not  of itself  discover 
the  cause  of the  change  in their relative value  Slnce it is impossible 
to  determine  whether  an  lncrease or  decrease  in the  relative  value  of 
a  commodity  is a  product of a  rlse in its own  unit-value in  addition 
to  which  or alternatively  a  decrease  in the  unit-value of the  other, 
or  In  the  latter  case  from  a  decrease  in  its  own  unit-value  In 
addition  to  which  or alternatively  an  increase in the  unit-value  of 
the  other.  Explaining  changes  in relative  value is therefore  a  two-
fold  problem,  firstly that of identifying the  source of  the  change, 
which  may  lie with  one  or  both  commodities,  and  secondly,  that  of 
identifying  the  cause of the  changes  in value  in the  first  instance 
(8). 
His  proffered  solution  to  the  first problem  lS  explained  In  the 
following  terms: 
If  we  compare  the  present  value  of  one,  with  shoes, 
stockings,  hats,  iron,  sugar,  and  all other  commodities,  we 
52 find  that it will  exchange  for  precisely  the  same  quantity of 
all these things as  before.  If we  compare  the  other with  the 
same  commodities,  we  find it has  varied with  respect  to  them 
all:  ~e  may  then  with great  probability  infer  that  the 
varIatIon  has  been  in  the  commodity,  and  not  in  the 
commodities  with  which  we  have  compared it (9). 
By  comparing  the  past  and  present relative values  of both  commodities 
against  the  various  commodities  for  which  they  exchange,  it  IS 
possible,  argues  Ricardo,  to identify which  of the  two  has  undergone  a 
change.  The  question  begged  therefore is what  IS it that  has  actually 
changed?  Observation,  according  to  Ricardo,  has  clearly  shown  that 
the  relative value  of a  particular commodity  has  changed  because it no 
longer  exchanges  for  other things  in the  proportions that it once  did. 
This,  however,  does  not constitute the explanation  of  the  change. 
Movements  In  relative  or  exchangeable  value  are  determined  by 
movements  In  a  commodity's  value  - and  this is  connected  with  the 
circumstances of its production: 
If  on  examining  still  more  particularly  into  all  the 
circumstances  connected with  the  production of these  varIOUS 
commodities,  we  find  that precisely  the  same  quantity  of 
labour  and  capital are necessary  to  the  production  of  the 
shoes,  stockings,  hats,  iron,  sugar,  etc.;  but  that  the  same 
quantity  as  before is not  necessary  to  produce  the  single 
commodity  whose  relative value is altered,  probability  IS 
changed  into certainty,  and  we  are sure that the  variation IS 
in  the  single commodity;  we  then  discover  also the  cause  of 
its variation  (10). 
According  to  Ricardo,  value is the  product  of  labour,  and  labour 
alone.  What  causes  the  relative values  of commodities  to change  is  a 
change  in their values  and  these values  are  in turn  determined  by  the 
quantity of labour  required to  produce  them  (11).  Observation of  the 
relative values  of commodities cannot,  in itself,  explain  the  causes 
of  their  change.  In  order to explain  the  causes  of  change  In  the 
53 values  of commodities it is necessary  to abstract to what  they  possess 
ln  common  because it is this which  determines their respective  values. 
The 
this 
notion of value  purely  as relative or  exchangeable  value 
essential  point.  Ricardo  thus  concurs  with  Smith's 
mlsses 
original 
notion  of  labour-time  as  the  immanent  measure  of  the  value  of 
commodities.  The  greater  part  of  his  disagreement  with  Smith, 
however,  relates to  the latter's subsequent  thought  on  the  measure  of 
value. 
Smith,  suggests  Ricardo,  who  possessed  an  otherwise correct conception 
of  the  immanent  measure  of the  value  of  commodities,  'has  himself 
erected  another  standard measure  of value'.  'Sometimes  he  speaks  of 
corn,  at  other  times  of labour,  as  a  standard  measure;  not  the 
quantity  of labour  bestowed  on  the  production of any  object,  but  the 
quantity  which  it can  command  ln the  market.'  (12)  Consequently, 
commodities,  according  to  Smith,  are valuable  in proportion  to  the 
quantity of labour  which  they  will  command. 
Ricardo's  objection  to Smith's alternative measure  of  value  is  an 
objection  to  the  assumption  made  by  Smith  after  establishing  that 
equivalence is a  necessary  condition of exchange.  If commodities  are 
equivalent,  the  value of X commodity  A can  be  measured  either by  the 
labour  required  to produce it, or  the  labour  required  to  produce  Y 
commodity  B for  which it exchanges.  Beyond  this point  Smith  separates 
the  labour  embodied  in  Y commodity  B from  the  physical product  itself 
and,  treating  it as itself a  commodity  sold at  a  prlce  (the  wage) 
employs  the  wage,  signifying  a  quantity  of labour  commanded,  as  a 
measure  of the  value  of other  commodities.  What  Ricardo  objects  to 
is  Smith's speaking of the  labour  embodied  as  X commodity  A  and  the 
54 labour  embodied  in  Y commodity,  measured  by  the  wage  paid  to it 'as if 
these  were  two  equivalent  expressions'  (13).  Excusing  the 
anachronistic  usage  of the  term  'wage',  under  the conditions  of  the 
model  of the  'rude state'  the  two  items  mentioned  are  quantitatively 
equal.  Qualitatively,  however,  they  are not,  a  point  reinforced  1n 
Smith's  employment  of the wage  category in this context.  Labour  sold 
as  a  commodity,  like anything else,  is sold at a  value  and  price.  It 
1S  tautological  to explain  values  by  values.  A conflation of  labour 
embodied  with  a  quantity  of labour  commanded  leads  to  the  false 
conclusion  that  wages,  i.e., the  value of labour,  are  equal  to  the 
quantity  of  labour  which  is supplied  by  the  labourer:  'and  as  if 
because  a  man's  labour  had  become  doubly  efficient,  and  he  could 
therefore  produce  twice  the  quantity  of  a  commodity  he  would 
necessarily  receive  twice  the  former  quantity  1n  exchange  for  it' 
(14).  However,  this  1S  not  just a  point  about  Smith's  erroneous 
theory  of the  wage  (which,  it might  be  pointed out,  Ricardo  shared  to 
some  extent)  but  explains  an  important  point  about  the  value-
relationships  between  commodities: 
If this indeed  were  true,  if the  reward  of the  labourer  were 
always  in  proportion to what  he  produced,  the  quantity  of 
labour  bestowed  on  a  commodity  would  purchase,  would  be 
equal,  and  either might  accurately  measure  the  variations  of 
other  things:  but  they  are not equal;  the  first is under  many 
circumstances  an  invariable standard,  indicating  correctly 
the  variations of other things:  the latter is subject to  as 
many  fluctuations  as  the  commodities  compared  with it (15). 
Smith's explanation  would  not  only  be  circular because it uses  a  value 
to explain  a  value,  but  because  any  commodity  employed  as  a  measure  of 
value  is subject  to  fluctuations  in its own  value,  thus  begging  the 
question  of how  this change is measured.  A solution to  the  problem  as 
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measure  the  values of other  commodities  would,  in turn,  imply  another 
which  could  measure  the  value  of the  measure  of value,  and  so 
infinitum. 
an 
Smith  himself  was  not  unaware  of this problem,  as  shown  in  his 
ad 
own 
rejection  of gold  and  silver as  suitable standard measures  of  value. 
But  then  Smith  was  simply  inconsistent:  'Adam  Smith,  after most  ably 
showing  the  insufficiency  of a  variable medium,  such  as  gold  and 
silver,  for  the  purpose of determining  the  varying  value  of  other 
things,  has  himself,  by  fixing  on  corn  or  labour,  chosen  a  medium  no 
less  variable'  (16).  Gold,  silver and  corn,  as  commodities,  are 
subject to  fluctuations  in value  just as  any  other:  'Is not  the  value 
of  labour  equally variable',  asks  Ricardo,  'being not  only  affected, 
as all other  things are,  by  the  proportion  between  the  supply  and  the 
demand,  which  uniformly  var1es  with every  change  1n  the  condition  of 
the  community,  but  also  by  the  varying  pr1ce  of  food  and  other 
necessarles,  on  which  the  wages  of labour  are  expended'  (17)  ?  The 
measurement  of  value  by  wages  (signifying  quantities  of  labour 
commanded)  leads  to  a  confusion of value  and  exchangeable  value, 
'things  perfectly  distinct'.  As  the  following  illustration  shows, 
Smith,  and  subsequently  Malthus,  are led into  circularity  by  not 
properly  drawing  the essential distinction: 
If  I  have  to hire  a  labourer  for  a  week,  and  instead of  ten 
shillings  I  pay  him  eight,  no  variation having  taken place in 
the  value  of money,  the  labourer  can  probably  obtain  more 
food  and  necessaries,  with  his eight  shillings,  than  he 
before  obtained  for  ten:  but this is owing,  not  to  a  rise  1n 
the  real  value of his wages,  as stated by  Adam  Smith,  and 
more  recently  by  Mr.  Malthus,  but  to  a  fall  in  the  value  of 
the  things  on  which  his wages  are  expended  (18). 
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can  purchase  with eight shillings 1S  greater  than  the quantity  which 
he  buys  with  ten.  Conflating real  value  with relative  value,  Smith 
argues  that  the  real  value of labour,  compared  with  other  things,  has 
r1sen.  Without  the  erroneous  conflation,  argues  Ricardo,  the  true 
state  of  affairs is revealed.  The  labourer's  consumption  has  not 
r1sen  because  his real wage  has  risen,  but  because  the  fall  1n  the 
value  of  the  things  on  which  his wage  is spent is greater  than  the 
resulting fall in the real value  of his wages.  In  the context of  any 
movement  in relative values it is necessary  to discover  the  cause  of 
the  movement  and  the  identity of the  commodity  which  has  changed  1n 
value.  Superficiality in the  understanding of the  nature of value  1S 
in  keeping  with  the  approach  Malthus  adopts  throughout  his works.  In 
Smith's  case,  the  superficial expedient of labour  commanded  represents 
a  retreat  from  an  earlier and  superior theoretical position. 
The  distinction  between  value  and  exchange-value is a  necessary  one  in 
Ricardo's  understanding of exchange-ratios.  Whilst  this 1S  implicit 
to  his  thought  throughout  the  Principles,  he  only  begins  to  concern 
himself  with  the distinction 1n  an  explicitly practical way  1n  his 
last  paper  on  Absolute  Value  and  Exchangeable  Value  (19).  The  paper 
itself  1S  largely  devoted  to  a  consideration  of  the  varied 
possibilities  of  an  'invariable measure  of value',  this  item,  of 
course,  occupying  much  of the theoretical  space  in  Chapter  1  of  the 
Principles  (20).  The  paper  does  not,  however,  occupy  itself with  the 
invariable  measure  of value  problem  alone.  As  the title suggests,  it 
is also  concerned with that  which  has  been  pointed  out  with  respect  to 
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it  sometimes  'real'  or  'natural'  value.  In  an  early  draft  of  the 
paper  Ricardo  contrasts his  own  view  with that of  the  'relativist' 
conception of value  favoured  by  Colonel  Torrens: 
Colonel  Torrens  does  not  scruple to confound  two  things  which 
ought  to  be  kept  quite distinct  - if a  piece  of  cloth  will 
exchange  for  less money  than  formerly  he  would  say  that cloth 
had  fallen  in  value  but  he  would  also  say  that  money  had 
r1sen  in  value  because it would  exchange  for  more  cloth. 
This  language  may  be  correct  aw  he  uses it to  express  only 
exchangeable  value  but  in Political Economy  we  want  something 
more,  we  desire  to  know  whether it be  owing  to  some  new 
facility  in manufacturing cloth that its diminished  power  1n 
commanding  money  is owing,  or  whether it be  owing  to  some  new 
difficulty  in  producing  money.  To  me  it  appears  a 
contradiction  to  say  a  thing  has  increased in natural  value 
while  it continues to  be  produced  under  precisely  the  same 
circumstances as  before  (21). 
Torren's  contradiction results  from  his not  considering  any  problem 
deeper  than  that of observing  and  recording changes  in  the  apparent 
exchange-ratios  1n  which  commodities  exchange.  Consciously 
distinguishing  his  own  theoretical efforts  from  this  superficial 
approach,  Ricardo  devotes  his  thought  to the  causes  of  change  1n 
exchange-ratios  and  an  account  of how  the magnitudes of  such  change 
are  determined.  Hitherto,  however,  Ricardo  has  done  little to  secure 
the  category  of real value itself other  than  to suggest  that  one  can 
make  very little sense of the causes  of quantitative  change  without 
it.  What,  then,  it would  seem  natural to  ask,  does  Ricardo  offer  1n 
terms  of a  theoretical  foundation  for  the  category of value? 
In  the  later unfinished draft of his last paper,  Ricardo  places  the 
conditions of equivalence  and  commensurability at the  forefront  of his 
investigations.  Exchangeable  value,  he  says,  1S  relative:  'By 
exchangeable  value  1S  meant  the  power  which  a  commodity  has  of 
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reference  whatever  to its absolute  value'  (22).  It is the  peculiarity 
of  exchange-values,  however,  to  be  equivalent  1n  exchange:  'Any 
commodity  having  value  will  measure  exchangeable  value,  for 
exchangeable  value  and  proportional  value  mean  the  same  thing'  (23) 
Proportionate  equality  between  two  different  things is only  possible 
if  they  are  regarded  as  proportions of some  item which  1S  common  to 
both.  According  to  Ricardo,  quantities of different  commodities  are 
said  to  be  proportionately equal  because  they  both  represent  like 
quantities  of value.  Each  commodity  is a  quantity  of  value.  Equal 
quantities  of value  can  be  exchanged  as  equivalents.  Consequently, 
commodities  which  differ  1n  their useful  forms  can  exchange  as 
equivalents,  in proportions equal  to  the  value  they  contain. 
The  distinction between  exchangeable  and  real  value  1S  evident  from 
the  exchange-relation  itself,  as  Ricardo  proceeds  to  show  1n  an 
argument  later to  be  used  by  Marx: 
By  knowing  that  an  ounce  of  gold will at  any  particular time 
exchange  for  two  yards of cloth,  ten  yards  of  linen,  a 
hundredweight  of s8gar,  a  quarter  of wheat,  three  quarters of 
oats,  etc.,  etc.,  we  know  the  proportional  value  of all these 
commodities  and  are enabled  to  say  that  a  yard  of  cloth  is 
worth  5  yards  of linen,  and  a  quarter of wheat  three  times 
the  value of a  quarter of oats  (24). 
An  ounce  of gold  possesses  many  exchange-values:  two  yards  of  cloth, 
ten  yards  of linen,  a  hundredweight  of sugar,  a  quarter  of  wheat, 
three quarters of oats,  etc.,  indeed,  as  many  exchange-values  as  there 
are  commodities  for  which  gold itself  will  exchange.  The  very 
possibility  of  these  different exchange-values  shows  that  1n  the 
calculation  of  their exchange-ratios  on  the basis  of  proportionate 
59 equality  they all represent  something  equal,  i.e.  something  equal 
quantity.  But  slnce  as  useful objects  they  exchange  In  unequal 
quantities,  as  equivalents  they  must  be  quantities of something  other 
than  their  various  useful qualities.  Or,  putting  it  another  way, 
cloth  can  only  represent  the  exchange-value  of one  ounce  of gold,  if 
cloth  lS  present  in the appropriate quantity,  i.e.  two  yards.  In 
their  useful  qualities,  gold  and  cloth possess different  forms.  As 
what  then,  are  gold  and  cloth,  and  all the  other  items  for  which  gold 
can  exchange,  equivalents?  It is irrelevant to  the  gold  whether  its 
value is represented in cloth,  linen,  sugar,  wheat  or  oats,  providing 
that  whatever  medium  the  value  of gold is expressed  in,  it is  present 
In  the  appropriate quantity.  Consequently,  the  item  sought  for  lS 
common  to  all  commodities  but  distinguishable  from  their  varied 
natural  forms.  As  like things,  commodities  are  values.  Each  lS  a 
quantity  of what  Ricardo  calls natural,  real or  absolute  value  (25). 
The  conditions of equivalence  and  commensurability,  however,  are  by  no 
means  new  to  Ricardo  only  with  his writing of  the  last  paper  on 
Absolute  Value  and  Exchangeable  Value.  They  are already  contained  In 
the  Principles,  where  they  are  tackled in  some  detail in Chapter  20, 
'Value  and  Riches:  Their  Distinctive Properties'.  'I  cannot  agree 
with  M.  Say',  explains  Ricardo,  'in  estimating  the  value  of  a 
commodity,  by  the  abundance  of other commodities'  (26). 
I  am  of  the  oplnlon of a  very  distinguished  writer,  M. 
Destutt  de  Tracy,  who  says that  'To  measure  anyone  thing  is 
to  compare  it with  a  determinate  quantity of that same  thing 
which  we  take  for  a  standard of comparison,  for  unity.  To 
measure,  then,  to  ascertain  a  length,  a  weight,  a  value,  is 
to  find  how  many  times  they  contain metres,  grammes,  francs, 
in  a  word,  unities of the  same  description  (27) 
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comparing  them  with  some  standard means  of measurement,  the  metre  1n 
the  case of length,  and  the  gramme  in that of weight.  But  what  is the 
measurement  of value?  According  to  de  Tracy,  the  conventional  measure 
of  value  1S  monetary,  for  example,  the  franc.  This  explanation, 
however,  is by  itself insufficient to  account  for  value  because  not 
all  examples  of exchange  involve  money,  e.g.,  direct  barter.  A 
quantity of money  is only  a  representation of value,  not  value itself. 
As  Ricardo  goes  on  to explain:  'A  franc  is not  a  measure  of value  for 
anything,  but  for  a  quantity of the  same  metal  of which  francs  are 
made,  unless  francs,  and  the  thing to be  measured,  can  be  referred  to 
some  other  measure  which  1S  common  to both'  (28).  The  franc  is only  a 
nominal  measure  of value,  being  no  more  than  a  name  for  a  quantity  of 
some  specified metal  of a  certain size,  weight  and  shape. 
represent  the  exchange-values  of  the  commodities  for 
exchanges  because  both it and  they  are  quanta  of the  same 
It can  only 
which  it 
homogeneous 
substance,  and  in  terms  of which  the  values  of all  commodities  are 
measured:  'This  I  think,  they  can  be,  for  they  are  both  the  result  of 
labour;  and  therefore,  labour  1S  a  common  measure,  by  which  their real 
as  well  as  their relative value  may  be  estimated'  (29).  As  values, 
commodities  are  solely considered as quantities of labour,  differing 
only  in  terms  of  the  respegtive quantities  of  value  which  they 
represent.  The  measure  of value is labour-time.  As  equal  quantities 
of  labour-time,  commodities  are  equivalents,  and 
proportions  based  on  equalities of labour-time  (30). 
exchange  1n 
Ricardo  consolidates  his  explanation of value  by  considering  the 
alternative theories of Say  and  Lauderdale  as  examples  of the  sorts of 
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which  make  the  category  of value  necessary  to its operation. 
III.  Utility  And  Demand  And  Supply  (Scarcity) 
This  interpretation of the  nature of Ricardo's  concept  of value  can  be 
reinforced  by  the  conclusions that can  be  drawn  from  an  examination  of 
his  critical commentary  on  rival theories of value.  A large  part  of 
this  commentary  is to  be  found  in the  aforementioned  Chapter  20  of the 
Principles.  However,  his  opening  critical  remarks  upon  rival 
conceptions  of value  are  to  be  found  on  the  first  page  of Chapter  1. 
The  first  argument  marshalled  by  Ricardo  against  general  utility 
theory is more  in the  nature of an  observation.  To  be  precise,  it  1S 
a  recollection of the  observation  formed  by  Smith  in  the  concluding 
paragraphs  of  WN  Chapter  4.  It will  be  recalled that these  are  the 
paragraphs  1n  which  Smith  draws  a  distinction between  use-value  and 
exchange-value.  Citing these  same  passages,  Ricardo  remarks: 
Water  and  air  are  abundantly  useful;  they  are  indeed 
indispensable  to  existence,  yet,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  nothing  can  be  obtained  for  them.  Gold,  on 
the  contrary,  though  of little use  compared  with  air  or 
water,  will  exchange  for  a  greater quantity  of  other  goods 
(31). 
He  concludes,  as  Smith  before  him  had  done,  that there is no  specific 
relationship  between  an  object's utility and  its exchangeable  value: 
'Utility  then is not  the  measure  of exchangeable  value'  (32).  Utility 
rather,  is a  necessary  condition  for  an  object  to  take  the  form  of the 
commodity,  but  does  not  explain its exchange-value:  'If  a  commodity 
were  1n  no  way  useful,  - in other  words,  if it  could  1n  no  way 
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exchangeable  value'  (33).  Possessed of no  utility,  commodities  would 
cease  for  which 
they 
to  exist as  such  because  there  would  be  no  purpose 
could  be  exchanged.  Therefore whilst  use-value  1S 
precondition 
a  necessary 
for  commodity-exchange it is so  only  to  the  extent  that 
without it commodities  would  not  be  exchanged. 
Throughout  the  Principles,  Ricardo  follows  Smith's  account  of the  two-
fold  nature of the  commodity  quite closely.  Smith's  definitions  of 
the  two  parts  of  the  commodity  are,  however,  theoretically 
underdeveloped  and  possess  the  character of preliminary  observations. 
What  further  development  Smith  does  make  with  them  is restricted to  a 
brief,  but  nevertheless  important,  explanation of  the  particularity 
and  non-commensurability  of commodities  as  use-values,  as  against  the 
generality  and  commensurability  of commodities  as  exchange-values. 
Ricardo  takes  these  preliminary  conceptions  formed  by  his 
and  develops  them  further,  particularly  1n  Chapter 
predecessor 
20  of  the 
Principles,  where  they  are subjected  to  r1gorous  analytical scrutiny. 
Smith's observation  1S  Ricardo's point of departure:  '''A  man  is rich or 
poor',  says  Adam  Smith,  'according to  the  degree  in  which  he  can 
afford  to  enjoy  the  necessaries,  conveniences,  and  amusements  of human 
life'"  (34).  In  a  state of abundance,  however  conceived,  the  very 
question  of the  degree  to  which  wealth  can  be  enjoyed  does  not  ar1se. 
Wealth  1S  appropriated  directly without  the  medium  of  exchange. 
Outside  the state of abundance,  the  degree  to  which  wealth  1S  enjoyed 
1S  dependent  on  the ability to  pay.  Wealth  1S  scarce  only  1n  relation 
to  the  quantity  of labour  which  is required  to  produce it.  Wealth  1S 
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wealth  1S  exchanged,  it is not its own  abundance  or  scarcity  which 
determines  its value,  but its abundance  or  scarcity relative  to  the 
quantity  of  society's  prime  scarce  resource  expended  on  its 
production,  i.e.,  human  labour:  'Value,  then essentially differs  from 
riches,  for  value  depends  not  on  abundance,  but  on  the  difficulty  or 
facility  of production'  (35).  The  utility of individual  objects  1S 
fixed  by  their physical,  chemical,  i.e. material properties,  and  1S 
therefore invariant irrespective of however  much  of other  things  they 
will  exchange  for,  or  however  much  labour is expended  upon  them: 
A  man  1S  rich  or  poor,  according  to  the  abundance  of 
necessaries  and  luxuries which  he  can  command;  and  whether 
the  exchangeable  value  of these  for  money,  for  corn,  or  for 
labour,  be  high  or  low,  they  will equally contribute to  the 
enjoyment  of their possessor  (36). 
The  substance of riches  1S  the  substance  of wealth itself,  and  this  1S 
nothing  other  than  the  qualities of each  useful  artefact  produced  to 
serve  some  need.  The  greater  the  quantities  of  each  that  are 
available,  the  greater is the store of wealth  and  vice-versa.  But 
wealth  and  riches,  however  great  or  small,  must  not  be  confused  with 
value  which  1S  dependent  on  the quantities of  labour  required  to 
produce  each  of the objects which  constitute the  substance of wealth. 
Ricardo  illustrates the  kind  of contradictions which  analysis  can  get 
into in  failing  to  adequately  distinguish  between  utility and  value  by 
providing  an  extended  commentary  on  the  theoretical component  of J.  B. 
Say's  Traite  d'Economie  Politique.  Praising  the  corrections which  Say 
had  made  to his  work  for  its fourth  edition,  Ricardo  however  1S  still 
unsatisfied  with  the  treatment of one  particular item:  'M.  Say 
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riches  and  value'.  Expanding  on  the  source  of his dissatisfaction,  he 
claims 
man  1S 
that  Say  'considers  these  two  terms  as  synonymous,  and  that 
rich  1n  proportion  as  he  1ncreases  the  value  of 
a 
his 
possess1ons,  and  is enabled  to  command  an  abundance  of  commodities' 
(37).  In  treating riches  and  value  as  identical,  Say  is led  back  to 
the  tautological explanation of value  favoured  by  Malthus,  and  later 
by  Bailey,  resulting  in the  following  kind  of  truistic  and  non-
explanatory  statement:  'The  value  of incomes  is increased  ... if  they 
can  procure  ...  a  greater quantity of products'  (38). 
In  the  first  and  second  editions of the  Principles,  Ricardo  considered 
Say's  theory  from  a  different  angle  that  of  its  internal 
consistency.  An  examination  of the  ma1n  steps in  Say's  theory  of 
exchange-ratio  determination  shows  its  basic  components  to  be 
inconsistent  with  one  another.  These  main  stages are  presented  as 
follows:  objects  are  regarded  as  valuable  because  they  possess 
utility.  To  create objects which  possess utility is to  create riches, 
and  'the utility of things is the  first  foundation  of their  value,  and 
it  is the  value  of things  which  constitutes riches'  (39).  From  the 
outset,  Say  operates with  preliminary definitions of  value,  utility 
and  riches  as if they  were  mutually  interchangeable.  Keeping  this 
fact  firmly  in  mind,  the  inconsistency  in Say's  thought  1S  introduced 
1n  the next  stage of analysis.  Productive activity,  Say's  argument 
continues,  1S  the  rearrangement  of matter  in  new  and  different  forms. 
The  forms  under  which  matter is reproduced  are  different  forms  of 
utility.  Production is thus  the  imparting of a  new  utility,  hence  a 
new  form,  to matter  in place of its original  form:  'Production  then  1S 
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value  arising  from  the  utility  of  the  object  produced  (40). 
'Productions'  are  measured  by  the  quantity  of utility  they  possess. 
Their  utility is their value.  Finally:  'The  utility of  any  object, 
according  to  general estimation,  is pointed  out  by  the  quantity  of 
other  commodities  for  which it will exchange'  (41).  Say,  according  to 
Ricardo,  fundamentally  misunderstands  the distinction between  utility 
and  exchangeable  value: 
If  by  an  improved  machine  I  can,  with  the  same  quantity  of 
labour,  make  two  pairs of stockings  instead of one,  I  in  no 
way  impair  the  utility of one  pair of stockings,  though  I 
diminish  their value  (42). 
The  production  of two  pairs of stockings  with  the  same  quantity  of 
labour  that was  required  on  a  previous occasion  to  produce  one  places 
Say  in  a  dilemma.  Has  the  value  of one  pair of stockings  halved  or 
has  the total quantity of value  produced  doubled?  In  the  first  case 
value  lS  measured  by  the  quantity  of  utility  imparting  activity 
required  to  produce  one  pair of stockings,  in  the  second it  lS  the 
total quantity  of utility itself which  is deemed  to indicate the  value 
of  the  stockings.  If the  value  of stockings  lS  reduced,  lS  the 
utility  of stockings  impaired?  The  answer,  for  Say,  must  be  In  the 
affirmative since  value  and  utility are  synonymous.  Finally,  Ricardo 
criticises the circularity of Say's explanation: 
If  we  ask  M.  Say  in what  riches consist,  he  tells us  in  the 
possession of objects having  value.  If we  then  ask  him  what 
he  means  by  value,  he  tells us  that things  are  valuable  In 
proportion  as  they  possess utility.  If again  we  ask.h~m  to 
explain to us  by  what  means  we  are  to  judge  of the utlllty of 
objects,  he  answers  by  their  value.  Thus  then  the  measure  of 
value is utility,  and  the measure  of utility is value  (43). 
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the  case of determining  the magnitude  of value after a  change  1n  the 
productivity  of  labour.  After  a  doubling  of  productivity,  1S  it 
correct  to  argue  that the  value of each  unit  produced  has  halved  or 
that  the  total value  of the  product  has  doubled?  Say  cannot  reconcile 
these  questions.  His  problem  stems  from  a  superficial  analysis  of 
exchange  which  looks  no  further  than  the  empirical  fact  of  the 
exchange  of two  different commodities.  An  examination of the  nature 
of  exchange  reveals the  condition of equivalence  which  1n  turn  rests 
upon  the  condition  of commensurability.  If Say  had  examined  the 
latter, it would  have  become  clear that use-value  cannot  be  the  basis 
upon  which  commodities  are quantitatively compared  (44). 
The  role of utility in Say's explanations of value  leads  him  to  the 
idea  that the  values of commodities  are  determined  by  their  relative 
scarcity.  Ricardo  also considers this possibility,  but  confines it to 
a  particular class of commodities:  'There  are  some  commodities,  the 
value  of which  is determined  by  their scarcity alone'  (45).  Scarcity 
1S  the  key  factor  in  the  determination of their values  because  they 
are  not  subject to  the possibility of reproduction:  'No  labour  can 
1ncrease the  quantity of such  goods,  and  therefore their value  cannot 
be  lowered  by  an  increased supply'  (46).  Most  commodities  are 
reproducible,  and  merely  require  the direction of  labour  to  their 
production,  their values  varying  with  the  quantity  required: 
By  far  the greatest part of those  goods  which  are  the  objects 
of  desire,  are  procured  by  labour;  and  they  may  be 
multiplied,  not  in  one  country  alone,  but  in  many,  almost 
without  any  assignable limit, if we  are  disposed  to  bestow 
the  labour  necessary  to obtain  them  (47). 
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supply  1S  fixed,  considered  by  Ricardo,  and  these  are  commodities 
which  are  monopolised.  Their  values  are  determined,  however,  not  by 
their  scarcity,  but  by  their cost of production  in  terms  of  labour 
under  conditions  of  monopoly.  Confusing  monopoly  with  scarcity, 
Lauderdale  is led  into believing that  a  reduction  in the quantity  of 
'riches'  actually  increases  the  quantity  of wealth: 
Let  water  become  scarce,  says  Lord  Lauderdale,  and  be 
exclusively  possessed  by  an  individual,  and  you  will  increase 
his riches,  because  water will  then  have  value:  and  if wealth 
be  the  aggregate of individual riches,  you  will  by  the  same 
means  also  increase wealth  (48). 
Lauderdale  possesses  no  analysis of the  term  value  and  so  uses it  1n 
the  customary  sense of exchangeable  or  relative  value.  A scarce,  but 
highly  demanded  commodity  such  as  water  in the  above  example,  is  then 
said to  possess  a  high  value  because it exchanges  for  large quantities 
of  other  things.  He  does  not  examine  the category of  'value'  as  it 
underlies the  appearance of the  exchange  relation.  Had  he  done  so,  he 
would  have  recognised  that even  under  monopolistic  conditions  the 
values  of commodities  are  determined  like all others  by  the  quantity 
of labour  required  to  produce  them.  The  price at which  they  actually 
sellon the  market  1S  subject  to  the  inter-related influence of demand 
and  supply.  In  the  case of a  monopoly,  the  price of the  monopolised 
product  may  consistently  remain  above  its value  because  of the  higher 
demand  for it relative to supply. 
Commodity-values  are  always  determined  by  the quantities  of  labour 
required  to  produce  them.  These  values  coincide with  prices  on  the 
market  under  competitive conditions.  The  forces  of demand  and  supply 
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always  determined  by  the  quantity of  labour  required  for  their 
production: 
Commodities  which  are  monopolised,  either by  an  individual or 
by  a  company,  vary  according  to  the  law  which  Lord  Lauderdale 
has  laid down:  they  fall in proportion  as  the sellers augment 
their  quality,  and  rise in proportion to  the  eagerness  of 
the  buyers  to  purchase  them;  their price  has  no  necessary 
connection  with  their  natural  value:  but  the  prices  of 
commodities  which  are  subject to  competition,  and  whose 
quantity  may  be  increased  in  any  moderate  degree,  will 
ultimately  depend,  not  on  the state of demand  and  supply,  but 
on  the  increased or  diminished cost of their production  (49). 
Ricardo  quite clearly draws  a  distinction  between  'natural'  commodity 
values,  determined  by  labour-time,  and  prices,  l.e.  the expression  of 
commodity-values  In  the quantities of other  commodities  for  which  they 
exchange.  Under  monopolistic  conditions  these  two  items  may 
quantitatively  vary,  depending  upon  the  behaviour  of  suppliers  and 
buyers.  Under  competitive conditions,  exchangeable  value will  tend  to 
equate  with  natural value  as  producers  move  from  less  advantageous 
occupations  into the  temporarily  more  lucrative occupations  which  are 
producing at  a  premium: 
In  speaking  then  of commodities,  of their exchangeable  value, 
and  of the  laws  which  regulate their relative prices,  we  mean 
always  such  commodities  only  as  can  be  increased in  quantity 
by  the exertion of human  industry,  and  on  the  production  of 
which  competition operates without restraint  (50). 
Hitherto,  the  principal  concern  has  been  to  show  that  Ricardo 
understood  by  the  term  'value',  a  dimension,  different  from  both  use-
value  and  exchangeable  value,  in  which  different commodities  could  be 
measured  and  compared.  The  substance of this item  'value'  lS  labour, 
and  so  far  labour  unspecified in  any  particular  form.  The  next  stage 
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actually  measured. 
IV.  Embodied  Labour  and  the  Invariable  Measure  of  Value 
The  first section of this chapter  examined  how  Ricardo  would  go  about 
explaining  a  change  in the relative values  of two  or  more  commodities. 
There  are  two  parts to his  solution,  firstly,  discovering  which 
commodity  within  the  exchange-relation is responsible  for  the  change, 
and  secondly,  discovering  the cause of this change,  l.e.,  what  the 
change  is a  change  of and  behind  that its cause.  Ricardo's  solutions 
to  these  problems  are relatively simple.  The  commodity  which  lS 
responsible  for  the  change  in the  relative value  of  two  or  more 
commodities  is to  be  found  by  comparing  them  with  the  quantities  of 
other  commodities  against which  they  customarily  exchange.  Assuming 
that  all these  have  remained  constant,  if one  of the  commodities  lS 
found  to  have  changed  with  respect  to  them  all whilst  the  other  has 
remained  constant,  the  source of the  change  in relative value  can  be 
identified.  This is the  procedure  which  Ricardo  adopts  in the  third 
edition of the  Principles,  subsequent  to  which  he  identifies the  cause 
of  the  change  as  a  change  in the  quantity  of  labour  required  to 
produce  one  commodity  but  not  the other.  In  the  first  and  second 
editions of the  Principles,  he  focuses  on  a  quite different  approach, 
which  though still present ln the third,  and  still advocated  to  some 
degree,  affords  Ricardo little theoretical satisfaction. 
The  key  target of Ricardo's critiques of Smith  and  Malthus  lS  the 
varied  choice of commodities  which  they  propose  to  adopt  as  standard 
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changes  in  the  values of commodities  by  comparing  them  over  time  with 
some  commodity  selected  to  perform  the  function  of  a  universal 
standard of value.  However,  what  both  had  elected  to  19nore  1n  their 
considerations was  the effect of changes  in  the  value of the  commodity 
standard  on  its ability to measure  changes  in the  values  of  different 
commodities.  What,  in other words,  was  going  to measure  the  value  of 
the  value-measuring  commodity?  Given  the  circumstance  that  all 
commodities  are  subject to changes  in value,  the result  1S  a  vicious 
circle  of  problems.  Under  only  one  circumstance  would  a  commodity 
perform  the  function  of a  measure  of value,  as envisaged  by  Smith  and 
Malthus.  As  Ricardo  explains  1n  the  first  two  editions  of  the 
Principles: 
If  anyone commodity  could  be  found,  which  now  and  at  all 
times  required  precisely  the  same  quantity  of  labour  to 
produce  it, that commodity  would  be  of an  unvarying  value, 
and  would  be  eminently  useful  as  a  standard  by  which  the 
variations of other  things  might  be  measured  (51). 
A commodity  unvarying  1n  its own  value  would  measure  the  variations 1n 
the  values of other  things  over  time  because  as  a  commodity  fell  1n 
value  it  would  correspondingly  exchange  for  less  of  the  standard 
measure.  Unfortunately:  'Of  such  a  commodity  we  have  no  knowledge, 
and  consequently  are  unable  to  fix  on  any  standard of value'  (52).  In 
support  of  this conclusion  can  be  cited Ricardo's  polemics  against 
Smith  and  Malthus  for  their consideration of,  alternatively,  gold, 
corn  and  labour  as  commodities  which  may  be  inappropriately  employed 
as  standard measures  of value.  This,  however,  is not  the  main  target 
of  Ricardo's  critical reflections.  He  explicitly  denies  that  any 
commodity  can  perform  the  function  of standard measure  because,  by 
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Ricardo  lS  aware,  determined  by  the quantity  of labour  required  to 
produce  the  commodity  to  which  it belongs.  But  this skill leaves  him 
with  a  problem.  Changes  In  the relative values of commodities  are  not 
self-explicable,  and  in  the  absence  of an  adequate  standard measure  of 
value  a  theoretically  conceivable  invariable  standard  may  prove 
invaluable: 
In 
It  lS,  however,  of considerable use  towards  attaining  a 
correct theory,  to ascertain what  the essential qualities  of 
a  standard are,  that  we  know  the  causes  of the  variation  In 
the relative value  of commodities,  and  that we  may  be  enabled 
to  calculate the  degree  in  which  they  are  likely to  operate 
(53). 
the  third  edition  of  the  PPE,  this  speculation  upon  the 
desirability  of  an  invariable measure  of value  is  replaced  by  the 
comparative  method  referred  to previously,  i.e.,  comparlson  without 
the  intervention of an  invariable measure  of value.  However,  it would 
be  premature  to conclude  from  this shift that Ricardo  finally  admits 
the  impossibility of an  invariable measure  of value  and  gives it up  as 
a  possible solution  (54).  Ricardo  returns  In  the  third edition with  a 
section  devoted  to the  subject in the  re-drafting  of  Chapter  One. 
From  a  practical point of view,  the  value  of an  invariable measure  of 
value  is self-evident: 
When  commodities  varied  In  relative  value,  it  would  be 
desirable  to  have  the means  of ascertaining  which  of  them 
fell  and  which  rose  in real value,  and  this could  be  effected 
only  by  comparing  them  one  after another  with  some  invariable 
standard  measure  of value,  which  should itself be  subject  to 
none  of  the  fluctuations  to  which  other  commodities  are 
exposed  (55). 
But,  as  Ricardo  repeatedly  points out:  'Of  such  a  measure  it  lS 
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in  value is not  the  only  circumstance  which  would  disqualify it  from 
functioning  as  an  invariable measure  of value:  the  composition  of 
capital;  the durability of fixed  capital;  changes  in the wage-rate  and 
turnover  time,  'all which  circumstances disqualify  any  commodity  that 
can  be  thought  of  from  being  a  perfectly accurate measure  of  value' 
(57).  Any  commodity  selected  to  perform  such  a  function  would 
therefore  only  do  so  successfully  in the  limiting case:  'It would  be  a 
perfect  measure  of  value  for  all things  produced  under  the  same 
circumstances  precisely as itself,  but  for  no  others'  (58). 
Ricardo  seems  to  have  built the  perfect case  against  arguments  made  on 
behalf  of  the  invariable measure  of value.  Theoretically,  it  1S 
possible  to  conceive of the  conditions which  a  commodity  would  have  to 
satisfy in order  to qualify,  but  Ricardo  has  convincingly  shown  that, 
in  practice,  these conditions are not  only  not  likely to  be  met,  but 
even  if they  were,  such  a  commodity  would  only  measure  the  value  and 
consequently  changes  in  the  magnitude  of value  of commodities  produced 
under  exactly  like conditions as itself.  It is,  therefore,  all  the 
more  surprising  to  discover  that in section  SlX  of  Chapter  One, 
Ricardo  not  only  speculates  on  the  theoretical possibility of such  a 
form  of measurement,  but  that  he  goes  further,  and  in spite of all the 
variable  factors  to  which  he  has  drawn  attention,  opts  for  the 
monetary  commodity  gold,  on  entirely pragmatic  grounds: 
To  facilitate,  then,  the object of this inquiry,  although  I 
fully  allow  that  money  made  of gold  is  subject  to  the 
variations  of  other  things,  I  shall  suppose  it  to  be 
invariable,  and  therefore all alterations in  price  to  be 
occasioned  by  some  alteration in  the  value  of the  commodity 
of which  I  may  be  speaking  (59). 
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stages  where  preliminary  concepts  are  being  set  up  and  obvious  false 
avenues  are  discounted.  It lS  almost  always  necessary  to  set  up 
initial assumptions  which  help  to  proceed  things  along,  but  which  will 
always  be  returned  to  later to  be  amended,  and  indeed  in  some  cases 
rejected  altogether  In  favour  of  more  adequate  assumptions  or 
postulates  derived  from  closer  analysis  of  the  subject  of  the 
investigation.  There  is,  however,  a  significant difference  between  a 
preliminary  but  temporary  assumption  and  an  assumption  made  to 
an  awkward  theoretical  gap.  The  value  of gold is as  subject 
bridge 
to  the 
causes  of variation  in  value  as  any  other  commodity.  Why,  then,  does 
Ricardo  compromise  the  rigour  with  which  his analysis  has  hitherto 
been  formed  for  the  sake  of such  an  artificial  device  (60)?  The 
answer  more  than  probably  lies in the  structure of his  theory. 
Few  writers  on  Ricardo  display  any  sensitivity to  the  architectonics 
of  Ricardo's  theoretical structure.  In  fact,  Sraffa's  commentary, 
though  brief,  is one  of the  few  that attempts  to  grapple  with  the 
construction of Ricardo's  theory  from  a  position approaching  anything 
like as  rigorous  as that applied  by  Ricardo  himself.  It lS  important 
In  that  Sraffa recognises  the  central role played  by  the  labour  theory 
of  value  In  Ricardo's  political  economy  (61).  Furthermore, 
recognising  that  role  he  then  proceeds  to  examine  and  explain  the 
theoretical  motives  behind  many  of Ricardo's  key  ideas  and  shifts 
those  ideas,  amongst  others the  very  question  which  has  between 
been  referred to in connection with  the  invariable measure  of 
(62). 
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value The  key  to  much  of what  Ricardo  says  regarding his  understanding  of 
the  labour  theory  of value lies in  the  relationship in  his  thought 
between  the  idea of labour  as  the  substance  of value  and  the practical 
problem  of  measuring  it,  a  problem  which  lies  beneath  his 
contemplation of the  invariable measure.  As  Sraffa puts it:  'The  idea 
of an  "invariable measure"  has  for  Ricardo its necessary  complement  ln 
that  of "absolute value'"  (63).  In  other  words,  the  very  concept  of 
an  invariable measure  of value  only  arlses in the  context of a  theory 
of  value  diametrically  opposed  to  the  relativism  of,  say,  Bailey, 
Jevons  et ale  (64).  In this respect,  the  requirement  to specify  the 
conditions  which  a  commodity  would  have  to  satisfy  ln  order  to 
function  as  an  invariable measure  of value  is  virtually  synonymous 
with  asking  for  an  answer  to  the  question  what  determines  the  value of 
commodities  ln  the  first place?  As  Sraffa explains,  the  thrust  of 
Ricardo's investigations, 
'the  problem  which  mainly  interested him  was  not 
finding  an  actual  commodity  which  would  accurately 
the  value  of corn or silver at different  times  and 
but  rather than  of finding  the  conditions which  a 
would  have  to satisfy in order  to  be  invariable  in 
and  this came  close to identifying  the  problem of a 
with  that of the  law  of value'  (65). 
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This  particular  approach  was  not original.  Smith  approaches  the 
theory  of value  at the close of his observations on  the  functions  of 
money.  Petty,  too,  had  expressed his initial concern with  the  causes 
of  the  magnitude  of  value  ln  relation  to  money  (66).  The 
distinctiveness of Ricardo's contribution to this way  of traditionally 
approaching  the  problem of value  was  that once  he  had  established  the 
general  theory  of value  he  then tries to tie it back  to  a  theory  of 
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This  idea  that  to every  theory  of  value  corresponds  an 
appropriate  'invariable  measure'  1S  evidently  based  on 
Ricardo's  experience  with  his  own  theory,  where  to  the 
det~rmin~tion  of value  by  embodied  labour  there  corresponds 
an  1nvar1able measure  in the  shape  of a  commodity  produced  by 
a  constant  quantity of labour;  and  in  so  far  as  there  are 
exceptions to  the  theory,  to the  same  extent the  accuracy  of 
the  measure  is affected  (67). 
Sraffa's further  discussion of the  relationship between  value  and  the 
invariable  measure  reveals  much  about  the  primarily  quantitative 
nature of his  own  conception of the  theoretical issues involved.  The 
purpose  of the  invariable measure  of value is to  overcome  the  problems 
posed  by  different conditions of production  for  the  labour  theory  of 
value.  To  the extent that commodities  are  produced  under  different 
conditions,  and  by  different kinds  of labour,  the  labour  theory  of 
value  would  always  be  hampered  by  the  existence  of  heterogeneity. 
Sraffa's  argument  is that if one  operates with  a  positive  conception 
of  value,  as  Ricardo  had  done,  the existence of  heterogeneity  would 
always  tempt  the  theory  to  opt  for  some  form  of  compromise  1n 
overcom1ng  the difficulty this posed.  But  in Sraffa's view  there  1S 
nothing  incongruous  about  the shift.  One  seemingly  follows  inevitably 
from  the other.  The  invariable measure  of value  1S  to  be  regarded,  in 
Sraffa's  account,  as merely  a  supplement  - any  method  of  measur1ng 
value  to  the  intrinsic measure  of  labour-time.  There  1S  no 
essential difference  between  the  two,  and if one  turns out  to  be  more 
practical than  the other then  nothing  would  be  lost if that was  opted 
for  in preference to the other. 
The  invariable measure  of value  comes  into its own,  however,  when  it 
takes  on  an  independent  role  from  value,  once  causes of  'value'  are 
76 admitted  other  than  labour.  In this context,  the  measurement  of value 
by  labour-time  becomes  ineffective  and  changes  can  only  be  measured  by 
a  commodity  which  is itself of unvarying  value.  Ricardo's  pragmatic 
decision  to  define  gold  as  the  invariable measure  of value  then  makes 
perfect  sense.  In  replacing  labour-time  by  a  quantity  of  gold, 
Ricardo  thought  he  might  be  able  to  circumvent  the  problem  of 
comparing  the  'value'  of commodities  once  other  factors  influencing 
relative  values  had  been  introduced.  However,  even  if  the  'other 
factors'  account  1S  admitted  a  problem still  persists.  As  Sraffa 
points  out,  the  influence of other  factors  than  labour  breaks  the 
hitherto  held strict proportionality  between  'absolute'  and  'relative' 
value.  This  being  the case,  will  an  invariable measure  of value still 
accurately reflect changes  in the  values of commodities?  (68) 
In  the  absence  of strict  proportionality  between  'absolute'  and 
'relative'  value  the  answer  must  inevitably  be  in the  negative.  As 
Sraffa  himself  points out,  Ricardo  was  never  fully  able  to  specify 
precisely  how  the  invariable measure  of value  would  overcome  this 
problem,  even  though  he  knew  of its existence  and  returned  to consider 
it  repeatedly.  There  is,  however,  one  aspect  of the  problem  which 
Sraffa neglects to give  consideration to  even  though  he  alludes to  it 
1n  his  discussion of Ricardo.  In  the  previous chapter it  has  been 
argued  that any  adequate  explanation of the  exchange  mechanism  must 
take  account  of and  produce  satisfactory explanations of the  necessary 
commensurability  and  equivalence  of commodities.  Sraffa  was  not 
entirely  unaware  of this problem  as it goes  right to  the  heart of  any 
theory  of value.  His  awareness  of its existence 1S  demonstrated  1n 
his  account  of  Ricardo's pre-Principles  corn-profit  model  1n  an 
77 earlier section of his  Introduction to  PPE: 
The  advantage  of Ricardo's  method  of approach  is that  at  the 
cost  of  considerable simplification, it makes  possible  an 
understanding  of how  the rate of profit is determined without 
the  need  of a  method  for  reducing  to  a  common  standard  a 
heterogeneous collection of commodities  (69). 
The  corn-profit  model  simplifies the  task of understanding  how  the 
rate of profit is determined  by  expressing  both  inputs and  outputs  1n 
units  of the  same  commodity,  i.e., corn.  The  problem  of  commodity-
heterogeneity  therefore  does  not  arise.  Against  this  simplification, 
the  Principles  admits  from  the outset that it 1S  a  fact  of  the 
commodity-economy  that  its  products  are  not  homogeneous.  The 
Principles,  therefore,  differs  from  the  single commodity  model  1n  its 
'adoption  of a  general  theory  of value'  (70).  At  this point,  Sraffa 
declines  to explore what  might  be  involved  in such  a  general  theory 
despite the  fact  that replacing corn  by  labour  - 'on  both  sides of the 
account'  - rather leaves the  question  to  be  begged  (71).  Where  Sraffa 
hedges  around  the  problem,  Ricardo  1S  a  good  deal  more  forthright.  An 
examination  of  the consideration which  he  gives  to  the  problem  of 
labour-heterogeneity  shows  that  whilst  he  was  fully  aware  of  the 
problems  of the  invariable measure  with  respect  to  the  other  factors 
that  are  supposed  to influence commodity  values  1n  conjunction  with 
labour-time,  he  was  highly  reluctant to  admit  that  the  existence  of 
labour  heterogeneity  posed  any  problem  for  his  theory  of  the 
invariable measure,  because,  not  least of all for  the  question-mark it 
would  have  raised  over  the effectiveness of his general  explanation of 
value in  terms  of embodied  labour. 
It  has  been  a  part of the  tradition of Ricardo  scholarship  to  locate 
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measure  and  not  within  the  theory  of value  itself (72).  Sraffa's  own 
preoccupation  with  the  question of an  invariable  measure  has  deep 
resonances  with  his  own  theoretical work  The  Production  of Commodities 
~ Means  of Commodities.  This  undoubtedly  explains  why  he  fails  to 
pursue  the general  theory  of value  any  further  than  1S  necessary  for 
his  own  purposes.  But  to do  so is in  fact  not  to  glve  the  whole 
picture  with  regard  to  Ricardo.  The  real  problem  of  the  general 
theory  of  value  1n  the  Principles is not  resolved  by  assess1ng  the 
relative  merits  of  differing commodities  in order  to  arrive  at  a 
workable  invariable measure  of value.  It is Ricardo's  treatment  of 
the  problem of labour-heterogeneity itself which  is the  key,  and  this 
lies at the  heart of the  labour  theory  of value itself. 
Like  his  predecessor  Smith,  Ricardo  argues  from  the  outset  that  the 
measurement  of value  by  labour-time  presupposes  labour  of  a  uniform 
quality.  This  1S  the  basic  problem  to  be  resolved  and  Ricardo 
specifically  draws  the  reader's attention to it  to  emphasise  its 
importance: 
In  speaking,  however,  of labour,  as  being 
all  value,  and  the relative quantity of 
exclusively  determining  the  relative value 
must  not  be  supposed  to  be  inattentive 
qualities of labour  (73). 
the  foundation  of 
labour  as  almost 
of commodities,  I 
to  the  different 
The  prec1se nature of the  problem lies in  'the difficulty of compar1ng 
an  hour's  or  a  day's  labour,  in  one  employment,  with  the  same  duration 
of labour  1n  another'  (74).  But,  however  difficult the  comparison  may 
be  in  theory,  in practice it is constantly  being  made,  and  it is  with 
an  appeal  to  what  apparently  happens  in practice that  Ricardo  tries to 
79 get  around  the  problem: 
The  estimation  in  which  different qualities of  labour  are 
held  comes  soon  to  be  adjusted in the market  with  sufficient 
precision  for  all practical purposes,  and  depends  much  on  the 
comparative  skill  of  the  labourer,  and  intensity  of  the 
labour  performed  (75). 
It  1S  immediately  apparent that the  solution does  not  answer  the 
question of how  one  kind  of labour is compared  with  another.  Invoking 
market  forces,  as  I  think  Ricardo is,  merely  presupposes  the  fact  of 
commensurability,  and  does  not explain it.  Clearly,  if  one  argues 
that  demand  and  supply  render  different  kinds  of labour  equivalent  to 
one  another,  it is only  a  short step away  to  the  inevitable  question 
of as  what  are they  commensurable?  The  estimation in which  different 
kinds  of labour  are  held is quite precisely  dependent  upon  the  skill 
and  intensity of the  work  performed,  and  much  else besides.  But  1n 
the  determination  of the  magnitude  of the  value of  commodities  all 
these differences are abstracted  from.  One  kind of labour is just  as 
much  the  same  as  any  other.  Ricardo  irons  out  these  differences 
between  different kinds  of labour  by  resorting to  an  explanation which 
is devastating to his theory  - wages.  Labours  of different  qualities 
are  reduced  to  a  common  standard  by  means  of a  scale of values  graded 
by  the  level of wages  paid  for  each  kind  of labour: 
The  scale when  once  formed,  is liable to  little  variation. 
If a  day's  labour of a  working  jeweller  be  more  valuable  than 
a  day's  labour  of a  common  labourer,  it has  long  ago  been 
adjusted,  and  placed in its proper  position in  the  scale  of 
value  (76). 
The  contradiction  1n  this explanation  cannot  be  avoided.  A  fixed 
scale  of values is incompatible with  the  mechanism  of adjustment  V1a 
80 the  market.  It would  seem  implausible that Ricardo  would  have  been 
willing  to  countenance  an  exception  to  the  universal  laws  of  demand 
and  supply  on  this scale unless  the  problem  which  he  sought  to  solve 
by  such  a  means  was  of equal  or  greater  importance  than  those  laws 
themselves.  We  can  only  conclude,  therefore,  that the  labour  theory 
of value  was  just such. 
This  solution,  however,  does  not  only  contain  a  contradiction.  It 
simply  reproduces  the central problem  in a  new  form  (77).  The  scale 
referred  to  1S  hypothetical  and  incapable  of  explaining  how 
commodities  can  be  compared  as  commodities.  This  much  at  least  1S 
admitted  by  Ricardo  himself in the  very  next  paragraph  which  explains 
how  value  comparisons  of one  commodity  at  a  particular time  can  be 
made  with  the  same  commodity  at  a  different time  (78).  Not,  it  must 
be  noted,  value  comparisons  between  different  commodities.  He 
concludes  with  a  surmise: 
If  a  piece  of cloth be  now  of the  value  of  two  pieces  of 
linen,  and  if,  in ten years  hence,  the  ordinary  value  of  a 
piece of cloth should  be  four  pieces of linen,  we  may  safely 
conclude,  that  either more  labour is required  to  make  the 
cloth,  or  less to make  the  linen,  or that both  causes  have 
operated  (79). 
The  problem,  as  Ricardo  has  repeatedly  explained at  length,  1S  to 
identify  the  source  and  magnitude  of the  values  of  commodities  and 
thereby  identify their source of quantitative difference  and  change. 
At  the  ground  floor  of any  explanation of how  this is to  be  determined 
1S  the  prior question of how  one  kind of labour  can  be  compared  with 
another.  In  the  face  of what  have  to  be  regarded  as  insuperable 
difficulties  at  the  heart of his theory,  Ricardo  adopts  an  evaS1ve 
posture: 
81 As  the  inquiry  to  which  I  wish  to  draw  the  reader's 
attention,  relates  to  the  effect of the  variations  1n  the 
relative  value  of commodities,  and  not  in  their  absolute 
value,  it will  be  of little importance  to  examine  into  the 
comparative  degree  of estimation in which  the different kinds 
of human  labour  are  held  (80). 
But  this  relative  conception offers no  solution  either.  Whether 
relative  value  1S  expressed  in another  commodity,  money  or  the 
'invariable  measure  of value',  the  same  problem will  be  encountered: 
'A  franc  1S  not  a  measure  of value  for  anything  but  for  a  quantity  of 
the  same  metal  of which  francs  are made,  unless  francs,  and  the  thing 
to  be  measured,  can  be  referred to  some  other  measure  which  1S  common 
to  both'  (81).  In  Ricardo's opinion that is only  possible  because 
they  are  both  the  products of labour. 
82 NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  TWO 
1.  The  principle  focus  of a  greater part of the literature on  Ricardo 
is the question of whether  or  not  he  extended  the  applicability  of 
the  labour  theory  of value  beyond  the  parameters  defined  by 
Smith's  'rude  state'.  A significant section of  the  literature 
follows  Marshall's  lead and  argues  that  he  quite consciously  did 
not.  Cf.  Marshall,  1920;  Hollander,  1904;  Hollander,  1979; 
Steedman,  1982.  An  alternative strand of thought  argues  that  he 
did  extend  the  basic  labour  theory  of  value  to  capitalist 
production,  and  arguments  revolve  around  to what  extent  Ricardo 
was  successful,  or  not,  as  the  case  may  be,  1n  developing  its 
applicability.  Marx  1S  probably  the greatest critic of  Ricardo 
1n  this context.  But  assessments  based  on  alternative points  of 
view  are  to  be  found.  Cf.  Schumpeter,  1954;  Sraffa,  1986.  With 
the  exception of Sraffa,  reasons  for  which  are  gone  into  1n  the 
third  part of this chapter,  the  bulk  of the literature  tends  to 
focus  on  the  pertinence of the  labour  theory  of  value  to  the 
problem  of  explaining  the  mechanisms  of  distribution  1n  a 
capitalist  economy.  Hollander's  judgement  on  Ricardo's  efforts 
with  the  labour  theory of value is representative:  'The  discussion 
of value  theory  in brief was  a  necessary  preliminary  for  the  main 
theme  but  not  a  topic considered  for its own  intrinsic  interest'. 
Hollander,  1979,  194.  It is part of  the  contention  of  this 
Chapter  that the  problem of value  was  one  of Ricardo's  concerns, 
and  it 1S  intended  to rectify the neglect of this aspect  of  his 
theory  by  demonstrating  that  Ricardo  does  indeed  supply  a  great 
amount  of  material,  much  of it  analytical  1n  nature,  which 
83 develops  the  labour  theory  of value  in some  important  ways.  Part 
of  the  problem  with  the existing literature is that it  fails  to 
recognise  what  is present  in  Ricardo  and,  failing to recognise  it 
for  what  it is,  tends  to  automatically fit it in  with  whatever 
value-theory  happens  to  be  current in the  school  of  thought  to 
which  the  commentator  belongs.  Value-theory  has  never  had  the 
importance  in  the  various  Neo-classical  and  Neo-classical-inspired 
schools  of  thought  that  it  has  had  1n  political  economy. 
Consequently,  the non-political economist  automatically  assumes, 
on  reading  Ricardo,  that  the  theory  of  value  1S  relatively 
unimportant.  It is necessary  therefore,  to  demonstrate,  at  one 
and  the  same  time,  that Ricardo  did  indeed  consider  the  problem  of 
value  as  a  problem of  'intrinsic interest',  and  why  that should  be 
the  case. 
2.  Throughout  reference is made  to the edition of Ricardo's  On  the 
Principles  of  Political  Economy  and  Taxation,  prepared  by  P. 
Sraffa and  published  in 1951  by  Cambridge  University  Press  for  the 
Royal  Economic  Society's  'Works  and  Correspondence  of  David 
Ricardo'.  Hereafter,  it shall  be  referred to  as  PPE. 
3.  PPE,  12.  The  'depends  almost exclusively'  is  a  change  which 
Ricardo  made  for  the  third edition of PPE,  replacing the  'depends 
solely'  of the  first  and  second.  This  substitution 1S  taken  by 
many  commentators  to  indicate  Ricardo's  gradual  repudiation of the 
labour-embodied  principle  in the light of  his  difficulties  1n 
reconciling  the  theory  of profit with  the  theory  of  prices. 
Following  Marx,  it is possible to  argue  that  Ricardo's  problem 
lies  not  with  his theory  of profit but  with  his  theory  of  value. 
84 Ricardo  1S  unable  to  distinguish  between  value  and  the  price-form 
because  he  has  no  theory  of the  nature of money.  This  in  turn  1S 
the  responsibility  of  the greatest weakness  of  the  Classical 
school  as  a  whole  - its failure  to analyse,  in its examination  of 
the  commodity,  the  value-form.  This is the  source  of  Marx's 
principal  1ssue  with  Smith  and  Ricardo.  This  1S  discussed  1n 
detail  in  Chapters  Three  to Five  below. 
4.  PPE,  13. 
5.  Loc  Cit. 
6.  Rubin  draws  the  following  contrasts between  Smith  and  Ricardo's 
respective  techniques  and  styles of presentation:  'With  Smith 
the  train  of his  theoretical analysis is broken  (and  at  times 
distorted)  by  a  superfluity  of  descriptive  and  historical 
material.  In  Ricardo,  the  sturdy  skeleton of theoretical  analysis 
is freed  of the  living  flesh  of concrete material culled  from  real 
life.  An  iron chain of syllogisms  rapidly  and  inexorably  carr1es 
the  reader  forward,  supported  only  by  hypothetical  examples 
(usually  beginning with  the  words,  'let us  suppose  that  ... ')  and 
arithmetical  calculations.  Instead  of  Smith's  vivid  and 
captivating  descriptions,  the  reader  can  look  forward  to  an 
abstract,  dry  exposition,  the difficulty of which  1S  made  all  the 
more  greater by  the  fact  that  he  cannot  for  a  minute let slip  from 
view  the multitude of premises  that  the  author either  explicitly 
or  tacitly  assumes.  Ricardo's method  of  abstract  analysis  1S 
precisely  what  gives his theoretical thinking its consistency  and 
intrepidity and  endows  him  with  the  power  to  trace the  workings  of 
85 each  tendency  of economic  phenomena  through  to  its  very  end'. 
Rubin,  1979,  242-3. 
7.  PPE,  17. 
8.  Again  Rubin  provides  an  accurate description of  the  nature  of 
Ricardo's  theoretical  approach:  'The  method  that  Ricardo 
consistently  applied  to  the  theory  of value  1S  that  of  the 
scientific  study  of causality,  which  the  Classical  school  did  so 
much  to  establish  as part of political  economy.  Ricardo  was 
looking  for  the  causes  of quantitative changes  1n  the  value  of 
products,  and  wished  to  formulate  the  laws  of  those  changes'. 
Rubin,  1979,  248-9.  The  Classical  schools greatest  strength  1S 
also  the  source  of  its  greatest  weakness.  The  deleterious 
consequences  of  its  largely  quantitative  approach  for  the 
Classical school's overall analysis of the  commodity  and  value  are 
concentrated in its failure  to  analyse  the  value-form. 
9.  PPE,  17-18.  Throughout  this passage  Ricardo  uses  'value'  to  mean 
relative or  exchangeable  value,  i.e., what,  in  a  moment,  is  shown 
to  be  the  expression of the  value  of any  particular commodity. 
10.  PPE,  12. 
11  I  Ch  t  Thr  e  ent1 "  tIed  'On  the  Rent  of  Mines',  Ricardo  .  n  ap  er  e  , 
reinforces  the  point that  'value'  is the result of labour  alone. 
'The  metals',  he  says,  'like other things,  are  obtained  by  labour. 
Nature  indeed  produces  them;  but it is the  labour  of  man  which 
extracts  them  from  the  bowels  of the earth,  and  prepares  them  for 
86 our  service'.  Consequently,  'the  same  general  rule  which 
regulates  the  value  of raw  produce  and  manufactured  commodities  is 
applicable  also  to  the  metals;  their value  depending  not  on  the 
rate  of profits,  nor  on  the  rate of wages,  nor  on  the  rent  paid 
for  mlnes,  but  on  the total quantity  of labour  necessary  to obtain 
the  metal  and  to  bring it to market'.  PPE,  85-6.  Principally 
criticising  Marshall's  'cost of  production'  interpretation  of 
Ricardo,  Ashley  says:  'by  "labour"  Ricardo  did  not  mean  only  that 
labour  which  has  been  immediately  occupied  upon  the  manufacture  of 
a  particular  article.  The  term  covers all the  labour  that  has 
indirectly  as  well  as  directly  contributed  to  the  product, 
including all that  has  been  devoted  to  the  creation of the capital 
with  which  the  process  may  have  been  assisted'.  Ashley,  1891,  11. 
Cf.  PPE,  25-6. 
12.  PPE,  14. 
13.  Loc  Cit. 
14.  Loc  Cit. 
15.  Loc  Cit. 
16.  Loc  Cit. 
17.  PPE,  17. 
18.  PPE,  19. 
19.  'The  discovery  of the  papers  on  Absolute  Value  and  Exchangeable 
h"  h  R"  d  workl"ng  during  the last weeks  of his  Value,  upon  w lC  lcar  0  was 
life,  has  given  a  new  interest and  importance  to  the question  of 
87 the  development  of his ideas on  value  after the  appearance  of  the 
third  edition  of the  Principles.  In  particular, it  has  become 
possible to  detect  the  emergence  of a  new  trend  1n  his  thought  - a 
trend  which  developed  out  of his  increasing  concern  with  the 
problem of the  relationship  between  "relative"  (or  "exchangeable") 
value  and  "absolute"  value.'  Meek  1973  110  ,  ,  . 
20.  Even  though,  it  has  to  be  pointed  out,  Ricardo  repeatedly 
recognises  the  impossibility  of such  a  measure  1n  practice. 
21.  D.  Ricardo:  Works  and  Correspondence,  Vol.  IV,  375.  Hereafter 
WCDR  IV.  In  the  passage  just cited,  Ricardo  intimates  that  a 
distinction  has  to  be  drawn  between  the  kind  of discipline  which 
he  practises,  i.e., political economy,  and  that  derivative  but 
decidedly  inferior  approach,  later dubbed  by  Marx  as  'vulgar 
economy'.  Political economy,  as  Ricardo  understands it, wants  to 
know  more  than  what  is apparent  on  the  surface of things,  it  also 
want  to explain  them. 
22.  WCDR  IV,  398. 
23.  WCDR  IV,  Loc  Cit. 
24.  WCDR  IV,  Loc  Cit. 
25.  These  simple conditions which  underlie exchange-ratios are  ignored 
by  Bailey,  Jevons  and  Bohm-Bawerk  in their critiques of the  labour 
theory  of  value.  Focusing  exclusively  on  the  phenomenon  of 
relative  value,  they  fail to  recogn1se  that  the  very  possibility 
of their being  exchanged  for  each  other  demonstrates  that each  1S 
88 only  a  'relative'  quantity of value,  i.e., relative to  all  the 
quantities of value  which  each of the  other  commodities  represent. 
By  no  means  is their relativity confined  simply  to their  relative 
values.  This  point is emphasised  by  Marx  in his  account  of  the 
structure of exchange.  See  Chapter  Four  below. 
26.  PPE,  284. 
27.  Loc  Cit. 
28.  Loc  Cit. 
29.  Loc  Cit. 
30.  This  aspect of Ricardo's  thought is underestimated  by  a  writer  as 
perceptive  as  R.  L.  Meek.  Observing  'Ricardo's  increasing 
tendency  to  identify the  absolute value  of a  commodity  with  the 
quantity  of  labour  embodied  in it', Meek  goes  on  to  consider 
Ricardo's  comments  on  de  Tracy's  account  of the  measure  of  value 
without,  however,  recognising  the existence of the  problems  of 
equivalence  and  commensurability  and  without  detecting  Ricardo's 
efforts to solve  them.  Meek,  1973,  112-113. 
31.  PPE,  11. 
32.  Loc  Cit.  Both  Bailey  and  Jevons,  Ricardo's  most  vocal  nineteenth 
century  critics,  concentrate their efforts on  this part  of  his 
argument.  Both  argue  on  behalf of a  utility theory  of value,  and 
both reject any  notion of a  category of value  other  than  relative 
or  exchangeable  value.  The  only  substantial  difference  between 
them  is Jevons's explicitly marginalist  formulation  of the utility 
89 theory  of value.  In  Bailey,  the  notion of marginal  utility  had 
not  yet  occurred.  Bailey's ideas  are  discussed  1n  the  next 
chapter  because  they  form  an  important  part  of  Marx's  own 
criticisms of Ricardo,  albeit 1n  a  back-handed  fashion.  But it is 
worth  pausing  to consider  the marginalist critique of the  labour 
theory  of  value  and  its replacement  by  marginal  utility.  In 
Chapter  Four  of his  Theory  of Political Economy,  Jevons  gives  the 
following  explanation of the  term  'value': 
If a  ton  of pig  iron exchanges  in  a  market  for  an  ounce 
of  standard  gold,  neither  the  iron is  value  nor  the 
gold;  nor  is there  value  in the  iron nor  in  the  gold. 
The  notion  of value is concerned  only  in the  fact  or 
circumstance of one  exchanging  for  the other.  Thus  it is 
scientifically  incorrect to  say  that  the  value  of  the 
ton  of iron is the  ounce  of gold:  we  thus convert  value 
into  a  concrete thing;  and  it is,  of  course,  equally 
incorrect to  say  that the  value  of the  ounce  of gold  1S 
the  ton of iron.  The  more  correct  and  safe  expression 
is,  that the  value  of the  ton  of iron is equal  to  the 
value of the  ounce  of gold,  or  that their values  are  as 
one  to  one.  Jevons,  1970,  128. 
The  'values'  of iron  and  gold  are  neither object considered  singly 
nor  1S  it the  relationship  between  them.  What,  then,  1S  value? 
And  how  1S  it determined?  The  word  value,  he  explains,  'is  often 
used  1n  reality  to mean  intensity of desire  or  esteem  for  a 
-
thing' .  Jevons,  1970,  129.  Clearly  this  1S  an  altogether 
different concept  to what  Smith  or  Ricardo  consider  as  the natural 
usefulness  of objects.  What  Jevons  means  by  value  1S  not  total 
utility,  but  marginal  utility or  final  degree  of  utility,  'as 
meaning  the  degree  of utility of the last addition,  or  the  next 
possible  addition of a  very  small,  or infinitely small,  quantity 
to  the  existing stock'.  Jevons,  1970,  110.  Value  in this  sense 
'is measured  by  the  intensity of the  pleasure  or  the  benefit which 
90 would  be  obtained  from  a  new  increment  of the  same  commodity'. 
Jevons,  1970,  129.  'Value'  in  the  marginalist  sense,  meaning 
neither  the  objects  themselves  nor  the  relationship  between  them, 
lS  determined  by  the magnitude  of the  esteem  bestowed  upon  the 
unconsumed  marginal  unit.  But  how  are  the quantities  of  esteem 
bestowed  on  different  objects to  be  compared?  Possessing  no 
explanation  of this requirement,  Jevons  introduces  the  device  of 
the  'divisible  commodity',  l.e.,  money.  'In  the  theory  of 
exchange  we  find  that  the  possessor  of any  divisible  commodity 
will  exchange  such  a  portion of it, that the  next  increment  would 
have  exactly  equal utility with  the  increment  of  other  produce 
which  he  would  receive  for it'.  Jevons,  1970,  169.  The  estimates 
of the  relative utilities of different commodities  are  expressed, 
from  the point of view  of the  individual,  by  the  amount  of  money 
he  lS  prepared  to part with  for  an  extra unit  of each  item.  Money 
lS  the  common  measure  of utility,  but it does  not  account  for  the 
estimations  of  the  marginal  utility  of  the  same  object  by 
different  persons  and  cannot,  therefore,  operate  as  a  general 
medium  of  exchange:  'the general  result of exchange  is  thus  to 
produce  a  certain  equality  of  utility  between  different 
commodities,  as  regards  the  same  individual;  but  between  different 
individuals  no  such  equality will  tend  to  be  produced'.  Jevons, 
1970,  170.  Although  thoroughly  bourgeois in every  other  respect, 
even  Robinson  Crusoe  did not  require  the service of money  to  tell 
him  how  much  he  thought  of the  useful  things  around  him!  Marginal 
utility theory  fails,  be~ause whilst it may  hold  to  the  condition 
of  equivalence,  it cannot  produce  an  account  of  the  necessary 
91 commensurability  between  different objects 1n  exchange. 
33.  PPE,  11.  Marshall  offers  a  more  positive  interpretation  of 
Ricardo's  thought  than  the  one  being  offered  here.  There  is, 
however,  no  evidence  for  thinking that  Ricardo  thought  of value  in 
any  other context  than  that of labour  embodied,  and  no  case,  for 
excusing  Ricardo  for  not  having  'much  to  say  that was 
importance  on  the  subject  of  utility'.  Ricardo, 
of  great 
Marshall 
explains,  'took  utility for  granted,  because  its  influence  1S 
relatively  simple'.  Marshall,  1920,  814.  The  relationship 
between utility and  exchangeable  value  in Ricardo's  understanding 
1S  simpler  even  than  Marshall's  interpretation.  Ricardo  1S 
adamant;  the  possess1on  of utility is a  precondition  for  the 
possess1on  of exchangeable  value,  but  only  in the specific  sense 
that without utility an  item would  not  be  wanted  in exchange. 
34.  WN.  Cited  PPE,  273. 
35.  Loc  Cit. 
36.  PPE,  275-6. 
37.  PPE,  279-80. 
38.  PPE,  280. 
39.  PPE,  219n. 
40.  PPE,  280n. 
41.  Loc  Cit. 
42.  Loc  Cit. 
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value-form. 
81.  PPE,  284. 
98 CHAPTER  THREE 
THE  LAW  OF  VALUE-SUBSTANCE 
I.  Introduction 
Aristotle  says  that property  has  two  uses;  'one is the  proper,  and  the 
other  the  lmproper  or  secondary  use  of it'.  For  example,  a  shoe  lS 
used  for  wear,  and  is used  for  exchange;  both  are  uses  of  the  shoe 
( 1 ) .  The  uses  to  which  property  can  be  put  are  divided  into  two 
kinds;  one  proper  and  primary,  the  other  improper  and  secondary.  The 
wearing  of a  shoe  lS  an  example  of the  first kind,  because  it  makes 
use  of the  shoe  as  a  shoe.  Its being  worn  is an  example  of its proper 
or  primary  use.  It is the  use  or  function  of an  object  which  makes 
proper  sense of its structure and  constitution;  in short,  its  nature. 
Being  used  as  footwear  is the  function  which  is consistent  with  the 
nature of shoes.  In  the  light of this definition of  'proper'  as  that 
use  which  is consistent with  the material  properties  (including  its 
form)  of the  shoe,  it is possible  to  define  the  contrasting sense  of 
improper  use.  An  improper  use  of a  shoe  is one  which  is  inconsistent 
with  the  nature  of shoes,  or  which  disregards  that nature.  Property 
is improperly  used if it is given  in  exchange  for  something  else.  The 
proper  use  of property is the  human  appreciation of  its  capacities 
towards  serving  a  particular  human  need  or  want.  An  article  of 
property  does  not  meet  a  need  and  thereby  fulfil the  functions  of  its 
nature if it is offered as  an  article for  exchange  (2). 
This  can  be  seen  from  the  following  consideration.  From  the  point  of 
Vlew  of its current  owner  the  property  no  longer  possesses  any  useful 
qualities  for  him.  However,  insofar  as  he  can  find  someone  who  has 
99 something  which  he  wants  and  who  is willing to  take  in  return  that 
which  has  ceased  for  him  to  be  useful,  his  unwanted  item  can  acqu1re 
him  some  other  useful  property  by  offering it in exchange.  Although 
this  1S  an  example  of a  use  to which  property  can  be  put,  Aristotle 
does  not  place it on  a  par  with  those  proper  or  primary  uses  to  which 
property  1S  put  in serving  human  needs  and  wants.  He  makes  the 
distinction between  proper  and  improper  uses  of property  on  the  basis 
of  the  human  intention  behind its production.  A  shoe  (or  more 
sensibly  a  pair of shoes)  is made  because  of the  purpose  or  function 
which  it can  perform  once  made.  Shoes,  according  to  Aristotle,  are 
primarily  made  for  wearing,  not  as objects of barter: 
He  who  gives  a  shoe  in  exchange  for  money  or  food  to  him  who 
wants  one,  does  indeed  use  the  shoe  as  a  shoe,  but  this  1S 
not its proper  or  primary  purpose,  for  a  shoe is not  made  to 
be  an  object of barter.  This  may  be  said of all  possess1ons 
. ••  (3) 
The  pr1mary  purpose  of producing  shoes is the  appropriation of  their 
useful qualities.  It is ontologically  fundamental  for  human  beings  to 
do  this.  Production  for  exchange  is  a  secondary  and  derivative 
activity. 
To  make  use  of an  article of property is to  recognise  its  inherent 
capacities  and  natural qualities.  To  appropriate  those qualities  1S 
to  employ  the article in  a  fashion  with  which  they  are consistent,  and 
thus  which  fulfils  the specific nature of the article.  It  lS  to 
employ  it as  in natura  product.  In  being offered  for  exchange,  the 
natural  qualities of the object are  no  longer  recognised;  they  have 
ceased  to  be  of any  significance.  To  regard  an  article of property  as 
an  item  of exchange  is to  recognise its  significance  as  something 
100 diametrically  opposed  to  its  natural  existence  and  character. 
Disregarding  their natural characters,  objects of property  have  only 
one  possible  source of significance left,  and  which  1S  the  direct 
opposite  of their material  natures;  that is,  their social  character. 
In  being  exchanged,  articles  of  property  acqu1re  a  social 
characteristic  which  is in direct contrast to their material  natures 
as  products.  However,  whilst  exchange  appears  to  completely  disregard 
their  useful  qualities,  as articles of exchange,  and  thereby  social 
entities,  they  reveal  the  circumstances of their  production.  They 
also  disclose  the  nature of the  relationships  which  obtain  between 
their producers.  The  exchange-relation is a  product  of a  specific set 
of relations of production.  As  Aristotle explains:  'Now',  he  says, 
it  1S  obvious  that in  the  pr1mary  association,  viz.  the 
household,  there is no  room  for  the  Art  of Exchange;  it  1S 
not  possible until  the  association is already  enlarged.  For 
1n  the  household  the  members  shared  everything  alike,  while 
in  the  larger association,  viz.  the  village  or  the 
where  they  lived separately,  they  experienced  various 
and  having  these  wants  were  forced  to  interchange 
properties by  'barter'  (4). 
State, 
wants 
their 
Individuals  who  do  not  produce  and  by  their  own  product  provide  for 
all their  needs  or  wants  directly are  compelled  to  do  so  by  exchange. 
What  first underlies the existence of exchange  is a  social division of 
labour.  The  entire productive activity of the  community  is divided  up 
into  certain tasks  which  are  then  performed  by  specific  people.  But 
the  existence  of a  social division of labour is  not  sufficient  to 
account  for  the  existence of exchange.  As  Aristotle points out,  the 
'Art of Exchange'  does  not  occur  within  the  individual  household,  but 
it  would  be  wrong  to  surmise  as  a  consequence  that  it  did  not 
therefore  provide  for  its needs  by  a  variety of activities  (5).  The 
101 household,  if it is self-sufficient,  must  provide  for its needs  out  of 
the  capacities which it has  at its disposal.  And,  since  those  needs 
are  varied,  those capacities must  be  deployed  to  perform  as  many  tasks 
as  there  are  useful  objects which  are  required  to satisfy those  needs, 
and  consequently  the  household  must  divide  and  allocate  its  labour 
accordingly.  What  takes  the  place of exchange,  or  more  properly,  why 
exchange  does  not  occur,  is because  the  product is a  communal  one, 
with  the  members  of the  household  contributing  to  the  variety of tasks 
to  be  performed  and  by  the  same  token  enjoying  the  fruits  of  the 
collective productive activity.  The  matter is different,  according  to 
Aristotle,  with  larger,  more  developed  associations  such  as  the 
village  or  the state.  In  these  kind  of associations  the  productive 
activities  of  its members  are  not  communal  but  private.  Exchange 
arlses  because  there  is no  direct  social  connection  between  the 
productive activities of private producers.  The  exchange  relation  lS 
the  necessary  social relation  between  individuals  who,  as  Aristotle 
points  out,  live separately and  produce  privately,  without  direct 
reference  to  social  need,  but  who  nevertheless are  elements  of  the 
social division of labour  within  the village or state association.  It 
lS  their  need  for  each others'  services which  as  private  producers 
compels  them  to enter  exchange  (6).  In  an  association  of  private 
producers  the social bond  which  holds  them  together is exchange,  'for 
there  would  be  no  society if there  were  no  exchange'  (7). 
Aristotle's  explanation of the  two  uses  of property is an  account  of 
the  form  taken  by  wealth in the  context  of  emerglng  relations  of 
private production.  The  form  which  wealth  takes  when  it lS  used  both 
as  a  useful  product  and  as  an  article of exchange  is  the  commodity. 
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want  are  an  appropriation of the  product's natural  properties,  an 
investigation of which  would  not  discover  the  social  manner 
of  its  production  (8).  That  aspect  of the  commodity  whereby  it  lS 
regarded  solely  as  an  object of exchange  however,  lS  a  wholly  social 
characteristic,  and  in  which  no  trace of the material qualities of the 
commodity  can  be  found.  The  character of the  commodity  as  an  object 
of  exchange  expresses  the  social  relations  under  which  it  was 
produced.  Consequently  wealth  only  takes  the  form  of  the  commodity 
when  it  is the  product  of a  private producer,  and  likewise  by  him 
privately  exchanged. 
The  value of Aristotle's analysis of the  commodity-form  of wealth lies 
In  his  identification  of  private  production  as  its  historical 
precondition.  Indeed,  Aristotle's analysis of exchange  points towards 
the  universalisation of that  form  of producing  wealth  which  In  fact 
lay  far  beyond  the  horizons of Ancient  Greek  society.  It is precisely 
the  failure  of Classical political economy  to  identify  the  historical 
nature  of that precondition which  lead to its failure  to  understand 
the  particular social  form  of production  which  it engenders  and  the 
consequent  developments  of that  form  which  Marx  takes  as his  specific 
object of analysis in Capital  and  elsewhere. 
II.  Marx:  The  Starting Point 
Eschewing  the  naturalism  of  Smith  and  Ricardo,  Marx  opens  his 
presentation  of  the  categories of political economy,  which,  as  his 
citation  In  the  Critique of Political  Economy  shows  lS  a  position 
103 which  he  took  over  from  Aristotle,  with  the  analysis of  'the  concrete 
social  shape  of the  labour  product'  in bourgeois  society  (9).  What 
distinguishes Marx's starting-point  from  that of Aristotle 1S  that the 
latter  was  writing  during  a  period  1n  which  relations  of  private 
production  were  at  an  early stage  in  their  development.  Marx, 
conversely,  is observing  a  form  of society which  is wholly  founded  on 
relations of private production  and  in which,  consequently,  wealth  1S 
appropriated  socially through  exchange  in  the  form  of the  commodity: 
'The  wealth of bourgeois society,  at first sight,  presents itself  as 
an  immense  accumulation  of commodities'  (10). 
Marx  treats the  commodity  as  a  social entity,  and  its universalisation 
as  a  phenomenon  corresponding  to  a  particular historical epoch,  V1Z., 
the  bourgeois.  He  was  reminded  of the  theoretical  preconditions  of 
his  examination  of  the  commodity  in  1819  on  reading  the  critical 
references  to  Capital  in  Adolph  Wagner's  General  or  Theoretical 
Political Economy,  in response  to  which  he  writes: 
What  I  proceed  from  is the  simplest social  form  in  which  the 
product  of labour  in contemporary  society manifests  itself, 
and  this  is as  'commodity'.  This  is what  I  analyse,  and 
first of all to  be  sure in the  form  in  which  it appears  (11). 
Aristotle  had  shown  that as  a  particular  form  of social  wealth,  the 
commodity  corresponded  to  a  particular  form  of social production.  The 
universal  appropriation of wealth  as  commodities  corresponds  to  a  form 
of  social  production  far  beyond  any  which  Aristotle  could  have 
experienced  or  imagined.  What  Marx  shows  is that  the  commodity-form 
of  the  product itself contains the  elementary  form  of the  society  of 
universal  exchange-relations.  The  commodity  is the  elementary  social 
form  of the capitalist system of social production.  The  key  to  that 
104 form  of social production is to track  down  and  analyse  the  particular 
form  1n  which  the  labour  product  first appears  in that  system.  In  the 
opening  pages  of Capital,  Marx  presents  the  results of just  such  an 
investigation. 
Marx,  like  Aristotle,  considers  the  production  of  wealth  as  the 
production of objects which  by  virtue of their natural  properties  are 
capable  of  serving  human  needs.  Production  1S  ontologically  the 
primary  activity in which  human  beings  most  necessarily  engage  (12). 
In  the  first edition of Capital,  he  writes:  'It 1S  the utility  of  a 
thing  for  human  life  that  turns  it  into  a  use-value'  (13). 
Reinforcing  this  point  and,  incidentally,  its  affinity  with  the 
thought  of  Aristotle,  he  writes  in the  third  edition:  'It  is  an 
assemblage  of many  properties,  and  may  therefore  be  of use  1n  various 
ways'  (14).  In  the  work  of 1859  he  adds:  'But  the  extent  of  its 
possible  applications is limited  by  its existence  as  an  object  with 
distinct properties'  (15).  As  the  product  of a  private  producer  whose 
intention  it is to  exchange it for  something  else,  the  useful  object 
requ1res  a  social specification.  This is necessary  because  exchange, 
as  a  wholly  social act,  expressive of a  social relation of production, 
disregards  the  qualitative content of the  objects  to  be  exchanged.  In 
a  form  of social  production where  productive activities are  mediated 
by  exchange  the objects  become  commodities.  Their  transformation into 
commodities entails their being  brought  together in exchange  where  one 
commodity 
value  of 
is  'worth'  some  quantity of another.  One  is the  exchange-
the 
characteristic 
other. 
existing 
This  quality of 
alongside  the 
being  exchange-values  1S  a 
use-value  of  the  product, 
consequent  on  its transformation  into a  commodity.  Exchange-value  is 
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its 'natural  form'  as  use-value  (16).  Hence  Marx's  peculiar  reference 
to  the  commodity  as  'a two-fold thing'.  It has  within its nature  two 
determinations  or characteristics which  are  the  polar opposites of one 
another.  It  lS,  on  the  one  hand,  a  specifically  identifiable 
qualitative  useful  object,  and  on  the  other,  it possesses  a  purely 
social  reality  as  a  social  form  of  wealth  corresponding  to  a 
particular  historical  form  of social  production.  'Use-values',  he 
says,  'become  a  reality  only  by  use  or  consumption:  they  also 
constitute  the  substance of all wealth,  whatever  may  be  the  social 
form  of that wealth.  In  the  form  of society  we  are  about  to consider, 
they  are,  in addition,  the material depositories  of  exchange-value' 
(17).  Humans  constantly  require the services rendered  to  them  by 
useful  objects.  As  such,  the latter are  the  substance  of human  wealth 
irrespective  of  the  particular social  form  which  they  take  and  the 
corresponding  relations of production  under  which  they  were  created. 
But  as  commodities,  use-values  serve  a  double  function,  the  first 
corresponding  to their natural identities as  useful  objects,  and  the 
second,  the  socially  necessary  function  of  being  the  material 
depositories,  or,  as  a  translation of the  term  from  the first  edition 
of  Capital  puts it - 'substantial bearers'  - of  exchange-value.  As 
commodities,  use-values  have  two  sets of functions  to  perform,  one 
with its origins in nature,  one  in society. 
III.  From  Exchange-value  to  Value 
In  1825  Samuel  Bailey  published  a  work  entitled  A  Critical 
Dissertation  on  the  Nature,  Measures,  and  Causes  of Value:  chiefly  In 
106 reference  to  the writings of Mr.  Ricardo  and  his  followers. 
- -- --------- As  its 
name  suggests,  the  book  is principally  a  critique of the  labour  theory 
of  value.  Its importance,  however,  lies in  the  position  from  which 
that  critique  lS  made.  In  the  Critical  Dissertation,  Bailey 
formulates  a  theory  of value  which  anticipates  In  essentials  the 
subjectivist  economics  of the later Nineteenth  Century.  Subsequent 
critiques  of  the  labour  theory  of  value  made  from  within  that 
tradition  have  consequently  differed  only  in details  from  that  first 
formulated  by  Bailey. 
The  key  to Bailey's account  of exchange  lS his definition of  exchange 
value. 
In  considering  the  objects in the  world  around  them,  Bailey  observes 
that  human  beings  naturally  value  some  things more  highly  than  others. 
What  forms  the  basis of this evaluation is the  esteem  within  which 
individual  objects  are  held  by  those  who  consider  them.  But  when 
objects  are  considered  singly  that  'emotion  or  pleasure  or 
satisfaction,  with  which  we  regard  their  utility  or  beauty,  can 
scarcely  take  the  appellation  of  value'  (18).  The  particular 
qualities  of  individual objects are  capable  of  inducing  different 
kinds  of  reaction within  the  minds  of those  who  contemplate  them. 
Each  object  possesses  a  corresponding set  of  feelings  which  the 
subject  experiences as  a  result of such  contemplation.  Such  feelings 
and  emotions  and  so  forth  can  be  quite  ambiguous  and  consequently  do 
not  present  themselves  with  any  distinct  shape,  still  less  any 
precision in,  for  example,  a  mathematical  sense.  The  contemplation of 
individual  objects therefore results in  the conferral of esteem,  but 
107 does  not  thereby  ascribe  such  esteem with  the  precision of a  value  1n 
the  economic  sense. 
If Bailey's argument  is pursued  further,  value  connotes  express10ns  of 
choice  or  preference.  One  object is  preferred  to  another.  The 
exerc1se  of choice is explicitly made  in  exchange  where  a  preference 
for  an  object  not  in  an  individual's possession  1S  higher  than  that of 
the  object  which  he  is willing to alienate to  acquire it.  If  utility 
1S  to  be  used  to  explain  exchange  this  disparity  1S  assumed 
implicitly.  But  Bailey  does  not  advance  the  theory  of utility as  an 
explanation of the  occurrence of exchange,  but  of the basis  upon  which 
items  are exchanged  when  it does  occur,  which  is quite  another  thing. 
In  considering the alienation of some  object,  through its  sale,  the 
owner  has  arrived at  a  conclusion  about  what  it is worth,  1n  short, 
what  he  expects  in  return  for it.  He  cannot  establish the  magnitude 
of  that worth  by  consideration of his  own  possession alone,  but  only 
1n  relation to the  thing  which  he  hopes  to  acquire  by  its alienation: 
It  1S  only  when  objects are  considered  as  subjects  of 
preference  or  exchange,  that the specific  feeling  of  value 
can  arise. 
And  aga1n: 
When  we  regard  two  objects of choice  or  exchange,  we 
appear  to acquire  the  power  of expressing  our  feelings  with 
precision  (19). 
Exchange  1S  the  transfer of commodities  1n  definite  proportions. 
Prior  to its realisation,  the parties to  the  transaction  agree  upon 
the  proportions  1n  which  their respective  commodities  are  to  be 
alienated.  The  agreed  proportions are  those  which  express  1n  the 
108 minds  of  their  owners  the relative esteem  which  they  hold  for  the 
objects  to  be  exchanged  (20).  The  value  of a  commodity  A is expressed 
1n  the  quantity  of  some  other  commodity,  B,  for  which  it  will 
exchange: 
The  value of A is expressed  by  the  quantity  of B for  which it 
will  exchange,  and  the  value  of B  is  in  the  same  way 
expressed  by  the  quantity  of A.  Hence  the  value  of A may  be 
termed  the  power  which  it possesses  or  confers of  purchasing 
B,  or  commanding  B in exchange  (21). 
Consequently,  Bailey  concludes,  if 'the value  of an  object  1S  its 
power  of  purchasing,  there  must  be  something  to  purchase.  Value 
denotes  consequently  nothing positive or  intrinsic,  but  merely  the 
relation  1n  which  two  objects stand  to each  other  as  exchangeable 
commodities'  (22).  If the  value of commodity  A is expressed  1n  the 
quantity  of commodity  B for  which  it exchanges,  and  vice-versa,  A  and 
B  stand  to  one  another  in  a  relationship of equivalence;  'we  say  for 
instance  that one  A is,  in  our  estimation,  equal  to  two  B'  (23).  In 
the  relative-value expressions of commodities  subjective  determination 
is given  objective expression  as  the  relationship of equivalence.  At 
this  point  the circularity of Bailey's explanation is most  apparent. 
Unable  to precisely express  the  measure  of esteem in which  they  hold 
individual objects,  people  compare  them  with  others  which  they  regard 
as equivalents  and  thus  express  their esteem relatively.  Conversely, 
exchange  is an  expression of the  relative esteem  in  which  objects  are 
held  because  1n  exchange  they  are inherently  equivalent.  In  the 
first,  determination  precedes  express1on,  condition  precedes  the 
conditioned.  In  the  second,  the  order  1S  reversed;  because 
commodities  are  equivalents,  relative esteem  1S  established  with 
precision.  Hence  the circularity  (24). 
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Bailey's  explanation  of  exchange-ratios  1n  terms  of  relative 
subjective estimation  obscures,  and  which  1S  for  that reason  ignored, 
1S  the  necessity  of understanding  that  exchange  brings  different 
commodities  into a  relationship of equivalence  and  one  which  moreover 
presupposes  their commensuration.  Only  things  which  are  commensurable 
can  be  equated  with  one  another  in the  appropriate  amounts,  and  can 
thus  relate to  one  another  as  equivalents.  Attempting  to explain  the 
proportions  of  exchange  subjectively  does  not  solve  the  problem  of 
commensurability  but  displaces it to  the  subjective  dimension  in  which 
a  generic  concept  of  'need'  or  'utility'  must  be  employed.  Since 
Bailey,  as  we  have  already  noted,  argues  that  individual  objects 
excite  particular  feelings  within  delimited  spheres  of  need,  the 
gener1c  'need'  itself therefore  no  more  exists than  the  possibility of 
satisfying  a  thirst by  eating sand.  In  other  words,  as  use-values 
objects  are  mutually  exclusive  and  possess  the potential  to  satisfy 
separate  needs.  Objective  equivalence  implies  the  necessity  of 
objective commensurability. 
Before  mov1ng  further,  it  1S  necessary  to  consider  another 
possibility,  viz.  that  money  renders  commodities  commensurable. 
In  modern  society,  commodities  are  customarily  exchanged  for 
quantities of money  and  not directly  for  one  another.  In  the  absence 
of  direct comparison,  Bailey  takes  up  the  argument  that money  serves 
as  a  means  to equate  with  one  another  two  commodities.  By  being  first 
compared  with  the  one  and  then  with  the  other  the  appropriate  ratio 
can  be  discovered in which  the  two  can  be  exchanged  as  equivalents. 
110 However,  this description of the  function  of money  lS  not  a  new  one. 
The  function  of money  as  a  means  of making  unlikes  commensurable  lS 
glven  relatively  detailed consideration  by  Aristotle in  Book  Five, 
Chapter  Five  of the  Nichomachean  Ethics  (25).  The  purpose  of  the 
chapter  lS  to explain  the  particular  form  of justice  which  obtains 
between  individuals  who  participate in  exchange.  He  explains  that 
exchange  is  founded  upon  the principle of  reciprocity  (26) .  What 
happens  on  one  side must  be  mirrored  by  that which  takes  place  on  the 
other.  Without  reciprocity,  exchange  becomes  advantageous  to  one 
alone,  and  thus  unjust.  The  advantage  arises  from  the  inequality  of 
the  things  exchanged.  Therefore,  justice requires their  equivalence, 
and  unlikes  cannot  be  equivalent  unless  they  are  commensurable,  l.e., 
that  they  can  be  compared  with  one  another  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  the  correct proportions which  are  required  to  ensure 
reciprocity  (27).  What  is required,  argues  Aristotle,  is  a  common 
measure:  'All  things  or  services  ... which  are  to  be  exchanged  must  be 
ln  some  way  reducible  to  a  common  measure'  (28).  He  proceeds  to 
explain:  'For this purpose  money  was  invented,  and  serves  as  a  medium 
of  exchange;  for  by  it we  can  measure  everything,  and  so  can  measure 
the  superiority  and  inferiority of different kinds  of  work  the 
number  of shoes,  for  instance,  that is equivalent to  a  house  or  to  a 
certain  quantity  of  food'  (29).  In  this passage  he  argues  that  the 
act  of measurement  effects the  necessary  equation.  This  lS  clearly 
not  the  same  as  arguing,  as  he  does  in the  previous  passage,  that  all 
things  which  can  be  exchanged  are  reducible  to  a  common  measure.  The 
act  of measurement  presupposes  the  reduction  as its prior  condition. 
Unlikes  cannot  be  measured  comparatively until they  have  all  been 
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recognition  of  this  limitation  of  money,  l.e.,  the  need  for 
commensurability,  is the  difference  between  Aristotle,  who  analyses 
the  nature  of exchange,  and  those  like Bailey  and  subsequent  advocates 
of  the subjectivist school,  for  whom  real exchange  is a  closed  book. 
Aristotle makes  his mark  when  he  declares,  'there would  be  no  society 
if there  were  no  exchange,  and  no  exchange if there  were  no  equality, 
and  no  equality if it were  not  possible  to  reduce  things  to  a  common 
measure'  (30). 
He  next  considers  a  composite  solution  to  the  problem  of 
commensurability  and  measurement  of  commodities.  Arguing  that 
producers  exchange  things  in order to  acquire  the  products of  others, 
he  concludes,  it 'is ... the  need  for  each  other's  serVlces  which 
holds  the  members  of society  together  (31),  and  which  constitutes  the 
means  of establishing their commensurability  and  equivalence.  In  this 
context,  he  argues,  money  acts symbolically  or  by  means  of  convention 
as  a  representation of need  capable of quantifying  the  commodities  to 
be  exchanged  ln their correct  equivalent  proportions,  proportions 
which  presumably,  as Aristotle does  not  make  the point,  correspond  to 
definite  quanta of need.  Such  an  explanation,  which  whilst  happily 
sponsored  by  Bailey et al., sits very  uncomfortably  ln  Aristotle's 
thought.  He  recognises this and  whilst  eschewing its  implausibility; 
'In  strictness,  indeed,  it is impossible  to  find  any  common  measure 
for  things  so  extremely divers',  he  resorts  to it  as  a  pragmatic 
solution;  'but  our  needs  give  a  standard  which  lS  sufficiently 
accurate  for  practical  purposes'  (32).  What  Aristotle is looking  for, 
and  his  failure is obviously  something  which  he  found  frustrating,  was 
112 a  property  or  dimension  by  virtue of which  unlikes,  1. e. ,  different 
commodities,  could  be  made  commensurable,  and  which  simultaneously 
established the  correct measured  proportions to establish equivalence. 
Having  settled for  the  pragmatic  solution,  he  goes  on  to  glve  further 
consideration to  money  as  a  means  of commensuration:  'Money  makes  all 
things  commensurable,  for  all things  are  valued  in  money'  (34)  and 
refers to  the  following  illustration: 
For  instance,  let A stand  for  a  house,  B for  ten  minae,  C for 
a  bed;  and  let A =  ~,  taking  a  house  to  be  worth  or  equal  to 
five  minae,  and  let C (the  bed)  = B.  We  see at  once,  then, 
how  many  beds  are equal  to  one  house,  viz.  five  (34). 
From  this simple  example,  he  concludes:  'It is evident  that,  before 
money  came  into use,  all exchange  must  have  been  of  this  kind:  it 
makes  no  difference whether  you  give  five  beds  for  a  house,  or  the 
value of five  beds'  (35).  At  this point,  he  leaves  the consideration 
of  exchange  and  returns  to his examination  of  the  more  general 
question  of justice.  What  is important  about  his conclusion,  however, 
1S  that  whilst  it is made  as  a  simple  observation  which  follows 
conclusively  from  the  premises of his  example,  in  fact it  demolishes 
his  claim  that  money,  whilst  merely  practical,  makes  things 
commensurable.  It  makes  no  difference  he  says,  if  five  minae  are 
glven  for  a  house,  or  five  beds.  Both  the  equations:  5  minae  1 
house,  and  5  beds = 1  house,  are  the  exchange  of equivalents,  just  as 
before  money  appeared,  barter of the  latter form  must  also  have  been 
the  exchange  of equivalents.  But  equivalence,  as  Aristotle  1S  well 
aware,  presupposes  commensurability,  and  therefore  cannot  be 
established by  money. 
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of  money  as  a  solution to  the  problem  of how  unlikes  can  be  measured 
for  the  purpose  of establishing equivalence  as  the  articulation  of 
reciprocity.  He  concludes  by  showing  that  money  itself,  as  a  measure, 
presupposes  commensurability  and  for  that  reason is not  the  means  by 
which  equivalence  is brought  about.  It is to establish  this  point 
that Marx  says: 
A given  commodity,  e.g.,  a  quarter of wheat  is exchanged  for 
x  blacking,  y  silk,  or  z  gold,  etc.  - in short,  for  other 
commodities  in  the  most  different proportions.  Instead  of 
one  exchange-value,  the  wheat  has,  therefore,  a  great  many 
(36). 
A  quarter of wheat,  therefore,  has  as  many  exchange-values  as  there 
are  kinds  of commodity  against  which it can  exchange;  thus  -
One  quarter of wheat  -
x  blacking 
y  silk 
z  gold,  or  z  quantity  of money,  etc. 
Justice  aside,  x  blacking,  y  silk and  z  gold  are all  equivalents  of 
one  quarter of wheat.  Consequently,  they  'must,  as  exchange-values, 
be  replaceable  by  each other,  or  be  equal  to each  other'  (37).  X 
blacking  is not  only  the  exchange-value  and  hence  equivalent  of  one 
quarter of wheat,  but  also of y  silk and  z  gold  respectively.  It does 
not  matter,  therefore,  which  commodity  lS  the  equivalent  of  one 
quarter of wheat,  whether it be  blacking,  silk or  gold.  Provided  that 
it  lS  present  in  the correct quantity, it can  act  as  the  exchange-
value  of one  quarter of wheat.  As  they  can  all replace  one  another, 
blacking,  silk or  gold  are  not  exchange-value itself,  as  for  Bailey, 
but  as  exchange-values  they  are  the  form  of what  is expressed  within 
the  exchange  relationship:  'Therefore,  first:  the  valid  exchange-
114 values  of  a  glven  commod1"ty  express  tho  1  some  1ng  equa;  secondly, 
exchange-value,  generally,  1S  only  the  mode  of  expression,  the 
phenomenal  form,  of something  contained  in it,  yet  distinguishable 
from  it'  (38).  What  Marx  1S  gradually  proceeding  towards  is  the 
problem  of commensurability,  and  he  makes  it clear that gold  or  money 
1S  subject  to  the  same  requirement  of  commensuration  as  all 
commodities,  and  for  that  reason is not  the  means  by  which  this  1S 
established.  But  exchange  1S  the  exchange  of  equivalents, 
irrespective of the  kind of commodities  involved;  as  Marx  makes  clear 
in  the  Critique of Political Economy: 
Quite  irrespective  ... of their natural  form  of  existence, 
and  without  regard  to the special character of the  needs  they 
satisfy as  use-values,  commodities  in definite quantities are 
congruent,  they  take  one  another's place  in  the  exchange 
process,  are  regarded  as equivalents,  and  despite  their 
motley  appearance  have  a  common  denominator  (39). 
The  very  condition of exchange itself,  viz.,  equivalence  disregards 
the  kind  of commodities  exchanged,  provided  that  they  are present  1n 
the  appropriate quantity.  From  the  first section of this chapter,  we 
know  that  commodities  have  a  natural  and  a  social content.  In  the 
disregard  for  the particular kind  of commodity  which  is contained  1n 
the  express10n  of  exchange-value,  a  disregard which  it  has  to  be 
emphasised is a  necessary  condition of exchange,  it 1S  the  natural  or 
bodily  form  of  the  commodity  which  does  not  concern  exchange. 
Therefore,  what  is expressed in the  relationship of equivalents,  and 
by  virtue  of  which  commodities  are  commensurable  1S  their  social 
content. 
He  begins  to  work  towards  this content  by  inviting  the  reader  to 
115 consider  a  particular exchange-equation:  1  quarter of corn  - x  cwt.  of 
lron: 
What  does  this equation tell us?  It tells us  that  ln  two 
different  things  - in  one  quarter of corn  and  x  cwt.  of 
iron,  there exists in equal  quantities something  common  to 
both.  The  two  things must  therefore  be  equal  to  a  third, 
which  ln itself is neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  Each  of 
them,  so  far  as it is exchange-value,  must  therefore  be 
reducible  to this third  (40). 
As  an  exchange  of equivalents,  and  therefore commensurables,  the  x 
cwt.  of iron is the  exchange-value  of one  quarter of corn.  As  natural 
objects,  l.e.,  as  use-values  they  are  incommensurable;  therefore, 
their  manner  of  commensuration  lS  as  something  other  than  their 
outward  bodily  forms.  The  term  'things'  in  the  second  sentence  lS 
potentially misleading.  It could  lead  to  an  interpretation of Marx  ln 
which  the  common  property  which  'things'  possess  as  commensurables 
actually resides in their physical  forms.  However,  ln  the  context  of 
the  rest of the  passage,  and  the  fact that it is used  ln the  context 
of  a  particular example  of an  exchange,  the  term  'things'  should  be 
read  as  'commodities'.  Hence  the  property  that is being  sought  for  lS 
something  which  as  commodities  both  corn  and  iron  possess,  but  which 
as  natural objects is neither.  Discounting  the  obvious  possibility of 
it being  another  commodity,  the  common  property  which  all  commodities 
possess  and  in virtue of which  they  are  commensurable  lS  a  social one. 
Commodities  are  exchanged  as  equivalents  precisely  because  they 
represent greater or  smaller  amounts  of this social property,  just  as 
the  areas of equilateral triangles,  irrespective of  size,  represent 
greater or  smaller quantities arrived at by  means  of a  single  formula 
which  lS  'something  totally different  from  "their"  visible  figure' 
(41) . 
116 As  if  to  emphasise  the point that it is a  social  property  that  1S 
being  sought  for,  he  says;  'This  common  "something"  cannot  be  either a 
geometrical,  a  chemical,  or  any  other natural  property of commodities. 
Such  properties claim  our  attention only  in  so  far  as  they  affect  the 
utility  of  those  commodities,  make  them  use-values'  (42).  What  1S 
being  sought  for  is the  common  property  of  commodities,  which  as 
greater  or  lesser quantities makes  them  values,  things  of  the  same 
uniform  substance,  of which  exchange-value is the expression.  In  the 
first  German  edition of Capital,  Marx  comes  to the  point  1n  a  way 
which  1n  the  third,  which  forms  the  basis  for  English translations,  1S 
obscured  by  the  form  in which  it is presented  (43).  In  the  first,  he 
says, 
Commodities  as  objects  of use  or  goods  are  corporeally 
different  things.  Their  reality as  values  forms,  on  the 
other  hand,  their unity.  This  unity  does  not  arise  out  of 
nature  but  out  of society.  The  common  social substance  which 
merely  manifests itself differently  in different  use-values, 
is - labour  (44). 
Use-value is not  a  social substance,  it is not  homogeneous  or  uniform 
and  is therefore  not  what  is represented in the  value  of commodities. 
IV.  The  Substance  Of  Value 
Exchange  brings  commodities  into a  relationship of  equivalence.  In 
order  for  this  relationship to  be  established,  commodities  which 
differ  1n  kind,  differences  which  spr1ng  from  their  material 
must  be  properties  and  which  make  them  useful  in different  ways, 
commensurable.  What  makes  this necessary  commensurability  possible 1S 
the  fact  that they  are,  as  values,  the  products of a  common  social 
117 substance  human  labour.  Thus  far,  Marx  is establishing  the  same 
conclusion  arrived at by  Classical political economy.  The  method  he 
uses  to  achieve  this,  however,  differs  from  that of Smith  and  Ricardo. 
From  the  outset,  he  has  replaced their speculation  upon  the  rules 
which  govern  rational conduct  between  men  in  the state  of  nature, 
with  the  analysis of a  species of social wealth  and  its  historical 
conditions  of  existence.  Both  recognise  that  the  definitive 
characteristic  of  the  modern  order is  the  private  production  of 
wealth.  Its  distribution,  therefore,  must  be  effected  through 
commodity-circulation.  Both  also  recognise that  the  exchange  of 
products  as  commodities  is simultaneously  a  relationship  between  the 
labours  which  produced  them.  However,  the question  of  the  specific 
character of the  labour  which  appears  in commodities  was  one  which  the 
Classical  school  was  unable  to  answer  because  in rooting  equivalence 
In  nature it was  one  which  they  were  unable  to  ask.  Thus  when  they 
attempted  to account  for  the specific quantities In  which  commodities 
were  exchanged  they  inflicted irreparable damage  to  their  theoretical 
apparatus,  In  much  the  same  way  as  Aristotle,  by  resorting  to 
makeshift  solutions which  contradict the  premises  of the  theory.  No 
such  potentially  disastrous solutions of last resort appear  on  the 
horizon  for  Marx  however,  because,  having  developed  his  theory  of 
value  from  the social  and  historical determinants  of the  commodity  he 
lS  In  a  position  to  ask  the  right  questions,  thus  avoiding  the 
problems  begot  of assuming  wrong  solutions in advance  of the  issue. 
Marx's  explanation of the character of value-producing  labour is given 
its  most  theoretically coherent  form  in the  1859  book  A  Contribution 
to  the  Critigue of Political Economy  and  the  first  and  subsequent 
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account  given  in this section of Marx's  theory  of the  substance  of 
value  follows  Moore  and  Aveling's English  translation of  the  third 
German  edition  of  Capital,  supplemented  where  appropriate  with 
material  from  the  1859  work  and  an  English  translation of  the  first 
chapter of the  very  first edition of Capital,  made  available  in  1976. 
In  the  third edition,  Marx  glves his  account  of the  kind  of  labour 
which  produces  value  1n  three  places.  He  glves  a  preliminary 
definition of it in  advance  of his account of the  magnitude  of  value, 
an  examination of which  is made  in  Chapter  Five  below,  in  the  second 
half of Section  One,  Chapter  One.  This is in anticipation of  Section 
Two  which  is devoted  to  an  examination of the distinction  between  the 
two  antithetical characteristics of labour  which  produce  commodities. 
Section  Three  addresses  the  problem of what  Marx  calls the  form  of 
value  which  will  be  dealt with  here  in  Chapter  Four.  Marx  returns  to 
the  question of the  nature of value-producing  labour  in Section  Four 
which  1S  entitled  'The  Fetishism of  Commodities  and  the  Secret 
Thereof'.  This  section is probably  best  known  for  the  interpretations 
of  Marx's  whole  theoretical enterprise to  which  it  has  supposedly 
given  rise,  interpretations which  on  the  whole  are  deserving  of  their 
sometime  notorious reputation.  Our  interest in this section,  however, 
is in intent more  modest.  The  minimal  interpretation of Section  Four 
proposed  here  regards its contents as  a  summary  of  the  conclusions 
arrived  at  1n  the  preceding three,  presented  in  their  theoretically 
appropriate  context,  that of a  systemic  account  of the  relations which 
obtain  between  the  members  of a  social  organism  founded  on  private 
production.  Whilst  the  section contains clearly  much  more  besides,  it 
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although  Section  Four  1S  a  summary  of  the  preceding  three,  the 
material  which  this account will extract  from  it does  not  presuppose 
conclusions  from  the latter half of Section  One  on  the  magnitude  of 
value,  nor  from  Section  Three  on  the  Value-Form  with  which  which 
deal  in the  subsequent  chapter. 
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By  the  time  Marx  introduces his concept  of abstract  labour  in  Section 
One,  he  has  explained  the  nature of the  commodity  as  a  two-fold  thing, 
possessing  a  natural  and  a  social dimension.  He  has  explained  that  as 
composites  of  natural  properties,  use-values  are  not  directly 
commensurable,  but  since their exchange  presupposes  their  equivalence 
they  must  be  socially commensurable;  and  he  has  explained  that  they 
are  commensurable  as  values,  of which  they  consequently  represent 
greater  or  smaller  amounts.  The  emphasis  in this section is  on  the 
magnitude  of  that  value  and  how  it is determined.  Before  he  can 
explain this,  however,  he  needs  to  know  what  the  substance of value  is 
1n  order  to  know  what  the  magnitude  of value  is a  magnitude  of.  Key 
categories  are  not  normally  introduced in this  fashion,  especially 
when  the  following  section is wholly  devoted  to  their  explication, 
unless  they  are  used  to clarify an  issue that  1S  important  enough  to 
run  the  risk of appearing  injudiciously  premature.  In this  case  no 
such  risk  1S  run  and  despite  the  preliminary  character  of  Marx's 
definition  of  value-creating  labour,  it  1S  one  which  follows 
conclusively  from  the  premises. 
As  exchange-values,  commodities  shed their natural-forms  and  relate to 
one  another  in  exchange  as  quanta of one  uniform  homogeneous  social 
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abstraction  from  use-value.  But  the  process of abstraction  does  not 
stop  there.  It  has  a  corresponding effect  on  the  labour  which 
produced  those  commodities  from  which  the  abstraction  from  use-value 
takes  place:  'Along  with  the  useful  products  themselves',  explains 
Marx,  'we  put  out of sight both  the  useful character of  the  various 
kinds  of  labour  embodied  in them,  and  the  concrete  forms  of  that 
labour'  (45).  In  abstracting  from  the  use-values  of  different 
commodities  exchange  also abstracts  from  the particular kind  of labour 
of  which  the  use-value is a  product.  It 1S  1n  respect  of  their 
formation  as  use-values  that  labour  1S  said  to  be  embodied  1n 
commodities.  In  exchange,  abstraction  1S  also  made  from  the 
particular  concrete  forms  of labour  which  in their  intercourse  with 
nature  produce  wealth.  Labour  specified as  concrete labour  does  not 
produce  values,  but  use-values.  Consequently  it  does  not  make 
commodities  commensurable  and  therefore  must  be  abstracted  from.  If 
use-value  does  not  explain  the  value  of commodities,  nor  the  specific 
forms  of  labour  which  produce  them,  what  does?  Marx's  argument  is 
that  even  though  the specific  form  of labour is abstracted  from  1n 
exchange,  the  fact  that commodities  are  products  still  remains. 
However,  within  this context  they  are  not  the  products  of  specific 
kinds  of  labour,  but  of  'one  and  the  same  sort  of  labour,  human 
labour  1n  the abstract'.  In  the  next  paragraph,  he  says  that  such 
labour is  'homogeneous',  or  looked at another  way,  that it 1S  'labour 
power  expended  without  regard to its mode  of expenditure'  (46).  And 
in  the  next  paragraph  but  two,  he  explains  further  that the  'labour' 
that  forms  the  substance of value,  is homogeneous 
labour,  expenditure of one  uniform  labour-power.  The 
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This  passage  lS  best  understood if it lS  remembered  that  commodity-
production  lS  carried on  by  producers operating  privately.  Whilst, 
however,  they  appear  to  be  independent of one  another  and  perform 
their  productive  activities in isolation,  as  members  of  the  social 
division of labour,  they  are  dependent  upon  one  another  and  need  each 
others'  products,  which  they  acquire  through  commodity-exchange.  What 
appears  in  exchange,  therefore,  as  the  value  of their commodities  lS 
thus  none  other  than their individual  productive  activities,  equated 
with  one  another  as aliquot parts of the total social expenditure  of 
labour  power.  In  the  values of their commodities  the  labour  of  the 
individual  producer  counts  only  as  a  quantum  of the  labour-power  of 
society  as  a  whole;  therefore,  the  labour  which  produces  value  appears 
as  the  one,  uniform  expenditure of  the  integral  labour-power  of 
society. 
The  labour  of the  individual  has  a  two-fold character.  As  concrete 
labour  it  lS  performed  with  a  specific  purpose,  working  on  the 
materials  appropriate  to  the  desired  end.  In  the  exchange  of  the 
products  of  that  labour as  commodities,  however,  the  labour  of  the 
individual  counts  as  simply  a  unit of the  labour-power  of society,  an 
instantiation of a  social average.  Its expenditure is the  same  as  any 
other.  Thus,  first it is concrete  and  differentiated in  nature  from 
other  forms;  secondly it possesses  through  the abstraction  inherent  in 
the  exchange-relation  a  separate abstract existence as  an  aliquot part 
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substance  of value. 
The  distinction between  the  properties of concrete  labour  and  abstract 
labour  lS  developed  further  in  Section  Two,  which  is  entitled  'The 
Twofold  Character of the  Labour  Embodied  In  Commodities'.  Concrete 
labour  can  be  dealt with cursorily: 
So  far  ...  as  labour is a  creator of use-value,  is  useful 
labour,  it is a  necessary  condition,  independent of all  forms 
of  society,  for  the existence of the  human  race;  it  is  an 
eternal nature-imposed  necessity,  without  which  there  can  be 
no  material  exchanges  between  man  and  Nature,  and  therefore 
no  life (49). 
Concrete  labour  lS  the material  producer  of  use-values.  To  the 
particular  use-values  required  by  the  members  of  a  society  'there 
correspond  as  many  different kinds  of  useful  labour,  classified 
according  to  the  order,  genus,  species,  and  variety  to  which  they 
belong  In  the  social  division of  labour  (50).  Consequently,  a 
particular  form  of society,  irrespective of that  form,  has  to allocate 
portions  of  its total labour capacities to  the  varlOUS  tasks  which 
together  appear  as  a  division of labour.  The  totality of  productive 
activities  are  simply  different ways  of expending  labour-power.  As 
expenditures of labour-power,  they  have  a  common  character;  each  lS  'a 
productive  expenditure  of human  brains,  nerves,  and  muscles',  and, 
says  Marx,  'in  this  sense  are  human  labour'  (51).  The  social 
capacities  of human  labour are nothing other  than  the  capacities  of 
the  members  of  any  particular society  (52).  Individual  kinds  of 
concrete  labour  are  special applications of these  capacities  (53). 
But,  however  varied  these special applications  become,  in any  form  of 
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are  glven  as  a  social  average  which  each  person  1S  theoretically 
capable  of  and  which  therefore  'ex1·sts  l·n  th  .  f  e  organ1sm  0  every 
ordinary  individual'  (54).  This  does  not  mean  to  say  that  such 
capacities are ahistorical.  The  social average  of human  capacities is 
something  which  develops  historically and  on  the  whole  progressively 
as social productivity  increasingly  fulfils some  human  potentials  and 
establishes  the  preconditions  for  the  fulfilment  of others  (55).  In 
systems  of commodity-production,  the  relationship  between  the  general 
capacities of human  labour  and  their specific applications within  the 
division  of  labour  possess  a  un1que  character.  Instead  of  a 
multiplicity  of  productive  activities,  'the value  of  a  commodity 
represents  human  labour  1n  the abstract,  the  expenditure  of  human 
labour  in general'  (56).  The  expenditure of the  general  capacities of 
the  members  of society,  irrespective of the  depth  of variety of  tasks 
that  it  may  perform,  should  result in  a  wealth  of  useful  products. 
Instead,  1n  systems of private production  those  general  capacities 
appear  1n  abstraction  from  the  natural  forms  of labour  which  in  their 
intercourse with  nature are  productive of wealth,  as  the  substance  of 
the  value of commodities  (57).  In  the  final  paragraph of the section, 
Marx  spells  out  the distinction  between  the  general  capacities  of 
human  labour  as  wealth  in potentia,  and  the  form  1n  which  these 
capacities  appear  in  commodity-producing  societies:  'On  the  one  hand 
all  labour  1S,  speaking physiologically,  an  expenditure  of  human 
labour-power,  and  1n  its character of identical abstract  human  labour, 
it creates  and  forms  the  value  of commodities'  (58).  In  Section  Four, 
Marx  explains  why  the  general capacities of human  labour  appear  as  a 
secondary  abstract characteristic,  in addition to  the  individual  forms 
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exchange. 
In  a  famous  passage  in the  Grundrisse,  Marx  divides the  history  of 
human  society  into three  bands  (59).  The  first  contains  forms  of 
society  which  are  based  on  relations of personal  dependence  and  1n 
which  consequently  the  labour-power of the  producers  is  allocated 
amongst  the  var10US  tasks  corresponding  to  the  individual  branches  of 
the  social division of labour,  according  to  custom.  The  second  form 
of  society  1S  that in  which  there  exists  no  direct  relationship 
between  the  producers,  thus  necessitating  the  indirect  one  of 
commodity  exchange:  private production.  The  third  and  final  possible 
form  of  society  1S  that of the  associated  producers  1n  which  a 
directly social connection exists between  the  producers  in the  form  of 
the  plan.  In  Section Four  of the first chapter  of  Capital,  Marx 
briefly  considers  the  social relations  of  private  production  1n 
comparison  with  those of forms  of society which  precede  and  post-date 
it. 
The  first  form  of  society  he  considers is not  a  society  at  all 
(insofar as societies generally contain more  than  one  individual);  it 
1S  the  world  inhabited  by  Defoe's  Robinson  Crusoe.  The  important 
point is explained  by  Marx  thus: 
Moderate  though  he  be,  yet  some  few  wants  he  has  to  satisfy, 
and  must  therefore  do  a  little useful  work  of various  sorts, 
such  as  making  tools and  furniture,  taming  goats,  fishing  and 
hunting  ...  In  spite of the variety of his  work,  ~e.  knows 
that  his  labour  whatever its form,  is but  the  act1v1ty  of 
one  and  the  same'Robinson,  and  consequently,  that it consists 
of nothing  but  ~ifferent modes  of human  labour  (60). 
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between  the  various  task of production.  Each  task  would  correspond  to 
a  particular  form  of useful  labour.  The  different  forms  of  useful 
labour,  however,  which  he  performs  and  which  he  measures  by  timing 
their  performances  on  average,  are  all  equivalent  because  they 
correspond  to the  expenditure of one  uniform  labour  power,  namely,  his 
own.  A clear parallel with  a  society of commodity  producers  can  be 
drawn  insofar as  'the relations  between  Robinson  and  the  objects  that 
form  this wealth of his  own  creation ... contain all that is essential 
to  the  determination  of value'  (61).  In  the  value-relations  of 
commodities  different kinds  of concrete  labour  are  rendered  equivalent 
by  the  general  capacities which  underpin  them  being  represented 
abstractly  as  the  substance of  value.  The  relationship  between 
Crusoe's  different labour  tasks  1S  analogous  except  that  instead  of 
his general capacities appearing  as  the  substance  of the  value  of  the 
things  which  he  has  produced,  it is represented directly in  his  own 
person  as  the  bearer  of those capacities.  Clearly,  what  1S  absent 
from  Crusoe's world  is a  system of private production  and  exchange. 
The  first  forms  of social  production,  like the  mythical  world  of 
Crusoe,  are  presented with  the necessity  of distributing the  general 
capacities at their disposal  between  the  tasks  which  together  sustain 
the  whole.  Marx  cites the  example  of a  peasant  family.  The  different 
functions  it performs  such  as  producing  'corn,  cattle,  yarn,  linen, 
and  clothing  for  home  use'  are  'direct  social  functions,  because 
functions  of  the  family'  (62).  Each  member  of the  family  does  not 
produce 
that  of 
privately  with  the  intention of exchanging his 
the  other  members  who  are  likewise  engaged 
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1n  private productive  activities.  Consequently,  the social  character  of  his 
labour  does  not  appear  abstractly in the  value of his product  as  a 
commodity:  'On  the  contrary',  explains  Marx,  'the product  of  labour 
bore  the  specific social imprint of the  family  relationship with  its 
naturally  evolved  division of labour'  (63).  The  labour-power  of  each 
individual,  by  its very  nature,  operates  •..  as  a  definite portion  of 
the  whole  labour-power  of  the  family'  (64).  The  labour  of  the 
individual  does  not  assume  an  abstract  form  in order  to  be  recognised 
as  an  expenditure of a  portion of the society's productive capacities. 
It is,  in its immediate  expenditure,  recognised as  the  expenditure  of 
those capacities on  behalf of the  society of the  peasant  family  which 
appropriates its product  in accordance  with  the  prevailing  custom. 
Customary  forms  of distribution are associated with  forms  of  social 
production  based  on  relations of personal  dependence.  The  social 
character  of  the  product  and  the  labour  which  produced  it  are 
established directly  through  the  dependence  of the  orders  and  classes 
of society  upon  one  another.  There  is,  consequently,  no  necessity  for 
the  products to  assume  the  form  of commodities  or  for  the  labour  of 
the  individual  to manifest its social character in their value;  'the 
social  relations  between  individuals in the  performance  of  their 
labour,  appear  at all events as their  own  mutual  personal  relations, 
and  are not  disguised  under  the  shape  of social relations between  the 
products  of labour'  (65).  Labour-power is distributed  and  exercised 
according  to the  custom  which  prevails between  the dependent  orders  of 
society.  The  social character of this labour is revealed  directly 
the  very  dependent  nature of these social relations. 
In  a  society of associated producers,  the  labour  of the  individual 
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is already  directly  social  too.  But  ln  place of  the  customary  and 
dependent  social  form,  the  labour  of the  individual  acquires  its 
social characteristic  from  its place within  the  conscious organisation 
of  social  production in accordance  with  an  agreed  social  plan,  'in 
which  the  labour-power  of all the different individuals is consciously 
applied  as  the  combined  labour-power of the  community'  (66).  Each 
individual  labour-power is representative of a  social  average  from  the 
outset,  without  which,  as  Rubin  points  out,  'the  organ  of  the 
socialist community  cannot  decide  whether  or  not it is more  useful  to 
spend  one  day  of qualified labour  or  two  days  of simple  labour,  one 
month  of  the  labour  of individual  A or  two  months  of the  labour  of 
individual  B,  to  produce certain goods'  (67).  The  labour-powers  of 
the  producers of socialist society are  accounted  from  the  outset  as 
portions  of  the total social  labour-power  and  are  then  equated  by 
means  of some  socially agreed  norm  for  the  purposes of  distribution, 
both  of  labour-power  to the  tasks to  be  performed  and  the  products 
between  the  members  of society.  'We  will  assume',  says  Marx  ln 
illustration  of  the  point,  'for the  sake  of  a  parallel  with  the 
production of commodities,  that the  share of each  individual  producer 
in  the  means  of subsistence is determined  by  his labour-time.  Labour-
time  would,  ln that case,  playa double  part.  Its  apportionment  ln 
accordance  with  a  definite social plan  maintains  the  proper  proportion 
between  the  different kinds of work  to  be  done  and  the  various  wants 
of  the  community.  On  the  other  hand,  it also serves as  a  measure  of 
the  portion of the  common  labour  borne  by  each  individual,  and  of  his 
share  in  the  part  of the  total  product  destined  for  individual 
consumption'  (68).  In  an  organised  economy  labour-time  might  play  a 
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average  to  produce  each  kind of use-value,  the  producers  can  plan  how 
much  of their capacities have  to  be  applied  to  each  task in order  to 
achieve  the  levels  of  necessary  output.  As  a  measure  of  the 
individual's  contribution to  the  production of that output it  serves 
as  a  means  of distributing that portion of the  total product  which  lS 
designated  for  personal  consumption.  Before  the  labour-power  of  the 
individual  producers  can  be  assessed  by  the  common  standard of labour-
time,  however,  they  must  be  equated  with  one  another.  Thus  before  it 
can  be  distributed to  the  various  tasks  which  face  the  members  of  an 
organised  economy,  the  labour-power  at their  disposal  has  to  be 
accounted  for  in  a  manner  which  recognises  the  distinctions  between 
varlOUS  qualities  of  labour-power,  and  the  varying  degrees  of 
difficulty  and  ease of the  tasks to  be  performed.  This  averaging 
process  can  only  be  accomplished  consciously  through  the  deliberations 
of  the  social  organ  responsible  for  the  planning  of  production. 
Labour  In  an  organised  economy  is  'first  of  all  socialized  and 
allocated labour'  and  it has  'the quality  of socially equalized  labour 
as  a  derived  and  additional characteristic'  (70). 
In  a  commodity-producing  economy,  the  producers  are  faced  with  an 
analogous  set  of  problems  relating to  how  their  labour  lS  to  be 
distributed among  the  branches of production.  Like  any  other  form  of 
production,  it has  the  same  fundamental  resource at its disposal,  the 
total social  labour-power  of the  producers  themselves.  The  difference 
between  commodity-producing  society  and  the  forms  of social  production 
which  precede it and  post-date it, in Marx's  conception of the 
bands  of history,  is that  where  production  in these  two  sets of 
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forms of society is carried out directly in  a  social manner,  the  production 
of  commodities  is by  its very  nature  private  and  independent.  The 
independent  producer is personally  independent  of the  other  likewise 
mutually  independent  producers of commodities.  As  Aristotle noted  ln 
his  Politics  and  Marx  notes  now  in Capital:  'As  a  general  rule, 
articles of utility become  commodities,  only  because  they  are  products 
of  the  labour  of private individuals or  groups  of  individuals  who 
carry  on  their work  independently of each  other'  (71).  However,  the 
fact  of  their personal  independence  does  not  ln  any  way  reduce  the 
social  character  of this  form  of production.  Where  there  exists  a 
social  division of labour,  and  it is difficult to conceive  a  form  of 
society  without  one,  the members  of  society,  whether  dependent, 
associated,  or  indeed  as in systems of commodity-production,  private, 
l.e.  in  one  form  or  another,  work  for  each  other  (72).  Their  labour 
possesses  a  social character.  In  both  dependent  and  associated  forms 
of social production,  labour is from  the  outset social.  In  systems  of 
commodity-production,  labour  is from  the  outset private,  but  Slnce 
such  forms  of society  are also characterised  by  a  social division  of 
labour,  the  fact  of its privacy  in no  way  denies  the  proposition  that 
'the  sum  total of the  labour of all these private  individuals  forms 
the  aggregate  labour  of society'  (73).  Private  production  still 
entails  the  distribution of social labour.  The  problem  lS  one  of 
explaining  how  labour  ln  commodity-producing  economies  can  be 
simultaneously private and  social  (74). 
The  'social metabolism',  Marx  writes in 1859,  of  commodity-producing 
societies,  'in  other words  the  exchange  of  particular  products  of 
private  individuals,  simultaneously  gives rise  to  definite  social 
130 relations of production,  into which  individuals enter  1n  the  course  of 
this  metabolism'  (75).  Consequently,  'the labour  of  the  individual 
asserts  itself as  a  part of the  labour  of society,  only  be  means  of 
the  relations  which  the  act of exchange  establishes directly  between 
the  products,  and  indirectly,  through  them,  between  the  producers' 
(76).  Commodities,  as  has  been  established  earlier,  exchange  1n 
quantitative  proportions  with  presupposes their  equivalence.  This 
equivalence can  only  be  established if commodities  are  commensurable. 
The  property  of commensurability  can  only  be  a  social  one  because  it 
does  not  exist naturally.  The  act of exchange  abstracts  from  both  the 
natural-form of the  commodity  and  the  particular useful  kind  of labour 
which  produced  it.  All  that remains  is abstract  labour,  or  labour 
which  1S  expended  without  regard  to  the  specific  mode  of  its 
expenditure.  What  this abstract  labour  represents is  nothing  other 
than  the  general social capacities which  are available to  the  members 
of  a  commodity  producing  society,  with  one  decisive  exception. 
Instead of appear1ng  within  their natural context,  i.e., that of their 
different  forms  of expenditure,  they  appear  1n  abstraction  as  the 
equal  labour  which  forms  the  substance  of value.  In  associated  forms 
of social production,  labour is directly social  and  then  equalised  for 
the  purposes  of the distribution of labour  power  and  the  resultant 
product.  In  commodity-producing societies,  labour is  private,  and 
only  becomes  social indirectly and  abstractly,  via its equalisation  in 
the  equalisation of commodities.  Abstract  labour is the specific  form 
or  secondary characteristic,  taken  by  concrete  labour  because  it  1S 
expended  privately,  which it must  take  in order  to  appear  as  social 
labour.  The  social  character  of  private  labour  1n  commodity-
production  1S  'an  emerging  result'  (77),  as  Marx  puts  it,  of  the 
131 universal  process of exchange. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
THE  FORM  OF  VALUE 
The  purpose  of this chapter is to glve  an  account  of  the  value-form 
and  the  role  which  it plays  in Marx's  overall theory  of value.  In  no 
small  part,  this entails an  exercise in recovery.  However,  important 
though  this  exercise  lS,  and  the  reasons  for  which  are  discussed 
below,  this  is not  the  main  aim  of the  Chapter.  The  importance  of 
Marx's  theory  of  the  value-form,  which  it  is  hoped  will  become 
apparent  as  the  chapter  progresses,  is two-fold.  Firstly,  it  answers 
a  number  of questions in general  value  theory,  extant  in  Aristotle's 
consideration  of the  problem  and  which  bedevilled  Smith,  Ricardo  and 
the  other  members  of the  Classical  school  of  political  economy .. 
Secondly,  in  providing  arguably  the  only  systematic analysis  of  the 
exchange-relation,  it  successfully  undermines  the  very  ground  upon 
which  orthodox  economics  has  developed  its  theory  of  value;  the 
assumption  of symmetry.  The  importance of this may  not  be  immediately 
apparent.  It  lS,  however,  arguable  that  orthodox  economics  has 
avoided  a  direct confrontation with  the  problems  of value  theory  by 
importing  a  series of symmetries  into its theory  of value.  Thus,  for 
example,  prlces  reflect values;  values  in  turn  reflect  utilities; 
money  flows  mirror  the  movement  of use-values.  What  orthodox  economic 
theory  has  not  appeared  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  lS  that  these 
assumptions  hold  good.  The  importance  of Marx's  analysis  of  the 
value-form is that it shows  that  the  very  nature of exchange  precludes 
the  possibility  of  symmetry,  except  as  an  accidental  form  of 
What  this analysis  shows  is that value,  and  its form,  do 
appearance. 
142 not  exist  1n  a  stable symmetrical  relationship. 
The  prevailing  Twentieth  Century  account  of Marx's  theory  of  value, 
whether  originating within  or  outwith  the  Marxist  school  of  political 
economy,  has  found  little in Marx's  analysis of  the  value-form  to 
augment  the  basic principle of the  labour  theory  of value.  If  what 
is  said in the  following  sections of this chapter  has  any  veracity, 
this absence  will  not  only  be  seen  as  a  significant omission  but  as  a 
possible  source of the  hypertrophy of thought characteristic of  late 
twentieth century  Marxism. 
Accounts  glven  from  within  the  non-Marxist  schools of economic  thought 
regard  the  theory  given  exposition in Capital  as little more  than  a 
corrupted  verS10n  of that given  by  Smith  and  Ricardo  in  their  more 
lapsarian moments,  politically re-modelled  and  packaged  for  a  moralism 
peculiar  to  the  Victorian  period.  That  Marx's  theoretical 
contribution  should  have  been  treated 1n  such  an  unsympathetic  manner 
from  such  a  quarter is perhaps  not  so  surprising.  However,  the 
absence  of a  full  account  reflects deleteriously  on  any  accompany1ng 
claim to scholarly representation. 
Whilst  non-Marxist  accounts  of Marx's  theory  of value  attach  little 
importance  to  the  value-form,  perhaps  what  is of greater surprise  1S 
the  low  importance  attaching  to it within Marxist  accounts  of  Marx's 
theory  of  value.  It is virtually absent  from  any  English  language 
account  of  note.  In  perhaps  the  most  familiar  of  the  sustained 
defences  of the  labour  theory of value  in English,  R.  L.  Meek  confines 
his discussion of the  value-form  to  a  single dismissive  remark: 
143 There  is  no  need  for  us  to  follow  Marx's  rather  complex 
analysis of the  'elementary',  'expanded'  and  'money'  forms  of 
value  in  any  detail.  (1) 
This  chapter  will  return later to  the  misconception  which  it  1S 
believed  underlay  Meek's  account  of the  labour  theory  of  value  and 
which  is responsible  for  his  failure to identify anything  of essential 
importance  in  the  value-form.  The  important  point  to  note  1S  that 
Meek's  judgement  1S  more  or  less  implicit  throughout  Anglophone 
Marxist  thought,  and  it is precisely  that  absence  which  perhaps 
justifies the  following  exegetical analysis of the  key  elements  of the 
theory. 
Marx  systematically presents his analysis of the  value-form  for  the 
first  time  1n  Capital.  Although  he  significantly referred  to  this 
theory  the earlier A Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Political 
Economy,  the  substance of these  references  presents  a  theory  1n  its 
process  of  formation,  in which  preliminary  conclusions  have  been 
reached,  and  which  therefore require  development  in order  to  draw  out 
their  full  theoretical  significance  (2).  As  far  as  the  English-
speaking  world  is concerned,  the  main  vehicle  for  the  theory  of  the 
value-form  is the  English  translation of the  third German  edition  of 
Capital,  first made  available in 1887,  and  which  has  been  the  main 
point  of reference  ever  since  (3).  It was  stated at the  outset  that 
it was  not  intended that  a  detailed methodological  commentary  be  made. 
However,  some  preliminary  comment  is  required  to  assist  1n 
understanding  the  nature  of  Marx's  method  of  explanation. 
following  section of this chapter will  provide  a  brief account  of 
chief characteristics of that method.  In  developing  that  account,  the 
The 
the 
section  attempts  to identify  the  links  between  Marx's  method  and  the 
144 account  given  of the  value-form  in  the  translated third  edition  of 
Capital.  To  the  extent  that  these  theoretical  links  cannot  be 
established,  the  substance  of Meek's  judgement  would  appear  to  be 
vindicated.  However,  it is one  of the  contentions of  this  chapter 
that  despite the  formal  nature of Marx's  presentation  these  elements 
form  a  structured whole  which  can  be  derived  from  the  text  and  the 
elements  of which  cannot  be  divorced  from  each  other  without  losing 
the  sense  and  meaning  of the  theory. 
The  third section of this chapter  provides  a  detailed examination  of 
Marx's  account  of  the  asymmetrical  structure  of  the  exchange 
relationship  and  in particular his dual  accounts  of the  properties  of 
the  asymmetrical  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  value.  The 
assumption  of  symmetry  is explicitly made  in  utility  theory  where 
utility  and  value  are  condensed  into a  single category  which  is  then 
reflected  In  a  mirror-like  fashion  in  the  exchange-relation.  This 
symmetry  has  its counterpart in Marxist  thought  where  the  symmetrical 
understanding  of the  relationship between  value  and  labour  explicit 
within  the  Classical  school  is preserved  within  Anglophone  Marxism. 
However,  whereas  Classical political economy  and  Anglophone  Marxist 
accounts  can  be  said to  have  collapsed  because  of  their  insistence 
upon  an  untenable  symmetry,  the  same  cannot  be  said  for  utility 
theory.  Utility  theory  is untenable  because  it  subjectivises  an 
essentially  objective structure  (4).  It is In  Marx's  account  of  the 
relative  and  equivalent  forms  of value  that  we  find  his  arguments  to 
support  his  contention  that  the  exchange  relation  possesses  an 
essentially  asymmetrical  objective structure.  To  the  extent  that 
these  arguments  fail,  then Marx's  theory  of value is flawed  at  its 
145 core.  Their  success,  however,  draws  into question  a  fundamental  tenet 
of economic  theory,  whether  Non-Marxist  or  of the  hitherto  prevailing 
Marxist  variant.  It will  be  contended  that the latter is the  correct 
version  of  events  and  that  the  Third  Edition  of  Capital  contains 
sufficient analytical  argument  to support  Marx's  major  proposition. 
The  third section of this chapter,  in analysing Marx's  account  of  the 
development  of the  value-form,  also  shows  how  the  theory  is linked  to 
the  other  key  elements of Marx's  theory  of value,  in  particular  the 
two-fold  nature  of the  commodity  and  the  dual  nature of  the  labour 
which  produces it. 
If  Marx's  arguments  regarding  the  objectivity  of  the  inherent 
structure  of  exchange  have  been  lost in the  course of the  last  one 
hundred  years,  of even  greater unfamiliarity is Marx's  explanation  of 
the  nature of money  and  its relationship  to  the  basic structure of the 
elementary  exchange-relation.  It lS  not  intended that  this  chapter 
should  provide  a  complete  account  of Marx's  theory  of money  (5).  It 
would,  however,  be  possible to point  to  a  common  deficiency  within 
those  accounts  which  are available  and  which  is  relevant  to  the 
purposes  of this chapter.  In  Section  Three  of Chapter  One  of Capital, 
Marx  goes  to  great  lengths  to  demonstrate that  the  formation  of  money 
is  a  necessary  development  of the  elementary  social act of  exchange. 
It  lS  a  common  mistake  to see in this presentation  nothing  more  than 
an  empty  logical construct,  and  one  which  at best  only  complicates  an 
otherwise  reasonably  transparent  theory.  What  is omitted,  and  largely 
so  because  the  purpose  of the  account  lS  not  understood,  lS  any 
consciousness of Marx's  presentation of the  value-form  and  its further 
146 developments  as  developments  of a  form  and  that  such  developments 
occur  of necessity.  It is essential,  therefore,  to  the  understanding 
of money  that this process is recognised  in its inextricable link with 
the  value-form.  Without  that recognition,  Marx's  consolidation of the 
elements  of  his  theory  of value  in  Chapter  Two  of  Capital  are 
meaningless,  as also  Chapter  Three  would  be  where  the  theory  is put  to 
work.  Section  Three  of this chapter,  therefore,  provides  an  account 
of  Marx's  explanation of the  development  of the  value-form  from  its 
elementary  form,  through  the  expanded  and  general  forms,  ultimately 
arriving  at  the  universal  and  money  forms  where  In  the  only  opus 
extant  in  economic  theory  is there  any  serious  attempt  to  address  the 
problem  of defining  the nature of price. 
II.  The  Value-Form  and  Method 
Of  the criticisms of the  Classical school  of political economy,  Marx's 
third  is  directed  towards its failure  to  analyse  what  he  calls  the 
value-form.  Whilst  Smith,  Ricardo  and  others are praised  for  their 
efforts in analysing  the  substance of value  and  for  having  worked  out 
an  elementary  theory of its magnitude,  they  are criticised for  failing 
to  distinguish  between  labour  as  producer  of value  and  labour  as 
producer  of  use-value.  Closely  tied to  this  criticism  are  the 
concepts  Marx  developed  in respect of  the  quantitative  dimension, 
principally,  socially-necessary  labour  time.  These  composite  findings 
are  attributed  by  Marx  to  the Classical  School's  almost  exclusive 
concern  with  the  quantitative value  problem.  The  third  of  Marx's 
criticisms  superficially appears  to  follow  the  same  line  of  attack; 
admonishing  the  Classical  school  theorists  for  neglecting  the 
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explains,  the  Classical  school  'has  indeed  analysed,  however, 
incompletely,  value  and  its magnitude,  and  has  discovered  what  lies 
beneath  these  forms'  (6).  From  the  account  glven  of Marx's  theory  In 
the  prevlous  chapter,  we  can  take  his reference  to  the  incomplete 
nature  of  the  Classical  inquiry  as  a  reference  to their  failure  to 
distinguish  between  abstract  and  concrete  labour  (7).  Of  great 
importance  though  these criticisms are,  particularly when  considering 
the  distinction  between  Marx  and  the  Classicals,  Marx  appears  to 
suggest  a  third criticism:  Classical political economy,  he  argues,  has 
failed  to  give  a  full  and  coherent  account  of the  labour  theory  of 
value  because  'it has  never  once  asked  the  question  why  labour  lS 
represented  by  the  value  of its product  and  labour-time  by  the 
magnitude  of that value'  (8). 
In  a  footnote  to  the  passage  containing this criticism,  Marx  expands 
this  point  by  explaining what  Smith  and  Ricardo  failed  to  do  and  why 
they  failed  to do  it.  The  errors in their theory  are  imported  at  the 
fundamental  level  of  their  endeavours:  'It is  one  of  the  chief 
failings of classical  economy  that it has  never  succeeded,  by  means  of 
its  analysis of commodities,  and,  In  particular,  of their  value,  In 
discovering  that  form  under  which  value  becomes  exchange-value'  (9). 
Marx's  analysis of the  commodity,  it will  be  remembered,  identified at 
the  outset  the  dual  nature of the  commodity  and  in particular that its 
specification  as  exchange-value  (or  material  depository  of  exchange-
value,  as  he  sometimes  puts it),  was  a  specification of  form.  The 
lack  of  importance  which  Smith  and  Ricardo  attached to  the  form  of 
value  is  not,  however,  caused entirely by  their  almost  exclusive 
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suggests  Marx,  'lies deeper'  (10).  The  Classical  economists'  neglect 
of  the  qualitative dimension  of the  value-problem is compounded  by  a 
peculiarity  of  the  nature of market  economies  which  masks  their 
essentially historical natures: 
The  value-form of the  product of labour is not  only  the  most 
abstract,  but is also the  most  universal  form,  taken  by  the 
product  in  bourgeois  production,  and  stamps  that  production 
as  a  particular species of social production,  and  thereby 
gives it its special historical character  (11). 
It is precisely the  universal  character of the  value-form in  bourgeois 
society  which  deflects its investigation.  In  appearing  to  possess 
universality  across  all products,  the  value-form  propagates  its own 
myth  that it is universal  to all  forms  of society,  irrespective of the 
stage  of  historical development.  But  regardless  of  its  universal 
applicability  to market  economy,  it is still a  historically  limited 
form  of social product.  Consequently,  if a  form  is not  looked  for,  a 
form  will  not  be  found.  Yet,  understanding  cannot  proceed  without 
just such  an  analysis.  Their  failure  to orient their efforts In  this 
direction  ensured  that  the  Classical  school  would  encounter 
insurmountable theoretical obstacles.  By  making  the  required  form  of 
analysis,  Marx  avoids  these obstacles.  The  first obstacle  lS  wrought 
by  history.  Thus,  if as  Smith  and  Ricardo  certainly did: 
we  treat this mode  of production  as  one  eternally  fixed  by 
Nature  for  every state of society,  we  necessarily  overlook 
that  which  is the differentia specifica of  the  value-form, 
and  consequently of the  commodity-form,  and  of  its  further 
developments,  money-form,  capital-form,  etc.  (12) 
The  failure  to  examlne  the  value-form is a  failure  to  examine  what 
differentiates  a  market  economy  from  any  other  form  of  social 
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political  economists  thought  that  those specific  characteristics  of 
the  commodity  form  of society  were  characteristic of all social  forms. 
The  value-form,  we  might  say,  is of the  essence of market  economy,  and 
its  identification  and  analysis  is  what  differentiates  the 
investigation  of  such  social  forms  from  the  investigation  of  any 
other.  The  pertinent  questions  therefore are;  what  is the  value-form 
and  wherein  lies its significance?  And  of what  does  Marx's  analysis 
of it consist?  By  answering  these  questions,  it will  be  seen  that  the 
value-form represents the  key-stone  to  Marx's  theory  of value. 
If  we  say  that the  value-form is the  differentia  specifica  of  a 
particular  form  of social production,  it is important  to  avoid  the 
danger  of being over-specific.  This  lS  so  for  two  reasons.  Firstly, 
by  being  specific it is possible  to  run  the  danger  of displacing  the 
embodied  labour of value  conception  by  an  'embodied  abstract  labour' 
conception  (13).  Secondly,  by  being  over-specific it is also  possible 
to  misunderstand  the  role  played  by  the  concept  of  form  In  Marx's 
methodology.  A good  example  of how  this can  occur  is that of Elson  in 
her  essay  'A  Value  Theory  of Labour',  an  essay  which  is discussed 
some  length  in  the  following chapter. 
at 
Few  would  dispute  that Marx's  theory  of value is inextricably  linked 
to  his  theory  of history.  It is probably  not  an  exaggeration  to 
suggest,  however,  that this relationship  has  rarely  been  properly 
articulated  in  a  comprehensive  manner.  Discussing  the  relationship 
between  money  and  value  Elson  argues: 
There  lS  a  problem  with  Marx's  exposition of  the  role  of 
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all  human  labour',  in  that  he  does  not  distinguish 
sufficiently  clearly between  money  as  a  medium  of  exchange 
and  the  money  form  of value  (money  as  universal  equivalent). 
Money  in  itself is not  specific to  the capitalist  mode  of 
production  •..  and  the  fact  that money  is functioning  as  a 
medium  of exchange  does  not  mean  that it is  functioning  as  an 
expression  of  value,  the  'direct incarnation of  all  human 
labour'.  This  distinction  is  elided  In  many  of  the 
statements  made  in Chapter  2,  'The  Process  of  Exchange', 
creating  the  impression  that  where  there is money,  there  IS 
also  value.  Money  as  medium  of exchange  IS  certainly  a 
necessary  precursor  to  the  money  form  of  value,  but  In 
Chapter  2  Marx  overstresses the continuity at the  expense  of 
the  difference  (14). 
Elson  IS  correct to identify this elision in  Chapter  2  of  Capital. 
However,  far  from  being  an  errant  mode  of expression,  it should  rather 
be  seen  as  a  consequence  of Marx's  very  procedure  for  presenting  the 
results  of  his  investigation.  In  other  words,  this  elision  IS 
deliberate.  Consider  the  following  passage  from  Chapter  2  itself: 
Money  is a  crystal  formed  of necessity  in the  course of  the 
exchanges,  whereby  different  products  of  labour  are 
practically  equated  to  one  another  and  thus  by  practice 
converted  into  commodities.  The  historical  progress  and 
extension  of  exchanges  develops  the  contrast,  latent  In 
commodities,  between  use-value  and  value  (15). 
What  for  Elson  signals danger  in this explanation  IS  that  Marx's 
explanatory  hierarchy of first value  and  then  money  is not  supported 
by  history  where,  for  example,  there  may  be  instances  of  exchange 
involving  money  but  where it would  be  inappropriate to  speak  of  a 
generalised  system  of exchange  based  on  commodity  production.  The 
problem  however  lies not  so  much  in Marx's  method  of explanation  but 
in  recognising  what  it is that  Marx  is explaining. 
If  Marx's  presentation  had  been  purely historical,  he  would  perhaps 
have  examined  the  concrete  development  of money  in specific societies, 
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reasons  for  why  it developed in its specific  forms  by  reference  to  the 
materials  of  its composition  and  so  forth,  1n  much  the  same  way  as 
Smith  1n  The  Wealth  of Nations.  But  Chapter  2  only  includes  passing 
references  to  this kind of material  and  even  then  only  1n  a  semi-
illustrative  fashion.  Rosdolsky  suggests  that  the  reason  for  Marx's 
particular  method  of presentation is closely  linked  to his  method  of 
analysis.  Adopting  the  suggestion made  by  Engels  in  reviewing  Marx's 
work  of 1859  (16),  Rosdolsky  explains  that 
Marx's  method  from  the outset can  be  seen  best of all in  the 
numerous  passages in the  Rough  Draft,  in  the Contribution  and 
in Capital  which  provide  - parallel to  the  logical derivation 
of  value  and  money  - a  historical derivation of  these  same 
concepts,  in  which  Marx  confronts  the  results of his abstract 
analysis  with  actual historical development  (17). 
According  to  Rosdolsky,  what  we  find  in  Marx  is a  combined  logical  and 
historical  methods  pace  Engels.  To  return briefly  to  Elson,  the 
description  of Marx's  method  as  logical would  have  some  credibility: 
'Money  as  a  medium  of exchange is certainly a  necessary  precursor  to 
the  money  form  of value',  but  we  would  have  to decline  the description 
of  Marx's  method  as historical,  because  there is nothing  there  that 
systematically  resembles  the  normal  scholarly conception of historical 
analysis  (18).  If we  are  not  to  be  helped  by  either logic  or  history, 
how  is Marx's  method  to  be  described? 
This  problem  1S  considered in detail by  Meikle  who  concludes  that 
confusion  as  to  the  nature of  Marx's  method  and  its  attendant 
philosophical  apparatus  is due  in large part to  the  absence  1n  the 
twentieth  century  of  any  coherently  formed  and  articulated 
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failed,  was  a  conception  of  Marx's  methods  of  analysis  and 
presentation  as  methods  informed  by  the  philosophical  categories  of 
essentialism.  The  fact  that  a  commentator  as  familiar  with  the  work 
of  Marx  as  Rosdolsky  was  unable  to  identify  and  promote  that 
methodology  1S  evidence  of how  deep  essentialist  thought  has  been 
buried  and  how  pervas1ve  the  influence of  the  alternative  atomist 
philosophies  has  been.  It is,  however,  of  central  importance  to 
appreciate  the  basic  components  of Marx's  methods  of  analysis  and 
presentation in  order  to derive greatest benefit  from  his analysis  of 
the  value-form,  an  analysis of what  many  regard  as  the  most  difficult, 
and  1n  purpose  most  obscure,  of Marx's  writings.  The  character  and 
relationship  between  the  two  components  of Marx's  science  are  justly 
summarised  by  Meikle  in  the  following  paragraph: 
There  is obviously  a  reason  why  the  'method  of  presentation' 
of  a  dialectical  scientific account  of  something  should 
result  in  a  product  that  appears  to  be  an  a  priori 
construction.  (Failure  to  understand  this  reason  explains 
bourgeois  objections  to  the  'self-contained'  and 
'theological'  nature of Marx's  'system'.)  The  reason is that 
having  gone  through  the  'method  of inquiry',  by  which  he 
means  seeking  out  the  'inner connection'  or essence,  one  then 
has  perforce  to  represent  the  movement  for  what  it really is, 
namely,  one  of the  developments  of an  essence,  a  series  of 
necessary  changes  or realisations of potential.  To  present 
the  real  nature  of the  process  in  this  way  necessarily 
abstracts  from  all  the  empirical material  turned  up  and' 
worked  over  in the  process of enquiry,  which  itself  resulted 
precisely  in  the  tracking  down,  and  identification,  of  the 
essence  or  real nature  (19). 
What  we  have  in Capital is Marx's  presentation of the  results of  his 
enquiries.  What  his enquiries  have  led  him  to discover is  that  the 
value-form  is the  sine ~  non  of the  market  form  of  economy.  What 
the  first chapter  shows  is the  basic structure of that  form  which  is 
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wage-labour  and  capital. 
II.  The  Relative  and  Eguivalent  Forms  of Value 
After  giving  his  brief  accounts  of  the  two-fold  nature  of  the 
commodity  and  of  the  labour  which  produces  it,  Marx  provides  ln 
Section  Three  of Chapter  One  a  detailed account  of the  structure  of 
the  value-form.  As  has  already  been  indicated,  this is the  component 
part  of 
little 
the  theory  of value  which  is most  often 
analytical  comment  in the  commentaries  on 
passed 
Marx. 
over  with 
The  main 
contention of this presentation is that this section is vital  towards 
understanding  both  the  preceding sections  and  the  further  elaborations 
of  the  categories  of the  market  economy  which  Marx  makes  ln  his 
thoughts  on  money  and  capital. 
The  section opens  with  Marx  reiterating a  basic  premise  of the  theory 
of value.  Value,  he  explains,  is a  property  of the  commodity-form  of 
the  labour-product  that has  to  be  distinguished  from  its  physical 
forms  and  qualities:  'Turn  and  examine  a  single  commodity,  by  itself, 
as  we  will,  yet  in so  far  as it remains  an  object of value,  it  seems 
impossible  to grasp it'  (20).  The  'immateriality'  of value,  however, 
only  persists to  the extent that the  qualities of a  product  as  value 
are  inaccurately identified or  ignored.  The  category of value  itself 
cannot  be  unravelled until  value is regarded  as  the  dimension  in  which 
commodities  exist as  units of the  same  homogeneous  substance,  social 
labour.  Once  that characteristic is correctly identified,  we  can  do 
away  with  the  necessity  of having  to try to  explain  value  on  the  basis 
of  the  individual  product  because  'it follows  as  a  matter  of  course, 
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commodity  to  commodity'  (21).  What  Marx's  methodology  allows  and 
which  is precluded  by  atomism  is the  conception  that  value  involves  a 
specific  social  relation  and  concomitantly,  that  what  lS  under 
investigation is not  the  composition of a  specific product  but  of  the 
social  relations  which  give rise to  the  exchange  of  products  as 
commodities. 
This  view  of the  problem is radically different  from  that  formulated 
by  both  Marx's  predecessors within  the  Classical  school  and  those  who 
have  followed  him  in attempting  to  resolve  the  problem  of value.  In 
the  Classical  theory  of Ricardo  and  Smith,  products  possess  the 
designation  'values'  simply  because  they  have  labour  expended  upon 
their  production.  Value,  therefore,  does  not  require  manifestation, 
expression  or  otherwise  revelation because its presence  within  the 
very  product  is sufficient to attract a  description  as  value.  For 
Smith  and  Ricardo,  commodities  are  values  because  they  are  products. 
The  language  of  value is the  language  of  man's  intercourse  with 
Nature.  Its position as explanation of man's  behaviour  is fundamental 
and  hence  Marx's  often-repeated criticism of the  Classical  political 
economists  that  they  apply  the  standards of the  modern  epoch  to  every 
age  and  therefore  fail  to identify their specific  differences.  For 
Marx,  distinctly,  commodities  are  values  because  they  are  produced 
under  the  specific  social  relations  of  private  production  and 
exchange.  Here  lies the pertinence of the  nub  of Marx's  criticism  of 
Smith  and  Ricardo,  that  they  failed  to  explain  why  labour  lS 
represented  by  its  product  as  commodity,  i.e.  value,  and  why  the 
quantum  of labour  so  expended  lS  represented  by  the  magnitude  of  that 
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he  has  answers  to these  questions  and  they  can  therefore  be  important 
to  him. 
objection 
merely  not 
instance. 
However,  that is not  to  diminish 
to  the  Classical  schema  in  which 
answered  but  that  they  are  not 
If one  does  not  recognise  in the 
the  pertinence  of  his 
these  questions  are  not 
even  asked  1n  the  first 
fact  of private production 
and  exchange  a  characteristic of importance,  one  cannot  even  begin  to 
ask  questions  about  such  social  phenomena.  Marx  saw  something 
remarkable  1n  those  facts  and  was  able to construct  from  them  the 
1nner  structure of exchange  which  contains  as  an  essential  component 
the  fact  that  in societies characterised  by  such  social  relations  of 
production,  labour  must  be  socially articulated or  the  society  would 
not  function.  If labour  1S  expended  privately,  there  must  be  a  focal 
social  nexus.  which  articulates those  private  activities  into  a 
social whole.  This,  he  discovers,  is exchange. 
Expressed  1n  terms  of  labour,  the  commodity  is  the  product  of 
privately  expended  labour.  That  labour  can  be  characterised  as 
individual  and  concrete  in  the  sense  defined  in the  previous  chapter. 
In  order  to  become  social labour,  i.e.  for  the  society  to  function  as 
an  articulated  whole,  that privately expended  labour  must  become 
abstract,  or  more  precisely acquire  the  character of abstract  labour. 
How  this is achieved  in practice is the  crucial question  addressed  by 
Marx's  thoughts  on  the  nature  and  structure of the  value-form  (22). 
As  with  all  problems,  it is necessary  to  identify  the  point  of 
departure  for  formulating  the  solution  - and  for  Marx  this  1S  quite 
straightforwardly  a  matter  of fact:  'In  fact  we  started  from  the 
exchange-value,  or  the  exchange-relation of commodities,  in order  to 
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under  which  value  first  appeared  to  us'  (23).  The  values  of 
commodities  are  expressed  In  their  relationships  with  other 
commodities,  that  is,  quite simply,  in  their  exchange-value  (24). 
Marx  denotes  this as  the  first  form  in  which  value  is presented  to  the 
observer,  and  by  a  process of analysis is abstracted  from  temporarily 
whilst  the  category  of  value  and  its  content  lS  glven  prior 
consideration.  In  Section  Three,  Chapter  One,  of Capital this initial 
starting point is returned  to in order  to complete  the  analysis. 
The  first  point  Marx  makes  lS  that  each  commodity  has  as  many 
exchange-values  as  there  are  commodities  (25).  One  commodity  of  a 
specified  quantity  does  not  just exchange  with  a  quantity  of this  or 
that  commodity  but  with  quantities of the  full  range  of  commodities. 
However,  all commodities  possess  an  exchange-value  in  common,  l.e.  one 
that is qualitatively different  from  that specified  by  exchange  for  a 
quantum  of any  ordinary  commodity.  'I mean',  explains  Marx,  'their 
money-form'. 
Here,  however,  a  task is set  for  us,  the  performance  of which 
has  never  yet  been  attempted  by  bourgeois  economy,  the  task 
of tracing the  genesis of this money-form,  of developing  the 
expression  of  value  implied  in  the  value-relation  of 
commodities,  from  its simplest,  almost  imperceptible outline, 
to  the  dazzling  money-form.  By  doing  this we  shall  at  the 
same  time  solve  the  riddle presented  by  money  (26). 
The  fact  that  bourgeois  economy  had  not  been  able  to  arrive  at  a 
definitive  analysis of its fundamental  category is not  unsurprising. 
However,  Marx  is not  just admonishing its lack of self-knowledge, 
he  attempting  in  any  simple  sense  to  complete  a  task  which  it  lS 
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had not  performed.  What  Marx  explains is that  the  apparent  mystery  which 
surrounds  money  is dispelled as  soon  as its constituent  elements 
identified.  Money  lS  but  a  development  of the  most  fundamental 
are 
form 
of market  economy  - the  value-form,  and  this  we  know  is what  bourgeois 
economy  failed  to identify  and  analyse. 
The  distinctive  way  in  which  Marx  approaches  the analysis of money  can 
be  appreciated  by  comparing it with  the  analyses of money  presented  by 
Classical or  indeed  modern  economic  theory.  For  these  two  schools  of 
thought,  the  problem  of explaining money  is solved  by  enumerating  its 
purposes.  Thus,  almost  without  exception,  a  review  of the  works  of 
political economy  and  economic  theory  will  reveal  that  money  came  into 
being  to  satisfy a  number  of functions.  Typically  those  functions 
will  be  as  a  means  of payment,  standard of value,  store of value  and 
means  of  exchange.  Once  these  functions  have  been  identified,  at 
least  so  far  as  modern  economic  theory is concerned,  there  lS  very 
little  else  that  can  be  said about  money.  If  money  lS  so  self-
explanatory  why  did  Marx  not  stop at money,  why  in that sense  go  any 
further?  The  necessity of extended analysis,  for  Marx,  was  abundantly 
clear.  There  is a  fundamental  methodological  flaw  in  the  view  that  a 
complete  analysis  of money  is achieved  once  its  manifest  functions 
have  been  identified.  For  Marx,  such  an  analysis would  at best  only 
point  In  the  direction of further  enquiry  and  at  worst  would  be 
misleading  in  that it suppresses  a  number  of the  very  questions  which 
it  begs.  An  examination  of the  functions  of  money  is  merely  a 
preliminary  exercise to establishing its nature.  In  order  to begin  to 
understand  money,  one  has  to first  form  the  concept  of the  money-form 
of value  and  this in turn will not  be  possible until  one  has  the  basic 
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In  order,  then,  to  comprehend  the  money-form  of value,  it  1S  first 
necessary  to  work  back  to  the simplest  expression of value  per  se,  and 
that  1S  the  simple,  isolated or accidental  form  of exchange  of  one 
commodity  directly  for  another.  Having  identified the  presence of the 
form  of value  in  the  simplest relation in which  commodities  take  part, 
one  1S  then  partially  equipped  to  carry  out  the  more  difficult 
operations of,  for  example,  identifying the  nature of the  money-form. 
Bailey's  critique  of Ricardo  hinges  around  the latter's  failure  to 
identify  that  value  requires  a  form  in  which  it  1S  manifested  or 
expressed.  Ricardo,  it may  be  remembered,  unsuccessfully  developed 
the  theory  of  value  in  the  direction of an  invariable  measure  of 
value.  Bailey's merit is in  having  shown  that  the  function  of  money 
as  the  measure  of value  was  independent  of any  consideration  of  the 
invariability of its own  value.  This  question is a  red-herring  which, 
as  we  saw  1n  Chapter  Two,  hindered  the  progress  towards  an  accurate 
formulation  of  the  problem of value.  Bailey,  however,  does  not 
himself  contribute to  a  clarification of that problem,  because  as  we 
have  already  seen,  he  criticises Ricardo  for  not  only  erroneously 
seeking  an  invariable measure  of value,  but  for  having  transformed 
value  itself from  a  relative to  a  positive and  absolute  phenomenon. 
For  Bailey,  the essential relativity of value is captured  1n  money 
because  via  various  quanta of money  it 1S  possible to  say  what  value  a 
particular  commodity  has  relative  to  a  quantity  of  some  other 
commodity  or  to  a  quantity of money  itself.  In  crude  terms,  money  1S 
not  only  the  measure  of the  relative value  of commodities,  it is their 
relative  values.  Money,  therefore,  is the  general  manifestation  of 
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of  Surplus  Value,  exchange-value  'manifests itself in a  general  form 
when  it is expressed  in the  use-value  of a  third commodity,  in  which 
all other  commodities  likewise express  their value'  (28).  This  third 
commodity  is the  money-commodity.  However,  as  we  know,  Bailey  also 
considered  the  expression of exchange-value  in  the  context  of  simple 
exchange  and  again  he  discovered  that there was  an  expression of value 
involved.  What  Bailey  fails  to  recognise  lS  that  there  lS  a 
qualitative  difference  between  the  general  and  the  particular 
expression  of value  which  points  in the  direction of the  fundamental 
problem  of value  itself. 
The  money-form  of value is at one  and  the  same  time  the  most  simple 
and  most  complex  of relationships.  It lS  a  simple  matter  to  recognise 
that  money  can  express  the  values of any  number  of  commodities.  It 
lS,  however,  a  more  difficult proposition to  accept  that  the  simple 
exchange  of products contains  an  identical relationship,  albeit in its 
most  rudimentary  form  (24).  As  we  have  already  seen,  Bailey's account 
of  exchange-value  imported  the  relationship  inherent  In  monetary 
exchange  into  that of the  simplest  exchange  relationship.  Bailey 
insists on  the  irreducibility of the  most  complex  of relationships and 
lS  unable  to detect or  recognise  that the  phenomenon  of money  is  but 
itself  a  more  highly  developed  form  of  a  simpler  economic 
relationship. 
factors  which 
The  monetary  relationship presupposes  more  elementary 
Bailey is unable  to  take  account  of.  And  what  this 
ultimately  represents is a  failure  to  ask  the  question of what  is  the 
value-form  an  expression  of?  As  Marx  puts it,  Bailey 
even  forgets  the  simple consideration that if  y  yards  of 
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two  unequal  things  - linen  and  straw  - making  them  equal 
magnitudes.  This  existence of theirs as  things  that  are 
equal  must  surely  be  different  from  their existence  as  straw 
and  linen.  It  is not  as  straw  and  linen  that  they  are 
equated,  but  as  equivalents.  The  one  side  of  the  equation 
must,  therefore,  express  the  same  value  as  the  other.  The 
value  of straw  and  linen must,  therefore,  be  neither  straw 
nor  linen,  but  something  common  to  both  and  different  from 
both  commodities  considered  as  straw  and  linen  (30). 
Ricardo  had  shown,  particularly in his comments  on  Destutt  de  Tracy, 
that  he  was  fully  aware  of the  problem  of  commensuration  and  had 
reached  it by  concluding  that  commodities  were  commensurable  because 
they  were  the  products of labour  and  that  their equivalence  arose  from 
their  being  the  products  of equivalent quantities of labour.  Having 
reached  this  point,  Ricardo  is unable  to  progress  further  as  his 
analysis  becomes  enmired  In  the  problem  of  labour  heterogeneity. 
Finding  no  suitable  resolution,  Ricardo  attempts  to  reVlve  the 
invariable measure  of value,  an  effort which  is ultimately  futile. 
Bailey's  critique of Ricardo  only  holds  good  to  the  extent  that  the 
latter  'does  not  examine  the  form  of value',  a  task  which  if  Ricardo 
had  carried  it  out  successfully would  have  shown  Bailey,  not 
mention  his latter-day supporters: 
that  the  relativity of the  concept  of value is by  no  means 
negated  by  the  fact  that all commodities  in  so  far  as  they 
are  exchange-values,  are only  relative expressions of  social 
labour  time  and  their relativity consists  by  no  means  solely 
of  the  ratio in  which  they  exchange  for  one  another,  but  of 
the  ratio of all of  them  to  this social  labour  which  is their 
substance  (31). 
to 
Ricardo's  concept  of labour-time  does  not  fulfil its purpose  because 
he  does  not  explain,  as  Marx  puts it in  the  footnote  cited  earlier, 
the  form  under  which  value  becomes  exchange-value,  or  to  put it in  a 
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product  of private,  individual,  concrete  labour  manifests  itself  as 
the  product  of social labour,  i.e.,  as  the  product  of  individuals 
working  under  the specific historical and  social relations of  private 
production  and  exchange.  As  we  saw  1n  the  previous  chapter,  under 
such  forms  of social production,  labour  must  take  the  form  of  value 
and  labour-time,  the  form  of the  magnitude  of that value: 
The  transformation  of  the  labour  of  private  individuals 
contained  in  the  commodities  into  uniform  social  labour, 
consequently  into  labour  which  can  be  expressed  in all  use-
value  and  can  be  exchanged  for  them,  this qualitative  aspect 
of  the  matter  which  is contained  in  the  representation  of 
exchange-value  as  money,  is not  elaborated  by  Ricardo.  The 
circumstance  the  necessity  of  presenting  the  labour 
contained  in commodities  as  uniform  social  labour,  i.e.,  as 
money  - is overlooked  by  Ricardo  (32). 
In  the  first part of this citation,  Marx  repeats his  usual  criticism 
that  Ricardo  fails to properly  address  the  qualitative  problem  of 
value.  In  the  second  part,  however,  Marx  specifies  unambiguously  the 
concern  which  he  has  with  Ricardo's  way  of approaching  the  problem. 
Correcting  himself  1n  the  process,  Marx  explains that  there  1S  a 
necessity  involved  in presenting the  labour  which  produces  commodities 
as  uniform  social labour.  Ricardo  cannot  ask  this question  because  he 
does  not  see that there is a  necessity  involved,  in addition  to  the 
assumption  which  he,  and  Smith  before  him,  had  made  in  respect of  the 
homogeneity  of labour.  However,  Marx  goes  further  than  his  and  argues 
from  the standpoint of his  own  researches,  that  the  transformation  of 
individual  into  social  labour  1S  inherently  connected  to  the 
phenomenon  of money.  How  this is achieved is the central  purpose  of 
Marx's  presentation of the  development  of the  value-form. 
162 As  explained  in the  Introduction to this chapter,  the  third  edition 
of Capital is the  one  used  as  the  point of reference  for  the  reception 
of  Marx's  theory  of  value  1n  the  English-speaking  world.  That 
edition,  as  we  know,  contains  a  detailed account  of the  value-form  1n 
Section  Three  of Chapter  One,  and  as  we  also  know,  this has  to  be  one 
of  the  least  explored  of  the sections  of  that  chapter  1n  the 
literature of Marxist  political economy.  Doubtless,  Meek's  dismissal 
of it is an  extreme  form  of the neglect  which  has  been  its fate.  It 1S 
now  intended  that  this neglect is amended  by  tracing  the  line  of 
Marx's  thought  through  the section with  the  ultimate  objective  of 
showing  how  the  form  of value is intimately connected  with  the  two-
fold  nature of the  commodity  and  the  labour  which  produces it (33). 
The  section itself contains the  briefest of introductions.  The  reader 
is not  really  given  any  sense  of the  importance  of what  is to  follow, 
nor  of the  prior analytical processes which  have  taken  place  in  order 
to  produce  what  the  reader  1S  about  to  follow.  The  section  opens  with 
what  can  only  be  described as  a  conclusion: 
The  simplest  value  relation  is  evidently  that  of  one 
commodity  to  some  one  other  commodity  of a  different  kind. 
Hence  the  relation between  the  values  of  two  commodities 
supplies  us  with  the  simplest expression of the  value  of  a 
single  commodity  ... The  whole  mystery  of the  form  of  value 
lies  hidden  1n  this  elementary  form.  Its  analysis, 
therefore,  is our  real difficulty  (34). 
Clearly,  Marx  was  only  able  to arrive at this conclusion after earlier 
analysis,  which  has  shown  to  him  that  the  simplest expression of value 
1S  contained in the  simplest  exchange  relationship.  What  we  now  see  1S 
a  presentation of the  conclusions of that analysis as  Marx  builds  up 
163 the  elements of the  value-form,  linking in,  in  due  course,  the  dual 
nature  of  the  commodity  form  and  the  two-fold  nature  f  o  commodity 
producing  labour. 
One  of  the  most  important  of those  conclusions  1S  that  of  the 
asymmetrical  structure  of exchange.  This  is also  one  of  the  most 
difficult of Marx's  ideas to grasp  and it is therefore,  at  the risk of 
being  digressive,  useful  to give it some  preliminary  consideration 
before  considering the  theory  as  a  whole.  It is useful  to contrast it 
with  the  symmetrical  theories of value  typically  based  on  utility. 
Marx  makes  a  distinction  between  the  roles  played  by  commodities  1n 
the  exchange  relation,  such  that  the  role  played  by  a  pint of milk  1n 
the  exchange, 
1  pint of milk = 2  oz.  of coffee, 
1S  different  from  that  played  by  the coffee  (35).  To  paraphrase 
Marx's  explanation,  the  milk  expresses its value  1n  the  coffee;  the 
coffee  serves as  the material  in  which  that  value is  expressed.  He 
then  goes  on  further  to specify  that the  former  plays  an  active  role 
whilst  the latter plays  a  passive  role.  It is clear  from  this  that 
the  two  roles are  inseparable.  It would  not  be  plausible to  have  a 
commodity  which  tries  to  express its  value  without  there  being 
something  ln which it can  be  expressed.  One  could  probably  go  further 
and  say  that it would  not  be  a  commodity  in the  first instance  because 
products  become  commodities  by  virtue of a  specific  set  of  social 
relationships.  Marx  then  goes  on  to consider  whether  or  not  the 
equation  works  if identical commodities  occupy  each  of the  positions. 
Interestingly  enough,  he  argues  that this does  not  result  1n  an 
164 expression  of  value.  Thus,  for  example,  the  term  one  pint  of  milk 
equals  one  pint  of milk  does  not  contain  an  expression  of  value. 
Since  the  commodities  are identical there is no  reduction  to  be  made 
and  correspondingly  there  is no  resulting  value.  Indeed,  1n  the 
context  of the  workings  of a  market  economy,  the situation would  not 
arise  because  there  1S  no  need  to  regulate  the  production  of  a 
particular  commodity  on  the  basis  of  that  commodity  alone  V1a 
exchange.  The  essence  of  market  economy  1S  the  regulation  of 
production  by  means  of commodities. 
This  1S  where  it may  be  appropriate to contrast 
Marx's  conception  with  the  symmetry  of  utility 
the  asymmetry 
theory.  For 
of 
the 
utility  theorist,  the  choice  as  to  which  commodity  to  acquire  1S  a 
subjective  one.  As  we  saw  in chapter  three,  these  subjective  impulses 
are  imported  into  the  exchange  equation  1n  order  to  determine  the 
proportions  1n  which  commodities  are  to  exchange.  It  is  the 
individual's  indifference  between  two  commodities  which  establishes 
their  equality,  so  that the  relationship  between  the  two  1S  indirect 
and  only  established  V1a  the tastes,  wishes  and  wants  of the  desiring 
subject.  From  the latter's point of view,  therefore,  the  exchange 
relation  1S  one  of symmetry  since  his  indifference  1S  expressed 
equally  on  both sides.  It does  not  matter  to the  individual  which 
commodity  he  takes since  the  proportions  present  represent  for  him 
equivalent  quantities  of utility.  What  appears  on  one  side  of  the 
equation  1S  mirrored exactly  on  the  other side.  Indeed,  it would  be 
possible  to  go  further  and  suggest  that there  is  no  relationship 
between  the  commodities  for  the  utility theorist  because  the  acts  of 
equating  are  the  acts of the subject  who  imposes  his  'values'  on  the 
165 external  world.  At  first sight,  this explanation  would  seem  complete. 
The  individual's  indifference  to  one  commodity  is reflected  by  his 
indifference  to  the  other.  But,  as  we  saw  earlier,  Bailey's 
explanation of exchange-value  In  these  terms  has  to effectively excise 
the  individual  out  of the  relationship,  so  that  one  must  either 
explain  value  In  terms  of some  property  inherent  In  the  items 
themselves,  or  explain  it in  terms  of  their  relationship  to  one 
another.  The  first  kind  of explanation  must  be  jettisoned  Slnce 
commodities  as distinct physical  objects are  incommensurable  with  each 
other  as  such.  The  second,  however,  cannot  operate with  any  success 
if it is intended that the  commodities  possess  some  inherent  physical 
quality  in  common.  An  equation of linen to  linen is not  an  expression 
of  value.  The  relationship can  only  operate  successfully  if  the 
commodities  within it play different roles.  The  symmetrical  concept 
of exchange  requires  the  presence of two  equal  items,  equal  that is in 
terms  of some  prior  determined quality,  that is prior to  exchange,  and 
this,  whatever  else  it is,  cannot  be  described  as  value  or  as  an 
expression of value. 
The  asymmetrical  nature of exchange  lS  apparent  from  the  outset: 
No  doubt,  the  expression  20  yards  of 
yards  of  linen  are  worth  1  coat, 
relation,  1  coat = 20  yards  of linen, 
yards  of  linen.  But  in that case, 
equation,  in  order  to  express  the 
relatively;  and,  so  soon  as  I  do  that, 
equivalent  instead of the coat  (36). 
linen = 1  coat  or  20 
implies  the  opposite 
or  1  coat is worth  20 
I  must  reverse  the 
value  of  the  coat 
the  linen  becomes  the 
The  ability  to  reverse  the  order of the  commodities  would  suggest 
symmetry.  However,  irrespective of the  order  in which  the  commodities 
appear,  the  roles  which  they  play  are  determined  by  the  structure  of 
166 the  exchange-relation  and  not  vice-versa.  This  would  appear  to  be  the 
substance  of Marx's  argument.  The  formulation  twenty  yards  of  linen 
equals  one  coat,  or its substitutes,  is  an  expression  of  value. 
Reversing  the  order of the  commodities is another.  They  t  are  no, 
however,  expressions  of  the  same  values  (37).  They  are  rather 
expressions  of  two  values.  The  plural expression  1S  important,  as 
Marx  himself  goes  on  to explain in  Section  III,  SUb-section  A2(a) 
(38). 
In  Sub-sections  A2  and  A3,  Marx  explains  how  the  exchange-relation  1S 
composed  of two  elements;  the  relative-value  form  and  the  equivalent 
value-form,  with  a  sub-section devoted  to  each  respectively.  In  Sub-
section  A4,  these  two  elements  are  combined  in  preparation  for  the 
further  elaboration of the  whole  value-form  in  Sub-sections  B-D. 
In  each  expression  of value,  only  the  value  of  one  commodity  1S 
expressed.  Thus  in  the  formulation  twenty  yards  of linen are equal  to 
one  coat,  the  value  of the  linen is expressed in relation to  the  coat. 
Hence,  the  position occupied  by  the  linen is termed  by  Marx  as  the 
relative  value-form  (39).  Consequently,  the  coat  occup1es  the 
position  of equivalent  form.  Switching  the  commodities  around  only 
results in their occupying of the  alternate roles;  it does  not  reverse 
the  structure  of  exchange itself which  1S  a  combination  of  both 
relative and  equivalent  forms  of value. 
There  are  two  points to consider  in connection with  the  relative 
of  value.  The  first is that in relating itself to  the  coat  as 
equivalent,  the  linen  demonstrates  that  both itself and  the  coat 
merely  quanta  of abstract labour: 
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are It  is the  expression of equivalence  between  different  sorts 
of  commodities  that alone  brings  into relief  the  specific 
character  of  value-creating  labour,  and  this  it  does  by 
actually  reducing  the different  varieties of labour  embodied 
in  the  different kinds  of commodities  to  their  common  quality 
of human  labour  in  the abstract  (40). 
The  express10n of equivalence itself demonstrates  that  the  commodities 
have  been  reduced  to abstract  labour  and  in  that state,  and  that state 
alone,  are  they  commensurable  and  therefore  capable  of  being 
equivalents  for  each  other.  This,  however,  is insufficient  by  itself. 
As  Marx  goes  on  to explain:  'Human  labour-power  in  motion,  or  human 
labour,  creates  value,  but is not itself value'  (41).  The  second 
point  therefore  1S  that labour  only  becomes  value  once it  has  been 
established  within  an  object.  As  Marx  puts  it,  once  it 
'congealed'.  Thenceforth: 
In  order  to  express  the  value  of the  linen  as  a  congelation 
of  human  labour,  that  value  must  be  expressed  as  having 
objective  existence,  as  being  a  something  materially 
different  from  the  linen itself,  and  yet  a  something  common 
to the  linen  and  all other  commodities  (42). 
has 
This  'something'  is an  equivalent  form  of value.  The  commodity  which 
occupies  the  position of equivalent is something  which  is  materially 
different  from  the  commodity  which  occupies  the  position of  relative 
form  of value,  but  which  is common  to all other  commodities  insofar as 
they  likewise  occupy  the  position of relative  form  of  value.  To 
return  to  our  formulation,  the coat,  occupying  the  position  of 
equivalent  'officiates',  as  Marx  puts it, as  the  'form of value'  (43). 
In  the  position of equivalent  form  of value,  the  coat is the  form  of 
value  of  the  linen.  °  If t  th  at  the  linen  By  equating 1tse  0  e  co  , 
t  t
o  f  °t  lue  In  summary,  Marx  acquires  a  material  represen  a  10n  0  1  S  va  . 
168 explains: 
By  m~ans,  therefo~e, of the  value-relation expressed  in  our 
equat1on,  the  bod1ly  form  of commodity  B becomes  the  value-
f?rm  of  commodity  A,  or  the  body  of commodity  B acts  as  a 
m1rro~  to  .the value.of commodity  A.  By  putting  itself  1n 
relat10n  w1th  C?mmod1ty  B,  as  value  in propria  persona,  as 
the  matter of wh1ch.human  labo~r is made  up,  the  commodity  A 
converts  the  value  1n  use,  B,  1nto the  sUbstance  in  which  to 
express  its,  A's  own  value.  The  value  of A,  thus  expressed 
in  the  use-value of B,  has  taken  the  form  of  relative-value 
(44). 
The  structure of exchange  therefore confers  inherently different roles 
on  commodities  dependent  upon  which  side of  the  relationship  they 
appear.  If they  appear  on  the left side,  as  the  conventional  notation 
1S  expressed,  they  occupy  the position of relative value-form  and  1n 
which  their value is expressed  by  being  represented  by  a  quantity  of 
the  commodity  which  occupies the position of equivalent  value-form. 
This  brings  us  now  to  a  problem  which  has  already  been  alluded  to.  By 
saying  that  the  value  of a  commodity  1S  only  expressed  1n  its 
relationships  with  other  commodities  can  Marx  be  interpreted  as 
suggesting  a  'relativist'  explanation of value,  and  one  which  he 
roundly  condemned  when  advanced  by  Bailey?  In  Sub-section  A2(b)  Marx 
responds  directly  by  considering  the effects in turn of changes  to  the 
labour-time  required  to  produce  one  commodity,  then  the  other,  then 
changes  (in  the  same  direction)  in both,  and  finally  unrelated  changes 
1n  either  direction.  What  is clear  from  each  of these  examples  1S 
that  changes  in  the  relative value,  as  expressed  by  being  related  to 
an  equivalent  are  determined  by  changes  to  the  quanta  of  labour 
required  to  produce  one,  the  other or  both.  Thus,  it may  be  possible 
for  the  relative value  of A to rise or  fall  as  a  result of changes  in 
th  t ·  t  k  t  d  B  Th1·s  occurrence,  however,  contains  a  e  1me  a  en  0  pro  uce  . 
169 temptation,  to  which  Broadhurst  amongst  others,  as  Marx  points  out, 
succumb  (45). 
But  what  of  the  equivalent  form  of  value? 
characteristics of its nature in  SUb-section  A3. 
Marx  considers  the 
The  first characteristic quality of the  equivalent  form  of  value  lS 
that  the  use  value of the  commodity  which  occupies  that  position 
becomes  the  form  in  which  value is manifested.  A  single  commodity 
cannot  manifest its own  value.  Consequently,  it must  express  it  In 
its relationships  with  other commodities.  The  latter then  become  mere 
manifestations  of  the  value  of the  former.  In  other  words,  in 
occupying  the  position of equivalent  value-form,  a  commodity  ceases  to 
be  simply  a  use-value  for  itself but  becomes  the material  In  which  the 
value  of  the  relative value-form is  expressed. 
analogy  to  explain  how  this occurs in actuality. 
Marx  employs  an 
The  exchange-relation,  he  argues,  can  be  compared  with  the  act  of 
weighing,  an  act  familiar  from  common  experience.  Just  in  the  same 
way  that  objects possess  weight,  commodities  are  values.  In  the  act 
of  weighing,  the  object  to be  weighed  is  placed  on  a  weighing 
apparatus  onto  which  objects representing weight  are  placed.  The 
weight  of the object  being  weighed  can  then  be  seen  to  be  'manifested' 
In  the  weighing  objects.  Their  physical  construction  represents 
weight  ~  se  In  the  same  way  that  the  use-value  of  the 
value-form  represents  value  and  can  be  exchanged  as 
equivalent 
such  for 
quantities 
points  out, 
properties 
of  other  commodities.  It is,  however,  as 
important  not  to carry this analogy  too 
evidenced  in  weighing  are  a  product  of 
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Marx  himself 
far  Slnce  the 
nature;  value conversely  1S  a  product  of society.  This  has  not,  it might  be  said, 
stopped  political  economists  from  attempting  to  derive  value  from 
nature.  Indeed,  the  very  nature  of  the  equivalent-form  itself 
encourages  just such  an  interpretation  (46). 
If the  first peculiar quality  of the  equivalent  form  of value is  that 
use-value  represents  value,  the  second is that concrete  labour  comes 
to  represent abstract  labour.  This  point  has  been little  understood. 
The  relationship  between  abstract  and  concrete labour  has  often  been 
explained  by  referring to the  former  as  a  general  component  of  the 
latter  (47).  This  in itself,  however,  is an  insufficient  expression 
of  the  complexity  of this relationship because,  as  Marx  says,  it  1S 
perfectly natural  to consider the  general  properties of labour  1n  some 
circumstances,  but  in the expression of value  we  are  faced  with  a 
difficulty: 
For  instance,  how  is the  fact  to  be  expressed  that  weav1ng 
creates  the  value  of the  linen,  not  by  virtue  of  being 
weaving,  as  such,  but  by  reason of its general  property  of 
being  human  labour? 
The  value  of a  commodity  is not  revealed in its own  substance,  nor  can 
we  say  alternatively that linen is value  because it has  been  woven. 
We  cannot,  however,  say either that  the  linen is value  because it  1S 
the  product  of abstract labour.  That  linen is a  value  produced  by 
abstract  labour is only  expressed  'by  opposing  to  weaving  that  other 
particular  form  of concrete labour  (in this instance tailoring),  which 
produces  the equivalent of the  product  of weaving'  (48).  It is  only 
the  in this way  that the  value  of the  linen demonstrates itself to  be 
product  of abstract  labour.  The  linen cannot  perform  this  function 
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In its role as producer of an  equivalent  labour,  of whatever  specific 
form,  is the  incarnation of abstract labour.  As  such,  it lS  identical 
with  any  other  labour,  yet it is  still  the  product  of  private 
individuals.  This  leads to the  third peculiarity of  the  equivalent 
value-form,  and  that is,  that the private labour of  the  individuals 
who  produce  the  equivalent  becomes  the  incarnation of social  labour. 
We  thus  have  three peculiarities or characteristics of the  equivalent 
value-form:  use-value  becomes  the  form  of  value;  concrete  labour 
becomes  the  form  of abstract labour,  and  private labour  becomes  the 
form  of social  labour. 
In  Section  3,  subsection  A(4),  Marx  draws  together his analysis of the 
two  component  elements of the exchange-relation,  the  relative  and 
equivalent  forms  of  value  respectively,  and  makes  the  following 
important  summary  observation: 
Our  analysis  has  shown,  that the  form  or  expression  of 
value  of a  commodity  originates in the  nature of value, 
not  that  value  and  its magnitude  originate in  the  mode 
their expression as  exchange-value  (49). 
the 
and 
of 
From  a  correct  analysis of value,  one  can  unravel  the  problem  of 
exchange-value.  Attempting  to operate in reverse  simply  leads  to 
incomprehension  (50).  This  lS  nowhere  more  manifest  than  In  the 
explanation  of  value  offered  by  Samuel  Bailey  whereby  the  task  of 
uncovering  the  nature of exchange-value is little more  than  a  vicious 
circle of unresolved  problems.  The  fact  of their unresolved state  is 
attributable  to  Bailey's  failure  to  overthrow  the  simplistic 
conception  of value  in his  own  mind  which,  it may  be  recalled,  arose 
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commensuration  (51). 
Once  this relationship is disclosed,  it becomes  possible to  identify 
the  meaning  of a  number  of Marx's  related ideas.  One  of  the  most 
readily  repeated,  but  also one  of the  most  obscure if not  interpreted 
in  the  correct manner,  is his characterisation of  the  relationship 
between  use-value  and  exchange-value  as  one  of contrast  and,  in  some 
contexts,  one  of contradiction.  The  nature of the  commodity  1S  a 
duality  comprising  both  use-value  and  value.  In  fact  this  can  be 
understood  theoretically  in the context of a  single  commodity.  By 
itself,  it may  be  examined  and  be  found  to  possess  useful  qualities. 
However,  if it is known  that it 1S  an  object  which  1S  to  be  exchanged, 
it  can  also,  at least theoretically,  be  conceived  to  be  an  exchange-
value,  or  to  possess  value.  But  this characteristic 1S  not  realised 
or  established 1n  isolation.  The  full  disclosure of the nature of the 
commodity  1S  only  achieved  via  the  exchange-structure of relative  and 
equivalent  forms  of value  as it is only  here  that  for  the  first  time 
the  inherent  nature of the  commodity  as  both  use-value  and  value  1S 
expressed: 
The  opposition  or  contrast  existing  internally  in  each 
commodity  between  use-value  and  value  1S,  therefore,  made 
evident  externally  by  two  commodities  being  placed  in.  su~h 
relation to each  other,  that  the  commodity  whose  value 1t  1S 
sought  to  express,  figures directly  as  a  mere  use-value, 
while  the  commodity  in  which  that value is to  be  expressed, 
figures  directly as  mere  exchange-value  (52). 
latent  The  structure of exchange  is an  enlarged representation of the 
contrast  within  the  simple  commodity  and  becomes  visibly  expressed. 
On  the  one  hand,  the relative  form  of value  only  exhibits  use-value. 
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However,  as  a  concept of the  value-form,  it 1S  not  exhaustive.  One  of 
the  characteristics  of  the  equivalent  value-form  1S  that 
representing  the  value of the  commodity  occupying  the  position  of 
relative-value  form,  it simultaneously  represents  that  commodity's 
equality  with  all other  commodities.  However,  at  the  stage  of  the 
elementary  form  of value,  this full  expressive equality is  not  yet 
realised.  This  is because  the  commodity  in  the  position of  relative-
value  form  is only  equated  to  a  single equivalent.  It is,  therefore, 
not  yet possible  to conceive of the  commodity  as  a  true  value,  because 
its  qualitative  equality  with  all commodities  has  not  yet  been 
fully  demonstrated.  The  practical expression of  universal  equality 
1S,  however,  a  simple  extension of the  limited  expression  contained 
within  the  elementary  form  of value.  Marx  designates this extension  a 
'more  complete  form'  (53)  which  he  then calls the  'Total or  Expanded 
Form  of Value'  (54). 
All  that  1S  involved  in this new  form  is that instead  of  a  single 
express10n  of the  value of the  commodity  which  occup1es  the  position 
of  relative value-form,  it obtains expression  in quantities of  every 
commodity  for  which it can  be  exchanged  (55). 
As  with  the  Elementary  form  of value,  Marx  analyses  the  Total  or 
Expanded  Form  of the  exchange-relation in  terms of the  relative  and 
equivalent  value-forms. 
As  the  value  of the  commodity  which  occupies  the  position  of  the 
relative-value  form  is expressed in terms  of the  use-values  of  every 
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but  a  'congelation  of  undifferentiated  human  labour'  (56).  In 
adopting  any  number  of value-expressions its own  labour is shown  to  be 
equal  to all other  kinds of labour.  For  the  first  time  the  value  of 
commodities  is practically demonstrated  to  be  a  social phenomenon: 
The  linen, 
a  social 
commodity, 
commodity, 
by  virtue of the  form  of its value,  now  stands 
relation,  no  longer with  only  one  other  kind 
but  with  the whole  world of commodities.  As 
it is a  citizen of that world  (57). 
1n 
of 
a 
Moreover,  that  world is not  random  in its operations  but,  as  Marx 
repeatedly  suggests,  subject to law-like processes.  The  accidental 
appearance  of  the  simple or elementary  form  of value  1n  which  the 
quantities  1n  which  commodities  exchange  could  be  taken  to  be  random 
gives  way  to  the  lawful  processes  of  value.  As  Marx 
characteristically  expresses it, in the  expanded  form  of  value,  'we 
perceive  at once  the  background  that determines,  and  1S  essentially 
different  from,  this accidental  appearance'  (58).  In  the  very  fact 
that  the  value  of a  single commodity  can  be  expressed  in  any  other 
type  of  commodity,  Marx  can  conclude  that it is not  exchange  which 
regulates  the  proportions 1n  which  commodities  exchange,  but  rather 
their  value  magnitudes  as  determined  by  quantities of labour.  This 
must  be  the  case,  as each  commodity  has  become  the equivalent of every 
other,  a  fact  which  could not  occur  or  be  established  by  accident. 
Their  proportions  therefore must  be  the  product  of  a  single  cause 
which  is value  as  determined  by  labour  and  labour-time. 
The  same  transformation  further  develops  the  equivalent  form  of  value 
to  a  more  complete  stage.  In  the  simple  form,  the  role  imposed  upon 
the  commodity  which  occupies  the position of equivalent  form  of  value 
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comprehended  1n  instances  of  one  to  one  comparison,  but  1n  the 
expanded  form  of  value,  it is irrelevant  what  kind  of  commodity 
occup1es  the  position of equivalent  because  they all equally  represent 
the  value  of the  commodity  occupying  the  position of  the  relative-
form.  From  this it can  also be  seen that  the  labour  which  produces 
the  equivalent  commodity  is merely  the  form  in which  abstract  labour 
is realised.  Outside  the exchange-relation,  the  labour  which  produces 
equivalents  retains its character as concrete  labour.  However,  to  the 
extent  that  a  specific concrete  labour  produces  a  commodity  which  1S 
successfully  exchanged  1n  the  market,  as  an  equivalent  within 
exchange,  the  labour  which  produced it is simply  the  form  1n  which 
abstract  labour  is realised.  Each  concrete labour,  insofar  as  it 
produces  equivalents,  is therefore  a  form  of realisation of  abstract 
labour  (59). 
The  expanded  form,  however,  1S  itself an  incomplete  form  of  value 
despite  the  characteristics  which  it possess  over  and  above  the 
elementary  form.  And  again,  the  limitations are exhibited  on  both 
sides  of  the  exchange-relation and  represent  inadequacies  1n  the 
expression of value. 
The  first limitation of the  expanded  relative  form  of value  consists 
in  the  fact  that its value  expression is never  complete.  Every  new 
commodity  which  is produced  represents  a  new  potential expression  of 
value.  However,  unless it is related to that  commodity  in  a  specific 
"  "th  1  t"ve  form  will only  be  a  exchange,  the  express10n  of value  1n  e  re  a  1 
partial  expression  and  to  the extent that it is incomplete,  value  1S 
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value  expressions means  that there is never  a  unified  expression  of 
value  which  encompasses  'value'  per se.  In  addition,  the  relative 
value of each  commodity  will not  be  expressed  as  a  quantity of  value, 
but  simply  as  an  extended series of commodity  quantities. 
The  fragmentation  and  disunity of the  relative value  form  is  mirrored 
in  the  expanded  equivalent  form  of value.  In  the  exchange-relation, 
the  equivalent  form  of value is by  turn first this commodity,  and  then 
the  next,  and  so  on  until theoretically the list is exhausted.  Each 
express10n  of value  excludes each  other.  The  role of  equivalent  1S 
not  the  privilege  of  a  single  commodity.  This  limitation  also 
restricts the manifestation of abstract labour.  In  the  expanded  form 
of  value  each  individual equivalent-producing concrete labour  1S  a 
form  of  realisation of abstract  labour.  The  commodity  in  relative 
form  relates its value  to each equivalent as  a  particular  realisation 
of  abstract  labour.  Therefore,  just  as  there  are  innumerable 
equivalents,  there are  innumerable  forms  of realisation  of  abstract 
labour. 
This  inadequacy  of expression  compels  another  development  of  form.  As 
Marx  explains,  the  expanded  relative-form of value is nothing  but  the 
sum  of  the  equations of the  elementary  form.  Thus,  a  particular 
quantity  of  a  certain commodity  is by  turns equivalent  to  first  a 
t Ot  f  th  dot  and  the  next  and  so  forth.  quan  1  y  0  some  0  er  commo  1  y, 
Correspondingly,  therefore; 
when  a  person  exchanges  his linen  for  many  other commodities, 
and  thus  expresses  its  value  in  a  series  °  of  other 
commodities  it necessarily  follows,  that the  var10US  owners 
of  the latter exchange  them  for  the  linen,  and  consequently 
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same  third commodity  (60). 
This  transformation  lS  a  key  one  In  Marx's  explanation  of  the 
development  of the  value-form.  In  the first  instance,  he  invokes  for 
the  first  time  the possibility of there  being  human  agents  involved  In 
the  process.  Hitherto,  the explanation offered has  been  given  In 
terms  of the  impersonal  mechanics  of exchange.  In  the  transformation 
which  supercedes  the  expanded  form,  the  agents  behind  the  exchange-
relation  are  considered  in relation to  the  structure  of  exchange 
itself.  However,  that  is not  to say  that  Marx  departs  from  his 
objective  conception  of exchange.  All  that he  would  appear  to  be 
suggesting  is that the  transformation itself is suggested  by  and  In 
fact  carried out  by  the practical business of exchange.  Thus,  just as 
the  individual commodity  producer  relates his  commodity  to every  other 
offered in  the  market  as equivalents of his own,  those other commodity 
producers  In  turn  relate  their  own  commodities  to  that  single 
commodity  as  to  the  equivalent of their own. 
Superficially,  all that  has  happened  is the  reversal of the  expanded 
form  of value.  But  since the structure of exchange  consists  of  the 
asymmetrical  polarities of relative and  equivalent  forms  of value,  the 
respective  roles  played  by  the  commodities  has  been  reversed. 
single  Consequently  each  relative  form  of  value  now  shares  a 
equivalent  form  with  every  other.  What  they  have  in common  Marx  terms 
the  General  form  of value. 
Despite  possesslng  a  number  of similarities,  the  General  form  of value 
lS  qualitatively  different  from  both  the  Elementary  and  Expanded 
forms.  It is still an  elementary  form  to  the  extent that  the  value of 
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It  is,  however,  a  General  form  in the  sense  that all commodities  now 
express their value  in the  same  physical  commodity.  Where  the  General 
form  departs  most  markedly  from  either the  Elementary  of the  Expanded 
forms  is in its complete  separation of value  from  use-value. 
Earlier,  reference  was  made  to  the characteristic of  the  exchange-
structure  which  necessitated a  separation of  use-value  and  value. 
This  structural  requirement  is  fulfilled  by  the  Equivalent  and 
Expanded  forms  of value  where  In  each  case  the  values of  commodities 
are  expressed  as  something  different  from  their  own  physical 
composition.  This is performed,  however,  only  In  an  individual  and 
accidental  manner.  Each  commodity,  as  Marx  puts it, must  find  for 
itself  either  a  single equivalent  value-form or  a  serles  of  such 
equivalents.  In this respect,  those  equivalents playa passive  role 
within  the  structure  of  exchange.  The  General  form,  however, 
introduces  a  new  social  dimension  into the  relationship: 
The  general  form  of value,  ... results  from  the  joint  action 
of  the  whole  world  of commodities,  and  from  that  alone.  A 
commodity  can  acquire  a  general  expression of its value  only 
by  all other  commodities,  simultaneous  with  it,  expressing 
their  value  in the  same  equivalent;  and  every  new  commodity 
must  follow suit.  It thus  becomes  evident that,  since  the 
existence  of  commodities  as  values is purely  social,  this 
social  existence  can  be  expressed  by  the totality  of  their 
social  relations  alone,  and  consequently  that the  form  of 
their  value  must  be  a  socially  recognised  form  (61). 
Reference  has  already  been  made  to the  way  in which  the  General  form 
b  1 ·  1  t  th  .  dl'ately  perceptible  social  rings  the  ana  YSlS  c  oser  0  e  lmme 
world.  But  this  lS  not  the  only  qualitative  departure  from  the 
previous  lesser value-forms.  The  General  form  of value  distinguishes 
179 the  value  of  commodities  not  only  from  their  own  use-values  (the 
condition  required  even  by  the  Elementary  form  of value)  but  from  use-
values  generally.  The  importance of  this  completely  independent 
expression  of  value lies in the  fact  that  value  does  not  appear  as 
common  to all commodities until such  an  expression is formed.  It  1S 
not,  to  put it another  way,  until the  General  form  of value  1S  reached 
that  value  1S  practically demonstrated  to  be  both  common  to  all 
commodities  and  independent  of any  specific commodity. 
The  General  form,  however,  is itself merely  the  basis  for  a  higher 
form  of  value  - the  Universal  form  of value.  The  General  relative 
form  of value converts  a  single commodity  into a  Universal  equivalent 
and  thereby  invests  the world of commodities  with  an  independent  and 
exclusive  expression of value  (62).  The  Universal  equivalent  form, 
however,  is most  decisive in its application  to  the  nature of abstract 
labour.  The  conceptual  difficulty of abstract labour  1S  that  1S 
appears  to possess  no  SU1  generis  form  of existence.  In  the  Universal 
equivalent  form  of value,  however,  the  role adopted  by  the  commodity 
placed  in that position  has  a  precise bearing on  the  form  of existence 
of abstract  labour.  Supposing this commodity  to  be  linen: 
The  substance  linen  becomes  the  visible  incarnation,  the 
social  chrysalis  state  of  every  kind  of  human  labour. 
Weaving,  which  is the  labour of certain private  individuals 
producing  a  particular  article,  linen,  acquires  .in 
consequence  a  social character,  the character  of  equal1ty 
with all other  kinds of labour.  The  innumerable  equations  of 
which  the  general  form  of value is composed  equate  1n  turn 
the  labour  embodied  in the  linen  to  that  embodied  in  every 
other  commodity,  and  they  thus  convert  weaving  into  the 
general  form  of  manifestation  of  undifferentiated  human 
labour  (63). 
The  linen,  1  .  1  nt  adopts  a  role  by  becoming  the  Universa  equ1va  e  , 
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1n  value  to all other commodities  whose  value  can  be  related  to  it, 
the  Universal  equivalent represents abstract labour in essence.  Thus, 
although  the  Universal  form  may  be  the  product  of a  specific kind  of 
labour,  the role defined  for it by  commodity-producing society is that 
of  form  of realisation of abstract labour. 
It  is  not  difficult to see  where  Marx  has  led  the  analysis.  The 
progressive  social  exclusion  of the  Universal  equivalent  1S  the 
immediate  precondition of the  Money  form  of value.  In  the  f"1oney  form, 
a  single  commodity  lS  accorded  the  exclusive  role  as  Universal 
equivalent.  It may  even  be  a  consequence  of that  appointment  that its 
own  useful character  becomes  irrelevant in  the context of its  higher 
role.  Its final  character is to represent  exchangeability  per  see 
Smith,  it may  be  recalled,  ascribed exchangeability direct  to  every 
commodity.  Every  commodity  was  thus  therefore money.  We  have  now 
seen  that  the  simple commodity  only  contains  the  potential  to be  money 
within  specific  confines.  Once  this position is  monopolised  by  a 
specific  commodity,  the  remaining  commodities  only  possess 
exchangeability  In  a  mediated  form.  Not  possessing  the direct  form  of 
exchangeability it lS  brought  to  them  in the  Money-form  where  a  single 
commodity  with  which  they  can all exchange  represents  'Smith's  power 
of exchanging'. 
181 NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  FOUR 
1.  Meek,  1973,  173.  Whilst  Meek's  claim  would  be  supportable if  the 
value-form  was  present within  his overall  account,  its  absence 
would  suggest  that the analysis  dismissed did contain matters  of 
importance.  That  analysis is gone  through  1n  detail  below  to 
establish  the  role  played  by  the  value-form within  the  completed 
theory  of value. 
2.  Cf.  Rubin,  1972,  Ch.12.  This  1S,  however,  not  to  say  that  this 
earlier  exposition,  together  with  others  such  as  the  Grundrisse, 
do  not  possess  their  own  merit  as  providers of  illumination  1n 
relation  to  the later work.  In  these earlier works,  we  see  Marx 
refining the concepts of his political economy  through  a  constant 
theoretical  dialogue with  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries  1n 
the  field. 
3.  This,  of course,  1S  a  position which  must  now  be  reviewed  1n  the 
light of the  translations of sections of the  first  German  edition 
of Capital  made  available  1n  1976  under  the title  'Values:  Studies 
by  Karl  Marx'.  It is perhaps  noteworthy  that with  a  very  few  rare 
exceptions,  these  translations  have  largely  gone  unnoticed. 
4.  It is also significant to  note  that  Marx  alludes  in places  to  the 
role of the  subjective 1n  the  exchange-relation,  and  particularly 
1n  a  manner  which  is reproduced  in a  number  of  utility-theories. 
However,  what  is of even  further  significance is that  1n  glv1ng 
room  to  this subjective element,  Marx  demonstrates  1n  precise 
terms  why 
explanation 
subjectivity  of  itself  provides 
of  exchange  whilst  simultaneously 
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no  satisfactory 
recognising  its existence  and  place  within  the  human  activity that constitutes the 
exchange-relation. 
5.  A  number  of attempts  have  been  made  at providing  just  such  a 
comprehensive  account,  about  each  of which  it is possible  to  have 
reservations,  most  notably  De  Brunhoff,  1973. 
6.  Marx,  1977,  84-5. 
7.  'As  regards  value  In  general,  it  lS  the  weak  point  of  the 
classical  school  of Political Economy  that it nowhere,  expressly 
and  with  full  consciousness,  distinguishes between  labour,  as  it 
appears  In  the  value of a  product  and  the  same  labour,  as  it 
appears  In  the  use-value  of  that  product.  Of  course,  the 
distinction  is practically made,  since this school  treats  labour 
at  one  time  under its quantitative aspect,  at another  under  its 
qualitative  aspect.  But it has  not  the  least idea  that  when  the 
difference  between  various  kinds of labour is treated  as  purely 
quantitative,  their qualitative unity  or equality,  and  therefore 
their reduction  to  abstract  human  labour,  is implied'.  Marx,  1977, 
84n. 
8.  Ibid.,  85. 
9.  He  goes  further:  'Even  Adam  Smith  and  Ricardo  treat  the  form  of 
value  as  a  thing of no  importance,  as  having  no  connection  with 
the  inherent  nature of commodities'.  Loc  Cit. 
10.  Loc  Cit. 
11.  Loc  Cit. 
183 12.  Loc  Cit.  A failure  to  understand  the  value-form  by  means  of 
analysis  lS  fundamental  in its consequences.  It  obscures  the 
real  relations of the  market  social  form  of production.  In  the 
final  section  of this chapter,  examination will  be  made  of  the 
relationship  between  the  value-form  and  money.  It  lOS  howev  ,  er, 
worth  mentioning  in  advance of that  examination that the  further 
analysis  of  the  value-form  leads  from  money  to  capital  as 
developments  of the  value-form. 
13.  Rubin  carefully preserves  the integrity of the  labour  theory  of 
without  making  this  substitution  by  drawing  out  the  several 
different senses  in  which  value is both  a  'form',  in  the  sense  of 
being  a  form  of  'something',  and  being itself something  which  has 
forms  or  further  developments.  In  our  account  of Marx's  theory, 
we  are  concerned  with  both aspects,  with  value  as  a  form  of social 
labour  and  the  value-form,  or  exchange-value  as  the  'form  of 
value'.  It is the  second  aspect  which  is very  often  overlooked  ln 
accounts  of  the  value  theory  so  that  the  problem  of  value  lS 
reduced  simply  to  a  specification of content  or  substance  without 
regard  to  their  form. 
14.  Elson,  1979,  163. 
15.  Marx,  1977,  90. 
16.  According  to  Engels,  Marx's  method  'is indeed  nothing  other  than 
the historical method,  only  stripped of its historical  form  and  of 
°d  t  1  The  point where  this  history  disturbing  aCCl  en  a  occurrences. 
begins  must  also  be  the starting point of the  train  of  thought, 
184 and  its  further  progress  will  be  simply  the  reflection,  In 
abstract  and  theoretically  consistent  form,  of  the  course  of 
history.  Though  the  reflection is corrected , it IS  corrected  In 
accordance  with  laws  provided  by  the  actual  course  of  history, 
since  each  factor  can  be  examined  at  the  stage  of  development 
where  it  reaches  its  full  maturity,  its  classical  'form' '. 
Engels.  Cited  in  Rosdolsky,  1977,  115. 
17.  Loc  Cit. 
18.  I  mean  by  this the analysis  and  categorisation of events  together 
with  their interpretation and  do  not  intend  any  judgement  as  to 
whether  this  is appropriate and,  if so,  whether  any  particular 
mode  of historical analysis  ought  to  be  preferred  to  any  other. 
19.  Meikle,  1985,  77.  The  essentialism described  by  Meikle  IS  to  be 
distinguished  at  every  point  from  its  philosophical  opposite: 
atomism.  In  the  twentieth  century,  atomist  philosophies  of 
sCIence,  and  particularly philosophies of social  SCIence,  have 
traded  at  a  premium  to  the wholesale  detriment  of  essentialism. 
In  the  social  SCIences,  atomism  IS  characterised  by  an 
individualist  methodology  which  explains  social  phonomena  by 
reference  to  the  actions,  motives  and  objectives of more  or  less 
ahistorical individuals. 
20.  Marx,  1977,  54.  This  conception encapsulates  a  feature  of  Marx's 
methodology  which  distinguishes it from  its  atomist  opponents. 
For  the  economist  operating with  an  atomist  ontology  as  it  is 
applied  to  the  problem of value,  there  can  be  no  question of there 
being  two  dimensions  to  the  commodity.  Empirically,  there  are 
185 only  objects which  in  various  ways  interact with  subjects  who  for 
one  reason  or  another,  to  be  determined  by  an  analysis  of  those 
individual  motives,  dispose  of those objects in  specified  ways. 
It is not  possible  for  them,  however,  to  see  in  those  motives  any 
other  overriding  concern  or  force  operating  to  compel  those 
individuals  to  behave  1n  the  way  that  they  do.  Correspondingly, 
on  the  objective side, it 1S  impossible  for  them  to conceive  that 
the  fact  of exchange  1mposes  a  characteristic on  the  product  which 
possesses  a  quality  unlike  any  of its other characteristics as  a 
product.  The  fact  that  those  qualities of the  product  as  a  use-
value  are  not  identified as  a  form  precludes  the  possibility  of 
identifying  any  other characteristic as  a  form. 
21.  Loc  Cit. 
22.  As  we  shall see  in  the  next  chapter  on  the  quantitative  value 
problem,  in many  respects,  Marx's  account  of the  labour  theory  of 
value  will  stand  or  fall  in the satisfactory  solution  of  this 
problem. 
23.  Marx,  1977,  54.  It is noteworthy  that  before  he  has  even  begun  to 
embark  on  anything like an  analysis of the  problem  just described, 
he  has  already  identified  that  exchange-value  1S  to  be 
distinguished  from  value.  In  other  schools  of  thought  these 
categories are  invariably treated as  interchangeable,  resulting  in 
value-theory  that  1S  little  more  than  a  vicious  circle  of 
unresolvable  problems  1n  which  premises  are  preceded  by 
conclusions  and  vice  versa,  with  the  ultimate result  that  value 
theory  appears  as  an  ad  hoc  arrangement  of thought  without  any 
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-sustainable structure or  coherence. 
24.  The  meaning  of  the  term  express1'on  w1'11  be  dealt  w·th  1  more 
systematically  in  the  following  two  sections of this chapter. 
25.  Bailey's single insight into the  problem  of value  consisted in his 
account  of exchange-value.  As  Marx  explains it, Bailey supplies, 
albeit  in  a  limited  form,  the  other  side of the  problem  which  was 
ignored  by  Smith  and  Ricardo.  Value  only  appears  1n  the 
relationship  of one  commodity  to  another.  This,  however,  is  the 
limit  to Bailey's understanding: 
This is how  matters  appear  directly.  And  Bailey  clings 
to  this.  The  most  superficial  form  of  exchange-value, 
that  1S  the  quantitative  relationship  in  which 
commodities  exchange  with  one  another,  constitutes, 
according  to Bailey,  their value.  The  advance  from  the 
surface  to  the  core of the  problem  is  not  permitted. 
Marx,  1975,  139. 
The  core  of the  problem,  as  we  saw  1n  the  prev10us  chapter,  1S 
that of commensuration  and  equivalence.  If we  say  that  so  much  of 
a  particular  commodity  1S  equal  to  a  specified  quantity  of 
another,  we  must  then  identify in  respect of what  they  are  equal 
to  each  other. 
26.  Marx,  1977,  54.  Marx  is  here  employing  a  certain  element  of 
hindsight  in that  he  knows  where  his analysis wants  to  take  him 
and  he  can  therefore posit certain objectives before  they  have 
been  theoretically  achieved.  However,  this. conception  also 
includes  an  important  characteristic  of  the  essentialist 
f  M  '  th  ht  As  Meikle  explains,  philosophical  foundations  0  arx  s  oug  . 
187 Our  knowledge  of what  a  thing is is  completable  only 
when  we  are  acquainted  with  the  thing  in  its  fully 
developed  form,  or  very  close to  (its realised  nature). 
Such  knowledge  is possible  only  when  we  are  able  to 
observe  the  fully  developed  item;  and  such  observation 
is possible  only  when  the  fully  developed  item exists or 
has  come-to-be.  Meikle,  1985,  80. 
27.  Those  tasks are  enumerated  by  Marx  1n  the  following  sentences: 
in clearly comprehending  the  universal  equivalent 
form,  and  as  a  necessary  corollary,  the  general  form  of 
value  ... The  latter is deductible  from  ... the  expanded 
form  of value,  the essential component  element  of  which 
... is ...  20  yards  of linen = 1  coat  or  x  commodity  A  = 
Y commodity  B.  Marx,  1977,  75. 
There  1S  a  very  important  question  here  which  is not  within  the 
scope  of the  peresent  enquiry  and  which  will  not  be  answered  here. 
It 1S  not  altogether clear whether  in  the  passage  just cited  Marx 
is illustrating the  path of investigation and  analysis,  or  whether 
he  is presenting  us  with  the  results of analysis  in  a  way  which 
suggests that  the actual  method  of analysis  follows  another  path. 
28.  Marx,  1975,  139. 
29.  As  has  already  been  indicated,  one  of the  most  difficult  aspects 
of  Marx's  account  of exchange is of what  are  we  speaking  when  we 
use  the  term  'form'?  Value  as  a  form  of something,  or  value  as 
something  which  itself takes  a  form? 
30.  Ibid,  139-40. 
31.  Marx,  1968,  172. 
32.  Marx,  1975,  131. 
33.  Over  the  last  few  years  there  has  been  an  increasIng  number  of 
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-commentators  on  Marx  who,  whilst  regarding  the  theory  of  the 
value-form  as  Marx's  quintessential  contribution  to 
development  of  critical  economic  thought,  still  identify 
residual  'embodied  labour'  theory  in Capital  which  they  regard 
incompatible  with  the  line of development  taken  by  the  theory 
the 
a 
as 
of 
the  value-form.  Cf.  Chapter  Five  and  Hanlon  and  Eldred,  1981. 
One  of the  purposes  of the  concluding  part of this  section,  and 
the  following,  lS  to  show  how  the  theory  of  the  value-form 
complements  Marx's  theory  of value,  thus  dispelling as  myth  the 
notion  of a  residual  labour-embodied  theory  of value. 
34.  Marx,  1977,  54-5. 
35.  Hitherto,  the  presentation has  spoken  of types  of  relationships. 
One  of Marx's  key  ideas  lS  that objects are  capable  of taking  on 
new  functions,  over  and  above  those  which  are  derived  from  their 
physical  properties.  These  new  functions  are  a  result  of  the 
object  occupylng  a  specific position in  relationship  to  other 
objects,  In  this  instance in occupying  a  particular  position 
within  the  exchange-relation.  In  this  sense,  although  the 
relationship  lS  expressed  th~ough the  objects,  it  lS  itself 
independent  of those  objects.  This  view  radically  differs  from 
other  accounts of exchange  which  perceive nothing other  than  the 
objects  themselves. 
36.  Ibid,  56. 
37.  By  this  lS  meant  nothing more  than  that  the  two  expressions 
contain  expresslons  of  two  'quanta'  of value.  They  may  very 
189 possibly  be  of  the  same  magnitude,  but  they  are  not  the  same 
value. 
3B.  Without  recognition of  the  plural,  analysis must  revert  to  an 
earlier unsatisfactory way  of.thinking: 
In  order to  discover  how  the  elementary  expression  of 
the  value  of  a  commodity  lies hidden  1n  the  value-
relation  of  two  commodities,  we  must,  in  the  first 
place,  consider  the  latter entirely  apart  from  its 
quantitative  aspect.  The  usual  mode  of  procedure  is 
generally  the  reverse,  and  in  the  value-relation nothing 
1S  seen  but  the  proportion  between  definite  quantities 
of  two  different  sorts  of  commodities  that  are 
considered  equal  to  each  other.  It  is  apt  to  be 
forgotten  that the  magnitudes  of different  things  can  be 
compared  quantitatively,  only  when  those  magnitudes  are 
expressed in  terms  of the  same  unit.  Ibid,  56. 
39.  Marx's  use  of  the  term  'relative'  is potentially  misleading  1n 
that  it  could  be  taken  to  mean  that  value  itself  is  relative. 
However,  as  we  shall see,  the relative expression of  value  does 
nothing  to  diminish its  'absolute'  nature. 
40.  Ibid,  57. 
41.  Loc  Cit. 
42.  Ibid,  57-B. 
43.  Loc  Cit. 
44.  Ibid,  59. 
45.  'This  incongruity  between  the  magnitude  of value  and  its  relative 
expression  has,  with  customary  ingenuity,  been  exploited  by  vulgar 
economists.  For  example  - "Once  admit  that  A falls,  because  B, 
190 with  which  it  1S  exchanged,  rises,  while  no  less  labour  1S 
bestowed  in the  meantime  on  A,  and  your  general  principle of value 
falls  to  the  ground  •.. "  (J.  Broadhurst:  'Political  Economy', 
London,  1842,  pp.  11  and  14).  Mr.  Broadhurst  might  just as  well 
say:  consider  the  fractions  10/20,  10/50,  10/100 etc.,  the  number 
10  remains  unchanged,  and  yet its  proportional  magnitude,  its 
magnitude  relatively to  the  numbers  20,  50,  100  etc.,  continually 
diminishes.  Therefore  the great principle that  the  magnitude  of a 
whole  number,  such  as 10,  is "regulated"  by  the  number  of  times 
unity  is contained in it, falls  to the  ground'.  Ibid,  61. 
46.  As  we  have  already  seen,  this explanation of  exchange-value  1S 
favoured  by  the utility theorists,  who  argue  that  the  exchange-
value  of  an  object is proportionate to its  utility  (total  or 
marginal).  As  Marx  points out,  the relative  form  of value  betrays 
an  underlying  social  relationship  within  exchange  which  1S 
obscured  within  the  equivalent  form  of value.  It  1S  precisely 
because  the  equivalent-form of value is a  representation of  value 
by  use-value  that the  relationship is made  to  appear  devoid of  a 
social origin. 
47.  The  most  recent  exponent  of this view  1S  Elson.  Cf.  Chapter  Five. 
48.  Ibid,  64. 
49.  Ibid,  66. 
50.  There  are  two  prevalent  manifestations  of  this  delusion. 
Mercantilism,  which  1n  its crudest  form  states  that  money  1S 
value,  stresses what  Marx  calls the qualitative dimension,  1.e., 
191 the  equivalent  form  of value  and  then,  not  least,  in its  fullest 
development  as  money.  Alternatively,  the theoretical  antithesis 
of  mercantilism,  free-trade,  denies  the  qualitative  problem  and 
focuses  on  the  quantitative,  1n  which  event  the  problem  of 
explaining value is synonymous  with  the  problem of price. 
51.  This  is perhaps  best exemplified  by  the  following  passage,  quoted 
by  Marx,  in which  Bailey  becomes  hopelessly  confused: 
The  value  of any  commodity  denoting  its  relation  in 
exchange,  we  may  speak  of it as  ... corn-value,  cloth-
value,  according  to  the  commodity  with  which  it  is 
compared;  and  hence  there are  a  thousand  different  kinds 
of  value,  as  many  kinds  of  value  as  there  are 
commodities  in existence,  and  all are  equally  real  and 
equally  nominal.  Bailey,  1825,  cited in  Marx,  1977, 
68n. 
As  Marx  points out,  Bailey reiteratei the  point  already  made  by 
Marx  himself that the  commodity  which  stands  in  the  position  of 
equivalent represents,  in its own  physical existence,  the  value of 
the  commodity  which  occupies  the  position of the  relative  form  of 
value.  It  becomes  the  form  of value.  To  the  extent  therefore 
that  the  value of a  particular commodity  can  be  represented  by  the 
use-values  of diverse  commodities,  then all commodities  represent 
something  which  is common  to  them  all,  and  it is  precisely  this 
which  Bailey  fails to understand. 
52.  Ibid,  67. 
53.  Lac  Cit. 
54.  Ibid,  68. 
55.  It 1S  true  that  by  means  of the  elementary  form,  the  value  of  a 
192 commodity  A becomes  expressed in  terms  of one,  and  only  one,  other 
commodity.  But  that  one  may  be  a  commodity  of any  kind,  coal, 
iron,  corn,  or  anything else.  Therefore,  accordingly  as  A  lS 
placed  in relation with  one  or  the  other,  we  get  for  one  and  the 
same  commodity,  different elementary  expressions  of value. 
67-8. 
56.  Loc  Cit. 
57.  Ibid,  68-9. 
58.  Ibid,  69. 
Ibid, 
59.  The  question of  the  preclse nature of the  relationship  between 
concrete  and  abstract  labour  and  the  claim that  the  former,  under 
certain  circumstances,  lS  the  form  In  which  the  latter  lS 
realised,  has  been  answered  In  a  number  of ways.  In  simplistic 
accounts  of Marx's contribution to  the  development  of the  labour 
theory  of value,  abstract  labour  lS often conceived  as  an  inherent 
property  of  concrete labour.  Consequently,  so  the  argument  lS 
put,  the  performance of concrete  labour entails the  performance  of 
abstract  labour.  This  'physiological'  conception is discussed  at 
length  by  Rubin  and  need  not  concern  us  here.  But  the 
relationship  lS  an  important  one,  without  which  even  a  basic 
understanding  of Marx's  contribution is impossible.  The  question 
is discussed  in  Chapter  Five  below. 
60.  Ibid,  70. 
61.  Ibid,  71. 
193 62.  By  the  very  nature of the  world  of commodities ,  more  than  one 
universal  equivalent  can  only  eXl"st  t  as  a  emporary  state  of 
affairs. 
63.  Ibid,  72. 
64.  This  account  of the  role of the  Universal  equivalent  can  be 
contrasted  with  the  money-fables  of  the  early  political 
economists  and  philosophers.  In  these  accounts  the  development  of 
money  (a  universal  equivalent)  is ascribed  to  convention  and 
convenience.  But  these  explanations are  flawed  to  the  extent  that 
they  cannot  produce  an  account  of how  the  commodity  so  selected 
for  the  role can itself be  an  equivalent.  The  highest  expression 
of  this  view  is found  ln  Ricardo  and  the  attempt  to  define  the 
properties of an  invariable measure  of value.  The  Universal  form 
of  value,  by  contrast,  can  ultimately  be  traced  back  into  the 
Elementary  form  of value  where  it originates in  the  distinction 
between  the  relative and  equivalent  forms  of value.  As  Marx  goes 
on  to explain,  the  Universal  equivalent  cannot itself assume  the 
relative  form  of value  since it would  be  necessary  to express  its 
own  value  ln  a  quantity of the  same  product.  The  invariable 
measure  of value,  interestingly enough,  pursued  the  argument  that 
a  single  commodity  could express  both its own  and  the  value  of 
every  other  commodity  simultaneously  simply  by  embodying  the 
characteristics  of  all  commodities.  The  very  nature  of  the 
commodity  world  precludes  this  possibility  and  resolves  the 
problem  practically by  singling out  a  Universal  equivalent. 
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THE  MEASURE  AND  MAGNITUDE  OF  VALUE 
I.  Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this chapter is to  explain  how  Marx  addresses  the 
problem,  which  common-sense  would  say  is the  problem  of  value-theory, 
that  is,  to  explain  the  process  of value-magnitude  determination  and 
its measurement. 
In  his  treatment  of these  issues,  Sweezy  drew  a  distinction  between 
the qualitative value-problem  and  the  quantitative  value-problem.  The 
former  has  been  addressed  in  the  previous  two  chapters.  The  present 
chapter  begins  with  an  examination of those  comments  made  by  Marx 
which  address  what  Sweezy  defined  as  the  quantitative value-problem. 
Before  beginning,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  qualify  ~weezy's 
distinction,  because  for  reasons  which  will  become  apparent,  it  lS 
believed  that  this  bifurcation of  the  value-problem  has,  whilst 
doubtlessly  illuminating  some  pertinent  problems,  obscured  many 
others.  This  chapter offers the  opinion  that  much  of  the  argument 
made  In  support  of the  claim that the  labour  theory  of  value  lS 
redundant  rests on  a  misconception of the  nature  and  purpose  of value-
theory  and  a  misconception  of what  such  a  theory  can  explain  and  how 
it  does  so.  But  nevertheless every  value-theory,  irrespective  of 
theoretical  background,  has  possessed  an  irreducible  quantitative 
characteristic in  the  sense that somewhere  in its purpose  there lies a 
request  for  a  solution to  the  question  of  how  exchange-ratios  are 
determined.  This  mayor  may  not  be  part of a  wider  set  of  problems 
and  solutions.  Hitherto,  this question  has  been  posed  in  the  context 
195 of  other  questions  as  to  the  nature  and  regulation of  economies 
which  the  products of their  producers  take  the  form  of  commodities 
which  are  exchanged  on  the  market.  There  1S  a  continuous  thread 
within political economy,  stretching  from  its early Classical  forms  to 
its  modern  practitioners which  has  sought  to  deny  the  pertinence  of 
these  wider  questions  and  their solutions to  the  formation  of  a 
solution to  the  quantitative problem.  The  aim  of the  present  chapter 
1S  not  only  to  show  that  these  solutions are  mutually  supportive  but 
are indivisible. 
Of  the  various  accounts  of the  labour  theory  of value  glven  1n  recent 
years,  many  have  been  written  perhaps  conscious  of the  argument  put 
forward  by  Bohm-Bawerk  nearly  a  century  ago,  that Marx's  explanation 
of exchange-ratio  determination  inevitably  involves  him  in  a  circular 
argument  (1).  With  the  exception  of  a  small  number  of political 
economists,  amongst  others  I.  I.  Rubin  and  R.  Rosdolsky,  virtually 
all  sympathetic  accounts of the  labour  theory  of  value  accept  the 
substance  of  Bohm-Bawerk's  critique and  subsequently  act  upon  the 
implicit  challenge  it  contains;  to  define  a  means  of  calculating 
exchange-ratios  in  terms  of labour-times,  without  invoking  exchange  as 
the  mechanism  by  which  individual,  concrete  and  private  labours  are 
made  homogeneous  for  the  purpose  of comparison.  If the  assumptions  of 
Bohm-Bawerk's  critique  are  accepted,  then  the  conclusion  that 
employs  a  circular argument  is inevitable.  And  with abstract 
Marx 
labour 
redefined  as  physiological  labour  and  the  problem  of  skilled-labour 
given  over  to algebra,  Marx's  solution to  Sweezy's  qualitative  value-
problem  1S  sacrificed on  the altar,  not  of quantitative  consistency, 
which  1S  a  perfectly  legitimate  aspiration,  but  that  of  the 
196 explanatory  priority of quantity  over  quality  which  seems  to accompany 
precisely  those  assumptions.  Recent  commentaries  have  discovered  that 
such  quantitative criteria tend  to underestimate,  and  in  some  cases 
altogether  19nore,  the  problem,  which  according  to  Marx  eluded 
Ricardo,  that is,  the  problem of explaining  why  the  products  of labour 
take  the  form  of  value,  and ~  the  magnitude  of  the  latter  1S 
determined  by  quantities of labour-time.  Paradoxically,  however,  the 
same  commentators  who  express their aim  (2)  as  one  of  recovering 
Marx's  qualitative analysis  from  the  ravages  wrought  upon  it by  years 
of dubious  interpretation,  inverted the relationship  between  quantity 
and  quality,  and  subsequently  fail  to explain  the  explanatory  role  of 
Marx's  concept  of labour-time.  Clearly,  a  theory  which  explains  how 
commodities  exchange  by  reference  to quantities of  labour  time  1S 
going  to  have  a  difficult  job  justifying its claim  to  be  a  serious 
contender if its key  concept  1S  embarrassingly made  redundant  (3).  In 
more  consistent  accounts of the  sympathetic  position,  labour-time  is 
self-consciously  excised altogether  or  compressed  into price,  but  not 
without  some  question-begging sotto  voce  comments  about  the origin and 
function  of money,  which,  as  shall be  shown  later,  do  not  stand  up  to 
scrutiny. 
The  a1m,  therefore,  is to  show  that,  contrary  to  current  opinion, 
Marx's  major  works  of political economy  contain  an  account  of  the 
independent  theoretical  value  of the  concept  of  labour-time  as  a 
measure  of  value,  which  is both  intelligible and  coherent.  Should 
th
O  t  b  f  lone of the  implications  of  1S  exercise turn  out  0  e  success  u  , 
SUccess  would  be  to  show  that the  division  between  a  quantitative  and 
f  1  °  °d  tifying problems  is  a  qualitative  value-problem,  though  use  u  1n  1  en  , 
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loyalists  of  both  aspects of the  problem  as  to  the  redundancy  of 
Marx's  concept  of labour-time.  In  the  second  part of  this  chapter, 
therefore,  there  lS  an  examination of  Marx's  explanation  of  the 
magnitude  of  value,  emphasising  the  role  played  by  labour-time  and 
arguing,  as  a  consequence,  for  its independent  explanatory  role.  The 
third,  fourth  and  fifth parts  examlne  a  number  of interpretations  of 
Marx's  thinking  on  the  problem of value  as if they  were,  which  they 
sometimes  are,  responses  to  the  charge of circularity.  Contributions 
made  by  advocates  of  both  the  quantitative  and  the  qualitative 
approaches  to  the  problems  of value  theory  are  examined  and  show  that 
far  from  representing  intractable  opposites  In  their  respective 
defences  of the  labour  theory  of value,  they  logically  converge  in its 
collapse.  The  sixth  and  final  part  draws  on  and  attempts  to  extend 
the  work  of I.  I.  Rubin,  whose  ~aluable contribution has  successfully 
dispelled  the  aura of mathematical exactitude with  which  the  labour 
theory  of value  has  been  encumbered.  The  impossibility of making  such 
calculations,  far  from  being  a  defect of the  theory,  in  fact  derives 
from  the  very  nature of commodity  production itself.  And  if  this 
argument  is taken  to its logical conclusion one  must  then  inevitably 
reject  arguments  made  against  the  labour  theory  of value  which  are 
based  on  the  claim that it cannot  produce  a  coherent  quantitative 
account  of exchange-ratio determination. 
II.  Labour-time 
From  Petty  onwards,  the  labour  theory  of value  has  been  beset  by  the 
problem  of  heterogeneous  labour.  Typical  of  its  philosophical 
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departure  from  the  assumption  of equality  and  introduced  anomalous 
the 
conditions  such  as  differences  in levels of  k"ll  at  s  1  successively 
later  stages of analysis;  these  conditions  being  dealt  with  more  1n 
the  nature of exceptions  to  the  rule rather  than  as  instances  covered 
by  it.  Hence  the  pragmatic  and  unsatisfactory  reference  to  the 
'higgling  and  bargaining of the  market'  which  we  find  in  Smith,  and 
which  1S  endorsed  by  Ricardo.  With  Marx,  conversely,  it  can  be 
demonstrated  that  the  problem of differences 1n  the  level  of  skill 
between  one  kind  of labour  and  another is to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
context  of the  more  general  problem  of labour  heterogeneity  itself. 
As  we  saw  1n  the third chapter,  the  problem  of  equality  between 
heterogeneous  labours  1S  synonymous  with  the  problem  of  how  the 
totality of individual,  private labours  are articulated into a  social 
economy,  viz.,  the  problem of how  society  regulates  its  productive 
activities  1n  the  absence  of direct social  regulation.  And  there  we 
saw  that  the  equivalence of commodities  1n  exchange  established  a 
corresponding  relationship of equivalence  between  the different  kinds 
of labour  which  produced  them.  The  quality of equality is the  social 
characteristic  of  labour  1n  an  economy  founded  on  the  private 
production  and  exchange  of commodities.  Therefore,  regardless of  how 
different society  requires its productive activities to  be,  insofar  as 
they  produce  exchange  equivalents,  they  all  possess  the  social 
character  of equality.  As  expenditures of equal  labour,  Marx  calls 
the  labour  which  produces  commodities  and  appears  as  value,  abstract 
labour.  Where  Smith  and  Ricardo  erred  was  in  failing  to  explain  the 
t "  labour.  In  assuming  the  specific  nature  of  this value-crea  1ng 
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equality  as  a  supra-historical  datum  rather  than  as  an  essentially 
historical  property  of a  particular  form  of social  production,  that 
is,  one  founded  on  private production. 
Following  his definition of value-producing  labour  as abstract  labour , 
In  Section  One,  Chapter  One  of Capital,  Marx  proceeds  to explain  how 
the  value-magnitude  of each  commodity  is determined,  and  immediately 
draws  a  distinction  between  what  shall be  called  here,  following 
Marx's  usage  elsewhere,  individual  labour-time  and  social  labour-time: 
Some  people  might  think  that if the  value  of a  commodity  IS 
determined  by  the  quantity  of labour  spent  on  it,  the  more 
idle and  unskilful  the  labourer,  the  more  valuable  would  his 
commodity  be,  because  more  time  would  be  required  in  its 
production.  The  labour,  however,  that  forms  the  substance  of 
value is homogeneous  human  labour,  expenditure of one  uniform 
labour-power  (4). 
Interpreters  of this passage  generally  draw  the  distinction  between 
the  labour-time  which  it  takes  for  a  particular  individual  or 
enterprise  within  a  particular industry  to  produce  one  unit  of  that 
industry's  commodity,  and  the  labour-time  taken  to  produce  one  on 
average  for  that  industry  as  a  whole.  This  average  IS  then  equated 
with  what  Marx  subsequently  defines  as  the  labour-time  socially 
necessary  for  the  production of a  unit of that industry's output  (5). 
This,  however,  appears  to  ignore  an  important  distinction.  He  does 
not  equate  socially  necessary  labour-time  with  the  labour-time 
required  on  average  within  a  particular  industry.  As  an 
interpretation  of Marx's  explanation it fails to  take  account  of  the 
sentences  which  appear  between  his  mockery  of outraged  entrepreneurial 
common-sense  and  the  introduction of the  concept  of socially  necessary 
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distinction  which  has  received little  recognition,  that  1S,  the 
distinction  between  individual  labour-time  and  social  labour-time. 
Individual  labour-time  can,  and  is measured  in units of  natural  time. 
It  is the  time  taken  to  perform  some  concretely  specified  activity, 
resulting  in  some  particular use-value,  e.g.,  weaving  cloth.  However 
it makes  very little difference  to  the  nature  of the  units of time  if 
it  1S  the  weaving  time  taken  by  an  individual  to  produce,  say,  ten 
metres  of cloth,  or  whether it 1S  the  weaving  time  taken  on  average  to 
produce  ten  metres  of cloth within  the  industry  as  a  whole,  the 
labour-time  which  measures  the  duration of weaving  1S  a  specific 
concrete  labour-time,  measured  in units of natural  time.  Therefore, 
just  as  it is impossible  to  find  some  inherent  means  of  comparing 
different  kinds of labour-expenditure,  one  hour  of weaving,  that  1S, 
one  hour  of natural  time,  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  equal  to  one  hour  of 
any  other  kind  of concrete  productive activity,  measured  similarly  1n 
units of natural  time  for  the  purposes of valuing its products.  This 
kind  of  time,  consequently,  belonging  as  it  does  to  concretely-
specified,  individuated  activities,  cannot  be  the  means  by  which 
value,  and  its substance,  abstract labour,  are  measured.  This  1S 
because  they  are  homogeneous  where  concrete  labours  and  their  temporal 
durations  are  not.  It is precisely this point which  Marx  makes  in  the 
passage  cited earlier.  In  so  far  as  commodities  are  regarded  solely 
as  values,  they  are  the  products of abstract  labour,  the  homogeneous, 
undifferentiated expenditure of one  uniform  labour-power. 
Each  kind  of commodity  differs,  only  to  the  extent that as  a  value  it 
represents  a  greater or  smaller  expenditure of uniform  labour-power. 
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commodity-producing  economies,  each  kind  of commodity  represents  a 
quantum  or  aliquot  part  of  the  expenditure  of  social  labour. 
Theoretically,  therefore,  the  output of each  branch  1S  simply  a 
multiple of the  quantity  of social labour  required  to  produce  one  unit 
of  its  particular commodity.  The  resulting value  is a  quantity  of 
social  labour-time.  If  the  total value  of  all  the  commodities 
produced  in  an  economy  in one  year  could  be  given  a  precise magnitude, 
we  would  see at once  that each  branch of production  would,  through  the 
value  of  its  output,  represent  an  aliquot  part  of  the  total 
expenditure  of social labour  for  that year.  Each  branch  would  account 
for  a  part  of the  available  labour-power,  and  one  labour-power, 
insofar  as it produces  value,  would  differ  from  no  other  labour-power 
because  they  would,  as  the  producers of value,  be  the  'expenditure  of 
labour  without  regard  to its mode  of expenditure'.  This  is  what  1S 
taken  to  be  Marx's  meaning  when  he  explains  that  the  'total  labour-
power  of society', 
This 
which  1S  embodied  in the  sum  total of the  values  of  all 
commodities  produced  by  that society,  counts  as  one 
homogeneous  mass  of human  labour-power,  composed  though  .it 
may  be  of innumerable  individual units.  Each  of these  un1ts 
1S  the  same  as  any  other,  so  far  as it has  the  character  of 
the  average  labour-power  of society,  and  takes effect as  such 
(6). 
passage  1S  important  because  it  contains  one  of  the 
characteristics  of  Marx's  theory of value  which  is  not  shared  by 
others  before  or  since.  Its  concept  of  value  is  that  of  an 
undifferentiated  'substance'.  There is only  one  value  corresponding 
f  1  b  Value  Produced  by  iron-smelting  to  a  particular conception  0  a  our. 
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There  IS  no  further  reduction  to  be  made  as  there  would  be  for 
Ricardo,  for  example,  where  value  IS  heterogeneous  because  its 
creation  and  measurement  is by  direct reference  to a  specific kind  of 
labour  of  a  certain  duration.  Does  this  mean  then  that  the 
relationship  between  labour-time  and  value  is indeterminate? 
Marx  answers  this  question  In  a  way  which  has  generated  much 
controversy  and  been  subject  to  a  number  of attacks,  particularly  from 
Bohm-Bawerk.  What  he  says  IS  that in  the  form  of  value  society's 
productive capacities appear  'as one  homogeneous  mass  of human  labour-
power'.  In  particular,  he  uses  the  expression  'counts'  and  it IS  this 
which  Marx's critics have  found  unpalatable.  Clearly,  the  use  of such 
a  word  invites  the  charge  that  words  are  being  used  to  deny  that 
something  IS  not  what  it  really  IS,  or  In  other  words,  that 
definitions  can  be  conveniently  overlooked.  However,  Marx  IS  not 
using,  or  indeed  misusing,  the definitions of  words.  He  IS  stating 
what  IS  a  property  of a  particular state of affairs.  The  particular 
labour  which  produced  a  portion of value is undetectable in  the  value 
itself.  This is a  statement of a  particular aspect  of the  nature  of 
value  and  not  a  mere  definition. 
Many  of the  critiques of the  labour  theory  of value  have  argued  that 
its veracity  depends  upon  the possibility of determining  magnitudes  of 
value  by 
responses 
direct empirical  measurement  of  labour  expenditure. 
made  to this form  of criticism have  attempted  to  show 
The 
that 
Marx  did  not  claim to  be  able  to determine  value-magnitudes  by  direct 
empirical  measurement.  However,  what  has  been  claimed  is  that  the 
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times  taken  to  produce  that commodity  within  the  branch  of  social 
production  responsible  for it.  Here  again,  however,  is the  assumption 
of empirical  measurement,  admittedly  at one  remove,  since  now  it is an 
average  for  an  industry  that is sought  and  not  a  direct measurement  of 
labour-expenditure  as  though  that was  simultaneously  a  measurement  of 
value.  It is the  opinion of the  present  work  that neither  of  these 
conceptions  forms  part  of Marx's  account  of the  labour  theory  of 
value.  As  was  seen  in  the third chapter,  Marx's  account  lS  based  on  a 
concept  of  labour  as  social  labour.  In  the  next  section  the 
quantitative  aspect  of  this idea is examined  with  the  purpose  of 
showing  what  concept  of time  Marx  employs  in  his  use  of labour-time  as 
the  measure  of value. 
III  Social  Labour  and  Labour-Time 
What  underlies  the  concept of social  labour  lS  the  closely  connected 
idea  of simple-labour as  the expenditure of  labour-power  which  is  of 
the  average  quality  for  each  society  In  its  different  phases  of 
development.  Such  labour-power is the basic  productive  resource  of 
any  society.  En  masse,  it constitutes the  substance of social labour. 
Therefore  the  expenditure of social labour is the expenditure  of  the 
socially  and  historically relative average  quality  of  labour-power 
available  to  that  society  for  its  productive  activities.  In 
commodity-producing  h  ver  labour  lS  not  economles,  owe  ,  expended 
.  t  1  as  the  labour  of  a  directly  as  social  labour,  but  prlva  e  y, 
particular producer  within  the  division of labour.  Consequently,  the 
.  .  .,  . lIb  1  asserts itself ~  medium  quantltatlve  dlmenslon  of SOCla  a  our  on  y 
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The  labour-time  which  counts  in the  determination of the  value of each 
individual  commodity,  therefore,  is that which  corresponds  to  the 
expenditure of simple-labour,  that is,  the  labour  performed  by  average 
labour-power. 
Marx's  concept  of socially necessary  labour-time is evaluated,  if that 
IS  the  right expression,  in units of social  labour-time,  that  IS, 
labour-time  which  measures  the  expenditure of simple  labour  by  average 
labour-power.  This  is what  Marx  means  when  he  explains  that  labour 
which  is accounted  for  in  the  production of value is labour  performed 
by  the  average  labour-power  of society.  And  then,  in  a  very  important 
idea,  where  the  labour  performed  does  not  coincide with  the  average 
labour-power,  its  value-producing capability is limited  so  that  it 
'takes effect  as  such'.  What  this means  is that,  although  individuals 
and  enterprises,  both within  and  between  different  branches  of  the 
division  of labour,  produce  under  different conditions,  resulting  In 
their  own  individual  labour-times  for  the  production  of  their 
particular  commodity,  In  the  market,  the  value  of  their  commodities 
will  correspond  to  that quantity of labour-time  which  IS  socially-
necessary  for  their production  and  corresponds  to  the expenditure  of a 
quantity  of  average  labour-power.  Socially  necessary  labour-time, 
which  represents  a  quantity  of social  and  hence  simple  labour, 
establishes  a  uniform  value  for  each  commodity,  and  by  representing 
uniform,  homogeneous  labour  makes  all commodities  commensurable 
hence  capable of being  exchanged  as  equivalents: 
We  see  then  that that which  determines  the magnitude  of  the 
value  of  any  article  is the  amount  of  labour  socially 
necessary,  or  the  labour-time socially  necessary  for  its 
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and production.  Each  individual  commodity,  in this connection is 
to  be  regarded  as  an  average  sample  of  its  class. 
Commodities,  therefore,  in  which  equal  quantities of  labour 
are  embodied,  or  which  can  be  produced  in  the  same  time,  have 
the  same  value.  The  value  of one  commodity  is to  the  value 
of any  other,  as  the  labour-time  necessary  for  the  production 
of  the  one  is to  that necessary  for  the  production  of  the 
other  (7). 
By  implication,  this idea could  be  extended  with  an  illustration.  For 
example,  imagine  within  a  particular branch  of the  social division  of 
labour  that  there are  two  producers;  one  whose  labour-power  conforms 
to  the  social  average  and  one  whose  labour-power  lS  of  a  more 
developed  quality.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  individual 
producers,  the  second will  probably  take  less  time  to  produce  a  unit 
of his commodity  than  the  first,  assuming all other  things  are  equal. 
However,  in  the market  they will obtain exactly  the  same  for  their 
respective  commodities.  Obviously  the  second  producer will  be  at  an 
advantage  because  even  though  his  commodity  takes  less  time  to 
produce,  it will  exchange  for  exactly  the  same  amount  of value  as  the 
product  of  the  first producer.  In  every  instance,  each  commodity 
represents  an  average  sample  of its class,  regardless  of  how  many 
hours it takes  to  produce it on  an  individual  basis. 
At  this point,  Marx  himself refers  to his earlier work  of 1859  where 
he  employs  this same  conception.  In  this work  we  find  the  following 
passage  which  would  appear  to  summarise  the  whole  of that  argument: 
The  labour-time  expressed in exchange-value is  ~he labour  of 
an  individual  but  of an  individual in  no  way  dlfferent  from 
the  next  indi~idual and  from  all other  individuals in  so  far 
.  t'  f  as  they  perform equal  labour  ... It lS  the  labour-.lme  0  an 
individual  his  labour-time,  but  only  as  labour-tl~e  .c~mmon 
'--- .,  . t  .  t  .  1  hose  lndlvldual  to all;  consequently It lS  qUl  e  lmma  erla  ~w  __  __ 
labour-time this is (8). 
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labour-time  of  equal  magnitude.  Thus,  despite  the  variety  of 
productive  activities  specified concretely within  the  division  of 
labour,  ln the  exchange  of commodities,  the  labour of the  individual 
takes  effect  as  labour  ln  no  way  different  from  the  labour  of  any 
other  individual,  'that is to say,  if the  individual's  labour-time 
represents  universal  labour-time  or  if  universal  labour-time 
represents  individual  labour-time.'  The  relationship  between  the 
qualitative  and  quantitative value-problems is emphasised  when  Marx 
explains  that  the  commodity  only  represents  a  'social magnitude'  when 
as  a  product  of social labour,  and  of a  definite quantity  of  social 
labour,  it represents  a  'universal magnitude',  a  quantity of the  same 
uniform  substance  (9). 
This  conception  heralds  a  significant departure  from  the  Classical 
political  economists. 
applied  to  different 
There  the  conventional  concept  of  time  was 
activities  ,  but  was  found  to  be  untenable 
without  major  qualification.  What  is interesting to  note  lS  that  the 
concept  of  time  employed  by  Smith  and  Ricardo  was  itself  an 
abstraction.  What  they  were  unable  to  conceive  was  labour itself  as 
an  abstraction.  For  them,  labour  was  the  root  of an  ordered  world  and 
rationality,  for  its part,  would  dictate that to  depart  from  that 
tangible  test  would  engender  disorder.  Marx  argues  ln  a  directly 
contrary  direction,  the  abstraction of labour  not  only  does 
place,  but  does  so  as  a  matter of necessity  and  routine  in order 
the  society  to  function.  Social-(or  universal-)labour  time 
take 
for 
lS 
1  t  t ·  1  tl'me  - wl'th  one  l'mportant  distinction.  ana  ogous  0  conven  lona 
Universal  labour-time  possesses  ontological  properties  which  are 
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time  corresponds  to  a  specific  form  of  regulation  of  social 
production.  Its  properties  cannot  be  divorced  from  that  form  of 
social  production  or its typical  modes  of functioning.  Value  can  only 
function  as  a  regulator of social production  to  the  extent that  labour 
assumes  the  form  of social  labour  by  means  of abstraction  and  labour-
time  assumes  the  form  of universal labour-time. 
So  far  we  have  examined  the distinction between  individual  labour-time 
and  social,  or,  as  Marx  sometimes  puts  it,  universal  labour-time. 
Having  established what  kind of time  social  labour  is measure  in,  we 
can  now  turn  to  examine  what  Marx  meant  by  the  term  'socially 
necessary',  which  hitherto  has  only  been  mentioned  in  pass1ng. 
In  the  course of drawing  the  distinction between  individual  and  social 
labour-time,  it 1S  also necessary  to  recognise  that  the  labour-time 
taken  to  produce  a  particular  commodity  on  average  1S  an  average  of 
individual  labour-times within  a  particular  industry  and  is  therefore 
calculated  in  terms of hours  of a  specified  form  of concrete  labour. 
If we  examine  the  following  passage  from  Capital,  it appears  that  such 
averages  are  regarded  by  Marx  as  synonymous  with  his  concept  of 
socially-necessary  labour-time:  'The  labour-time socially necessary  1S 
that  required  to  produce  an  article under  the  normal  conditions  of 
production,  and  with  the  average  degree  of  skill  and  intensity 
prevalent  at  the  time'  (10).  This  passage  has  been  taken  to  imply 
that  socially necessary  labour-time is measured  in  hours,  days,  etc. 
d Oh  °  d  try  That  being  the  of  the  concrete labour  performe  1n  eac  1n  us  . 
°t  Id  seem,  falls  foul  of the  issue which  case,  Marx's  explanation,  1  wou 
obstructed  Smith  and  Ricardo;  that of explaining  how  differences  in 
208 skill  and  intensity  can  be  accounted  for  in the  labour  theory  of value 
without  courting the possibility of serious  inconsistency.  Although 
in  the  market,  it is possible to  think  of one  kind  of labour  being  the 
equivalent 
different 
of another,  in  production,  commodities  are  produced 
conditions  which  involve differences in  both  the 
under 
average 
level  of skill and  average  intensities between  industries.  This  has 
caused  problems  for  a  number  of interpretations.  Thus,  Gerstein,  for 
example,  treats  such  differences  as  problems  to  be  resolved  in 
abstraction  from  the  qualitative problem of  concrete  and  abstract 
labour:  'The  reduction of concrete  labour  to abstract  labour  1n  the 
market  1S  prior  to  the  problems  involved  1n  the  determination  of 
socially  necessary  labour-time  and  in  the  reduction  of  skilled  to 
simple  labour'  (11) •  The  implications of such  a  view  will  be 
discussed  in the  next  section where  we  examine  R.  L.  Meek's  solution 
to  the  supposed  problem of skilled and  unskilled  labour.  The  ma1n 
point  to establish here is that as  an  account  of Marx's  explanation  of 
the  magnitude  of value,  the  view  put  forward  by  Gerstein  and  others  1S 
based  on  a  misunderstanding,  which  to  a  degree  Marx  has  fostered  with 
his  decision  to  introduce the  concept  of  socially-necessary  labour-
time  in  the  way  that he  did. 
We  cannot,  of course,  speculate as to the  reasons  why  Marx  did  not 
provide  a  fuller  account  of his concept  of socially-necessary  labour-
time.  It  1S  true  to say,  however,  that his failure  to  do  so  has 
introduced  a  number  of trains of thought  which  are  tangential  to  the 
direction of Marx's  own  thought  and  consequently  which  have  engendered 
much  largely  irrelevant controversy. 
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difficulties  which  skilled labour  posed  for  both  Smith  and  Ricardo, 
should  have  so  short-sightedly  fallen  foul  of the  same  problem.  This 
is  not  to  suggest  that Marx  was  above  such  clumsy  mistakes,  but  that 
gIven  that  he  discussed  the  problem  so  widely  in his  own  work,  it 
would  be  difficult to  support  an  argument  that  he  was  indeed  guilty of 
such  a  misdemeanour.  The  implication of the  view  held  by  Gerstein, 
for  example,  is that the  theory  of abstract  labour  is  more  of  the 
nature  of an  assumption  of labour-homogeneity,  made  perhaps  to  account 
for  commodity-commensurability,  but  which  has  no  bearing  In  the 
context  of the quantitative value-problem.  It can  be  contended  that 
this  view  IS  insupportable.  It can  be  shown  that  the  theory  of 
abstract  labour  does  play  a  crucial  role  In  explaining  value-
magnitudes  which  IS  to  be  disclosed  in  the  category  of  socially 
necessary  labour-time.  After all,  the  whole  problem  of  defining 
the  substance of value is one  of defining  a  property of commodities  by 
virtue of which  different commodities  can  be  thought  of as greater  or 
lesser quantities of such  a  property,  and  therefore  by  which  they  can 
be  comparable.  To  then  claim  that  the  theory  of abstract  labour  has 
no  bearing  on  the  determination of value-magnitudes  would  seem  to 
contradict  the  very  purpose  for  which  it was  developed.  What  then  was 
Marx's  position?  Did  he  renege  on  the  theory  of abstract  labour  In 
his explanation of value-magnitudes  by  arguing  that socially-necessary 
labour-time is calculated in hours  of concrete  labour-time?  It  would 
be  difficult to  draw  this conclusion.  In  the  example  which  he  offers 
to  illustrate  the  concept  of socially  necessary  labour-time,  Marx 
identifies the  concept  as  magnitude  with  social labour  as  substance: 
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by  one  half the  labour  required  to  weave  a  given  quantity  of 
yarn  into cloth.  The  hand-loom  weaver,  as  a  matter of  fact, 
continued  to require  the  same  time  as  before;  but  for  all 
that,  the  product  of one  hour  of their  labour  represented 
after  the  change  only  half an  hour's  social  labour,  and 
consequently  fell  to one-half its former  value  (12). 
In  this example,  the  change  in the  value  of cloth is not  explained  as 
a  change  in  the  average  labour-time,  calculated in  hours  of  weaving, 
taken  to  produce  a  given  quantity of cloth,  but  as  a  change  1n  the 
quantity  of social labour,  i.e., homogeneous,  abstract  labour  required 
to  produce it.  Socially necessary  labour-time is calculated in  units 
of  simple  labour,  the  individual unit of which  1S  average  labour-
power.  Therefore,  average  labour-times calculated in  terms  of  hours 
of  a  specific concrete  labour  play  no  role in Marx's  explanation  of 
the  magnitude  of value.  There is therefore  no  intermediate stage  at 
which  time  the  individual  labours of a  particular  branch  of  social 
production  are converted into  branch  averages.  Gerstein's  problematic 
therefore  does  not exist.  Individual  labour-times are translated into 
hours  of social  labour,  without  first  being  translated  into  average 
labour-times  for  each  industry. 
The  pertinence  of the  theory  of the  two-fold  nature  of  commodity-
producing  labour  to  the  problem of value-magnitude  determination  1S 
revealed  in this passage  from  the Grundrisse: 
The  labour of individuals in the  same  branch  of work,  and  the 
various  kinds  of work,  are different  from  one  another  not 
only  quantitatively  but  also qualitatively.  What  does  a 
solely  quantitative  difference  between  things  pres~ppo~e? 
The  identity  of their qualities.  Hence,  the  quan~ltat~~e 
measure  of labours  presupposes  the  equivalence,  the  1dent1  y 
of their quality  (13). 
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different  from  each  other,  but  so  are  those  within  the  same  branch. 
Before  their  respective  products  can  be  quantitatively compared  they 
must  be  rendered  commensurable.  Therefore  their  quantitative 
dimension  is inseparable  from  their qualitative congruence. 
In  the  above  passage,  Marx  stresses that  there is no  'averaging'  of 
labour-times  within  each  branch of production  to  determine  socially 
necessary  labour-times  for  each  kind  of commodity;  and  consequently, 
there  1S  no  residual  problem of accounting  for  differences  of  skill 
outside  the  manner  1n  which  concrete,  private  labours  are  translated 
into abstract,  social labour. 
So  prevalent  1n  the  literature of Marxism  is  the  V1ew  that  the 
existence  of a  variety of levels of skill associated  with  different 
productive  activities poses  a  problem  for  the  labour-theory of  value 
as  an  explanation of the  magnitude  of value,  that  the  way  1n  which 
Marx  accounts  for  them  is often  ignored.  The  existence of  different 
levels  of skill is regarded as  prima  facie  evidence  of the  existence 
of  fundamentally  heterogeneous  labour.  In  the  Critique,  Marx  himself 
responds  to  this in the  following  way:  'This  kind  of  labour  [i.e. 
skilled  labour]  resolves  itself into simple  labour;  it  1S  simple 
labour  raised  to  a  higher  power,  so  that  for  example  one  day  of 
skilled  labour  may  equal  three  days  of simple  labour'  (14).  The 
specific  laws  governing  this reduction,  he  says,  are  not  pertinent  to 
the  problem  in  hand: 
It  is  however  clear that  the  reduction is made,  for,  ~s 
"  f  h'  hI  killed  labour  1S  exchange-value,  the  product  0  19  Y  s  . 
equivalent  in definite proportions,  to  the  product  of slmple 
,  ,t  d  t  ertain  amount  of  average  labour;  thus  be1ng  equa  e  0  a  c 
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As  Rubin  puts it:  'the transformation of qualified labour  to  simple 
labour  1S  only  one  part of a  larger process  of  transformation  of 
concrete  labour  into abstract'  (16). 
The  equation  of  commodities  as  equivalents  1n  exchange  1S 
simultaneously  an  equalisation of the different  kinds  of labour  which 
produced  them.  Even  if there were  no  differences  in  the  level  of 
skill  between  one  kind  of labour  and  another,  and  indeed  between  two 
different  expenditures  of the  same  kind of labour,  the  problem  of 
equalisation would still exist because of the  differences 1n  concrete 
characteristics  which  naturally exist between  one  kind  of  productive 
activity  and  another.  Differences  1n  the  level of skill  brought  to 
the  performance of a  specific task  do  exist,  but  because  they  belong 
to  the  specification  of labour  in its concrete  variety,  they  are 
abstracted  from  in exactly the  same  manner  as  any  other  qualitative 
property  1n  the  translation of private  into  social  labour.  The 
abstraction  from  differences in skill takes  place  in exactly  the  same 
way  1n  which  the  multitude of individual,  private  activities  are 
unconsciously  welded  together  into a  unified  reproducible  social 
economy  and  is an  intrinsic element  of the  whole  process: 
Experience  shows  that this reduction  1S  constantly  being 
made.  A  commodity  may  be  the  product  of the  most  skilled 
labour,  but  its  value,  by  equating it to  the  product  of 
simple  unskilled  labour,  represents  a  definite  qua~tity  .of 
the latter labour alone.  The  different proportions  1n  wh1ch 
different sorts of labour  are  reduced  to unskilled  labour  as 
their standard are established by  a  social  process that  goes 
on  behind  the  backs  of  the  producers,  and  consequently 
appears  to  be  fixed  by  custom  (17). 
As  values,  commodities  are  compared  against  one  another  as  the 
213 products  of simple  labour,  the expenditure of  average  labour-power, 
which,  1n  turn  is the  basic  component  of  social  labour.  In  the 
example  of  an  exchange  of a  product  of skilled labour  for  that  of 
unskilled  labour,  the  proportions  in  which  they  exchange  can  be 
discerned  explicitly to correspond  to equal  quantities  of  unskilled 
labour.  This is because  the  commodity  to  which  the  product  of skilled 
labour  1S  equated  or  made  equivalent to  in exchange,  is  itself  the 
direct  product of unskilled or  simple  labour,  labour  which  corresponds 
to  the  expenditure  of  social  labour  (18).  In  exchange,  the 
proportions  1n  which  commodities  exchange  correspond  to  equal 
quantities of social labour.  It is as if they  were  produced  by  simple 
labour  which  counts  in the  determination of  their  value-magnitudes, 
and  at the  same  time it is the act of equalisation which  establishes 
this  uniformity.  Commodity-exchange  as  exchange  of  equivalents  1S 
simultaneously 
labour  (19). 
the  equalisation  of  heterogeneous  expenditures  of 
In  Marx's  account  of the  labour-theory of  value,  the 
problem  much  discussed in the literature,  viz.,  that of  skilled  and 
unskilled  labour,  therefore  does  not  exist.  Exchange  itself, 
according  to  Marx,  establishes the  ratios in which  one  kind  of labour, 
irrespective of its level of skill,  can  be  exchanged  for  any  other  by 
'reducing'  them  to  the expenditure of average  unskilled  or  simple 
labour,  and  this of course is synonymous  with  Marx's  explanation  of 
how  private labour  becomes  social  labour. 
This  explanation  of  how  labour-homogeneity  is  established  1S  the 
target  aimed  at  by  many  of Marx's  most  trenchant critics.  Discussing 
the  skilled-labour  problem  1n  terms  of  what  he  thinks  1S  its 
insuperability,  Bohm-Bawerk  declares:  'Here  we  stumble  against  the 
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circumstance  that the standard of reduction is determined  solely  Qy 
the  actual  exchange  relations  themselves'.  Consequently,  concludes 
the  critic,  'Marx  is arguing  in  a  complete  circle'  (20).  Marx's 
explanation,  it  would  seem,  is a  victim of its own  simplicity,  and 
clearly,  if  the  role  played  by  exchange  in  establishing  equality 
between  different  kinds  of labour  of varying skill is in doubt,  then 
the  theory  of the  two-fold  nature of commodity-producing  labour  is  1n 
doubt  also  and  this,  as  Marx  claims in  a  letter  to  Engels,  he 
considers  to  be  his greatest discovery  (21).  Therefore,  what  1n  fact 
appears  as  a  technical issue  expands very  rapidly  to  question  the  very 
validity  of  the  labour  theory of value itself which,  of  course,  1S 
Bohm-Bawerk's  intention. 
Bohm-Bawerk's  claim 1S  that Marx's  explanation violates the  sense  of 
the  labour  theory  of value,  in that,  in making  exchange-relations  the 
means  by  which  commodities are made  commensurable  as  the  products  of 
social  labour,  Marx  inverts the direction of  determination  between 
production  and  exchange;  the  determined  becomes  the  determinator  and 
vice-versa.  In  fact,  if we  examine  Bohm-Bawerk's  argument  carefully 
labour-times,  he  would  argue,  are  excised  out  of  Marx's  account 
altogether,  leaving  exchange  relations to self-determination  or  to 
some  convenient  alternative such  as utility. 
The  problem,  1n  Bohm-Bawerk's  words,  1S  this: 
But  1n  what  proportions skilled is to  be  translated  into 
terms  of simple  labour  in  the  valuation  of their products  1S 
not  determined,  nor  can it be  determined  a  priori  by  any 
property  inherent  in the skilled labour itself,  but it is the 
actual  result  alone  which  decides  the  actual  exchange 
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On  the  basis of this passage,  Bohm-Bawerk's  argument,  as it  generally 
understood,  1S  this;  for  the  labour-theory of value  to  be  offered  as 
an  explanation  of exchange-ratios,  the principle by  which  one  labour 
is made  commensurable  with  another  must  be  stated without  reference  to 
exchange.  Claiming  that  no  such  a  priori principle exists the  labour 
theory  of value,  he  concludes,  is invalid.  As  stated by  Bohm-Bawerk, 
the  claim is undoubtedly  true,  but  in his  account  of Marx  he  omits  to 
explain  how  the  labour  theory  of value  accounts  for  the  magnitude  of 
value. 
IV.  Bohm-Bawerk's  Critigue  Of  Marx 
Bohm-Bawerk's  claim that there is no  principle by  which  one  kind  of 
labour  can  be  rendered  commensurable  with  any  other  has  been  taken  by 
many  defenders  of the  labour  theory  of value  to contain  an  implicit 
challenge,  namely,  to  find  one.  The  main  response  to this  challenge 
has  taken  the  form  of a  redefinition of many  of Marx's  concepts,  to 
render  them  consistent with  what  Elson  calls  the  'arithmo-morphic' 
understanding  of  the  labour  theory  of value  favoured  by  orthodox 
economists,  an  understanding  which  they  share with  Bohm-Bawerk,  and 
quite naturally his conclusion  (23).  One  such  attempt  was  made  by  R. 
L.  Meek,  who  went  so  far  as  to declare that his purpose  was  to  show 
orthodox  economists  how  the  labour  theory  of value  was  an  example  of 
'good  science'  (24).  An  examination  of his  treatment of Marx's  theory 
of value is instructive. 
In  1973,  Meek  published  a  second edition of his major  book  Studies  1n 
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repudiated many  of the  things  which  he  had  argued  in 1955  at  the  time 
of  the  first edition.  One  reservation  in particular stands  out:  'I 
would  now  be  rather  more  critical of  certain  aspects  of  Marx's 
treatment  of  the  quantitative  side  of  the  value-problem'.  In 
particular,  he  goes  on  to explain:  'His  treatment  of  the  skilled-
unskilled  labour  problem,  although  suggestive  enough,  lS  rather 
fragmentary  and  incomplete,  and  there  seems  little  doubt  that  he 
under-estimated  the  importance  of the  problem'  (25).  He  does  not 
explain  how  he  thinks  Marx  should  have  approached  the  problem, 
unfortunately,  so  we  do  not  really  know  just precisely  what  it  was 
about  Marx's  approach,  or at least Meek's  understanding  of it,  which 
deserved  reservation.  On  reading  Meek's  explanation of how  he  thinks 
Marx  deals  with  the  problem,  and  his  interpretation of the  theory  of 
the  two-fold  nature  of commodity-producing  labour,  the  source  of 
Meek's  discomfort  becomes  particularly apparent;  it lies in  his  own 
interpretation  of Marx's  concepts.  It is not  very  difficult to  show 
that Meek's  interpretation is at odds  with  Marx's  own  explanations,  a 
demonstration  made  in various ways  by  Pilling  (26)  and  Elson  (27),  and 
which  shall not  be  repeated here.  What  is interesting is to  explain 
the  motivation  behind  Meek's  interpretation,  a  motivation  which  it 
would  be  possible to suggest  has  a  great deal  to  do  with  Bohm-Bawerk's 
implicit challenge to explain value-determination without  reference  to 
exchange. 
Meek  lS clearly uncomfortable  about  a  number  of Marx's  formulations. 
It  might  not  be  too  presumptuous  to suggest that  one  source  of  his 
evident  discomfiture  is the  simple,  perhaps  embarrassingly  simple, 
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The  final  section of this chapter will  show  that  such  embarrassment  is 
unfounded,  arguing  that the  simplicity of Marx's  explanation  lS  its 
virtue  and  not  the  embarrassing  failing  which  it lS  often  presented 
as.  In  that  section it will also  be  suggested  why  Bohm-Bawerk's 
criticism  has  been  widely  accepted,  an  acceptance  which  I  think  lS 
also  unjustified. 
It  should  be  the  aspiration of anybody  who  wishes  to  address  a 
difficult  problem  not  to  be  caught  out with  something  as  superficial 
as  a  circular  argument.  The  mere  suggestion,  then,  that  one  is guilty 
of  making  such  a  clumsy  error creates  cause  for  concern.  This, 
perhaps,  is what  happened  in Meek's  case.  But  his  concern  to  appear 
consistent  in  one  direction  undermines  his  case  in another. 
In  the  first edition of the  Studies  he  adopts  what  Rubin  calls  the 
physiological  conception  of  abstract  labour,  l.e.,  'productive 
activity  as  such,  from  which all the  differences  between  the  various 
kinds of activity have  been  abstracted'  (28).  What  such  a  conception 
entails is that it allows  him  to conceive  of homogeneous  labour  prlor 
to  exchange,  ln  production.  Individuals,  quite  simply,  perform 
abstract  labour.  In  a  passage  reminiscent  of Rubin's  explanation,  he 
accounts  for  abstract  labour  by  suggesting that  ln  'a  commodity-
producing  society  ... the  social character of each  producer's  labour 
manifests  itself  in  the  fact  that his  labour  'ranks  on  an  equality 
with  that of all others'  - i.e.,  lS  reduced  to abstract labour'  (29). 
But  the  comparison  with  Rubin  is superficial because  Meek  then  goes  on 
to  make  the concept  of abstract  labour  opaque  by  explaining  that  'this 
"averaging  process"  takes place  in history  before it takes  place  ln 
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historical  process  whereby,  as  the  system  of  commodity-production 
develops,  each  individual's labour  is reduced  to abstract  labour. 
Meek  identifies abstract labour  clearly with  commodity-production,  but 
any  explanation  of how  this  'reduction'  is made  is conspicuous  by  its 
absence;  he  leaves  us  only  with  'history'  and  a  questionable 
generalisation.  Nowhere  does  he  explain  why  labour  tends  to  become 
homogeneous  with  the  development  of  commodity-exchange,  and  the 
explanation  for  this  omission  has  to  be  simply  that  In  terms  of 
productive  activities alone,  Meek  was  wrong  and  that labour  does  not 
become  more  homogeneous  with  the  development  of  commodity-production. 
In  fact,  the  very  reverse.  As  the  diversity of products  grows,  the 
division of labour  expands  and  labour,  consequently,  is expended  in  an 
ever-increasing  diversity  of  forms.  Productive  activities  do  not 
become  more  homogeneous,  according  to  Marx,  as  commodity-production 
develops,  but  despite  the  increasing  heterogeneity  of  labour 
consequent  upon  such  a  development,  each  expenditure  of labour  is made 
equivalent  with  any  other  through  the  equivalence  of  commodities, 
l.e.,  through  exchange.  Meek  shrinks  away  from  this conclusion  and, 
defining abstract  labour  solely in  terms  of production,  which  is  what 
he  understands  Marx  to  do,  he  is led  into  another  problem;  the 
skilled-unskilled labour  problem. 
The  historical tendency  towards  uniformity  of labour-expenditures  has 
to  take  account  of the  fact  that the  kind  of labour  required  In  one 
industry  may  have  to possess  a  degree of skill higher  than  that  In 
another.  If Marx's  theory  is to  'explain differences  (or  changes)  in 
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suggests  Meek,  it  'has  to  be  recognised that  the  "average  degree  of 
skill"  prevalent  in one  industry at a  given  time  may  differ  from  that 
prevalent  1n  another;  and  that the equilibrium prices of  commodities 
produced  by  relatively  skilled  labour  are  generally  higher,  1n 
relation  to  the  number  of hours of labour-time  expended  1n  their 
production,  than  those of commodities  produced  by  relatively unskilled 
labour'(30).  Here  he  identifies value  with  a  quantity  of  concrete 
labour-time,  the  labour-time  expended  within  each  industry  calculated 
as  so  many  hours  of weaving,  cuckoo-clock  making,  etc.  The  problem  of 
labour-heterogeneity  1S  thus  reintroduced,  and  has  to  be  explained 
away;  a  procedure  which  1S  both  unsatisfactory  and,  from  the  point  of 
V1ew  of our  assessment  of Meek's  handling of Marx's  concepts,  quite 
superficial.  This  is particularly revealed  1n  the  construction  he 
puts  on  the  explanation  which  he  attributes to  Marx.  Quoting  the 
passage  from  Capital  which  invited  Bohm-Bawerk's  charge  of 
circularity,  Meek  explains that Marx's  intention was  'to  demonstrate 
that  the  reduction of skilled to  unskilled  labour  does  in  fact  take 
place  1n  the real world,  and  that this reduction  1S  essentially  an 
aspect  of the  general  process  whereby  individuals'  labours  are  reduced 
to abstract labour'  (31).  Taken  by  itself this passage  would  appear 
to  accord  with  the  interpretation of Marx  given  in  the last  section, 
but  taken  with  Meek's  account of abstract  labour,  we  see at once  that 
the  reduction  of skilled to  simple  labour  does  not  take  place  ~ 
medium  of  exchange,  but  by  a  process of  gradual  'de-skilling',  a 
process  synonymous  with  the  tendency  towards  the  homogenisation  of 
labour  which  takes place,  according  to  Meek,  in the  general  course  of 
the  development  of  commodity-production.  Such  an  unrealistic 
zzo proposition is damaging  without  further  elaboration,  but  in his  final 
consideration,  the  category of abstract  labour  disappears  altogether. 
Citing  the  passage  in which  Marx  explains  that  the  reduction  of 
skilled  to  simple  labour  takes  place  via  'a social  process  that  goes 
on  behind  the  backs  of the  producers',  Meek  proceeds  to explain that: 
All  that  he  says is that in the  real world  the  proportions 
in  which  different kinds  of skilled labour  are  reduced  to 
unskilled labour  are established by  a  social  process of whose 
character  the  producers  themselves  are  generally  unaware 
which  is surely  a  fairly  evident  fact.  The  question of  the 
actual  laws  according  to which  the  reduction is made  is  left 
over  until later,  the most  appropriate point  to  introduce  it 
being,  ln  Marx's  opinion,  that at which  the  question  of 
wages,  or  the  value  of  labour-power,  comes  up  for 
consideration  (32). 
He  concludes  by  advocating  the  explanation of  the  greater  value-
creating  power  of  skilled  labour,  proffered  by  writers  such  as 
Hilferding,  Bauer  and  Sweezy  before  him,  and  more  recently  by  Rowthorn 
(33):  namely  by  taking into account  the  labour  required  to  train 
labour  to  a  skilled level,  which  they  claim not  only  results  ln  a 
labour-power  of a  higher  value,  but  labour  of a  higher  value-creating 
capacity.  Consequently,  they  argue,  it  should  be  possible  to 
calculate  how  many  hours of simple  labour  are equivalent to  one  hour 
of skilled labour  by  calculating how  much  simple  labour is required  to 
train  labour-power  of above  average  quality  and  skill.  The  problem 
with  this  explanation  is that skilled labour is  trained  by  other 
skilled labour,  which  was  in turn trained  by  other skilled labour,  and 
so  on.  How  does  one  calculate the  higher  value-creating  power  of 
skilled  labour  by  taking  into account  the  historic cost of  producing 
it?  (34)  The  fact  is that such  an  operation is impossible,  and  at 
this point  we  finally  get  around  to  the  crux  of the matter. 
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is  normally  paid  higher  than  the  average.  Skilled  and  unskilled 
labour  can  be  compared  via  the  wages  paid  to  each,  allowing  the 
calculation  of  ratios  of  skilled  to  unskilled  labour-times 
proportionate  to their respective hourly  rates of pay.  In  this  way, 
skilled  labour  can  be  compensated  for  its  higher  value-creating 
capacity  by  exchanging its commodities  in ratios corresponding  to  the 
difference  between  the  hourly  rate paid  to it and  the  hourly  rate  paid 
to  labour  of  unskilled  producers.  Here,  Meek  appears  to  have 
formulated  the  laws  governing  the  reduction of skilled  to  unskilled 
labour,  which  he  sets out  to discover at the  beginning of his  second 
chapter  on  Marx.  It 1S,  however,  interesting to  note  that  1n  that 
statement  of intent he  makes  the  following  qualification:  'And  these 
laws,  naturally,  must  explain  the  reduction without  reference  either 
to  the  wages  which  the skilled and  unskilled workers actually  receive, 
or  to  the  ratios at which  their products  actually  exchange  on  the 
market'  (35).  Having  examined  Marx's  concept  of abstract  labour  and 
his  treatment  of the skilled-unskilled labour-problem,  Meek  has  to 
confess that  he  cannot  see  any  satisfactory solution  to  the  problem  of 
labour-heterogeneity  other  than  via  the  introduction of the  category 
of the  wage,  a  solution which  Marx  denounced  in  a  footnote  in Capital, 
and  the  letter of which  Meek  upheld  in his initial definition of  the 
problem  of  value  to  which  his chapter is addressed.  Having  worked 
through  Marx's categories,  he  is compelled  to  admit  that in  terms  of 
his  own  interpretation,  Marx's  account  and  explanation  of  the 
categories  of  ·the  labour  theory  of  value  1S  contradictory;  but 
introducing  the wage  into the  picture is,  according  to  Meek,  we  must 
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circularity  (36)  which  immediately  follows  any  reference  to  exchange-
relations.  Thus  Meek  capitulates to an  explanation of the  value  of 
commodities  which  Marx  repeatedly  denounced  as  tautologous,  that  lS, 
of explaining  values  by  values. 
The  source  of  Meek's  discomfort  lS  not  difficult  to  identify. 
Attempting  to  avoid  the charge of circularity,  a  perfectly  rational 
desire,  he  declines  to  examine  the  nature  of  exchange,  wrongly 
assuming  that  any  reference  to it entails  potentially  embarrassing 
exposure  to  a  charge of inconsistency.  But  attempting  to define  the 
uniform  substance  of  value  In  production  equally  results  In 
circularity  when  it has  to  take  account  of the different  levels  of 
skill  which  exist  between  one  kind of  labour  and  another.  The 
inability to specify  some  quantifiable,  uniform  substance  of value  In 
production  can  leave  Meek  with  only  one  conclusion;  that labour  lS  not 
the  substance  of  value  and  labour-time is not  its  measure.  In  a 
telling  footnote  in the  first edition of the  Studies,  Meek  toys  with 
the  idea of explaining exchange-ratios  In  a  way  which  allows  for  some 
adjustment,  to  compensate  skilled labour  for  its  greater  value-
creating capability,  by  the market  ~ la Smith  and  Ricardo  (37).  In  an 
essay  appended  to the  second edition,  he  fulfils  the  implication  of 
this thought  and  completely  rejects Marx's,  or at least what  he  takes 
to  be  Marx's,  quantitative value-analysis,  arguing  that it should  be 
replaced  by  the  customary  demand  and  supply  apparatus  of  orthodox 
economics. 
However,  he  does  not  reject Marx's  theory  of  value  altogether. 
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economic  magnitudes  of an  empirical  nature  could  be  supplemented  by  a 
model  of  the social relations of commodity-production  of  the  like 
contained  1n  the  qualitative side of Marx's  explanation of value  (38). 
In  the  final  section it shall  be  shown  that  the criterion of empirical 
measurement  is a  false  one  in the  context  of any  theory  of value,  not 
because  such  a  criterion is in itself wrong,  but  because  in  the  very 
nature  of commodity-producing  economies,  it is irrelevant.  However, 
the  irrelevancy  of empirical  measurement  should  not  be  taken  as  an 
argument  for  the  irrelevancy of labour-time  as  a  measure  of  value. 
This  is the  argument  which  we  shall  now  examine,  an  argument  which  has 
a  very  strong  presence  1n  contemporary  accounts  of the  labour  theory 
of value. 
v.  A Non-Empirical  Concept  of Labour-Time 
Recent  accounts  of the  labour  theory  of value  have  emphasised  that  the 
kind  of interpretation of Marx  favoured  by  Meek,  and  others  such  as 
M.  Dobb,  and  to  a  degree  P.  Sweezy,  is based  on  a  methodological 
paradigm  alien to  Marx  in that it subordinates  the  qualitative to  the 
quantitative,  resulting in  a  greater  degree  of identification  between 
the  Classical  theory  and  that of Marx  than  can  be  supported  or  1S 
desirable  (39).  Thus  what  the  Meek  type  explanation  underestimated 
was  the  importance  in Marx's  theory  of the  particular social  form  of 
labour.  Consequently,  the  recent literature has  paid closer attention 
to  Marx's  definition of abstract  labour,  and  especially  the  summary 
explanation  given  in  Section  Four  of Chapter  One  of Capital.  However, 
the  position  adopted  by  this body  of literature is itself not  without 
224 problems.  One  of its explicit objectives has  been  to  reinstate  the 
qualitative aspect  of Marx's  theory  which  it is suggested  has  suffered 
subordination  to  the  prevalent quantitative interpretations  of  the 
labour  theory  of value  both  within  and  outside Marxist  thought.  One 
notable  example  offered  from  within  Marxism  of such  an  account  is that 
given  by  Mohun  and  Himmelweit.  A brief examination  will  bring  a 
number  of problems  to light. 
It  1S  a  characteristic of commodity-producing  societies,  argue  Mohun 
and  Himmelweit,  that  'in addition  to  the  aspect  of  labour  which 
produces  use-values,  there is another  aspect  of labour  which  produces 
use-values  as  commodities,  this is abstract labour'  (40).  Only  when 
labour  produces  commodities is it to  be  thought  of as  abstract.  As 
abstract  labour,  they  argue,  labour  produces  value:  'Marx's  "value"  1S 
the  product  of  abstract labour'  (41).  Up  to this  point  there  1S 
little to  distinguish  between  their explanation  and  that proffered  by 
Meek.  Where  they  differ is in their respective  explanations  of  the 
means  by  which  different  productive  activities  are  rendered 
homogeneous:  'the reduction of labour  to abstract  labour is  something 
that  can  only  be  done  by  the market'  (42).  Passing  over  for  the 
moment  the  problem  of explaining  how  value  1S  simultaneously  the 
product  of  abstract labour  and  yet is the  means  by  which  labour  1S 
rendered  homogeneous,  their  account  of  exchange-relations 
elaborated  further  in  the  following  manner: 
Exchange-value  1S  the  proportion  1n  which  commodities 
exchange  for  one  another  in the  market.  Commodities  are 
bought  and  sold  for  money,  and  the  quantity  of  money  for 
which  they  exchange  is called their price.  Given  a  theory  of 
money,  the  determination of exchange-value  is immediately  the 
determination  of price,  and  therefore  any  theory  of  one  1S 
automatically  a  theory  of the  other  (43). 
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1S Their  a1m  1S  to  show  how  Marx  explains  exchange-ratios  in  terms  of 
abstract  labour,  but  Slnce  'there can  be  no  a  priori  determination  of 
abstract  labour  until commodities  are  actually  exchanged  on  the 
market'  (44),  this leaves  a  residual quantitative problem still to  be 
resolved.  If abstract labour  cannot  be  explained prior  to  exchange, 
how  can  exchange-ratios  be  said to  be  determined  by  quantities  of 
abstract  labour?  If  abstract  labour  does  not  exist  1n  direct 
production,  1n  the  manner  favoured  by  Meek  and  Dobb,  it  must  exist 
prior  to  exchange.  Sensing  that this conclusion is perhaps  a  little 
too  close  to  the circular argument  abjured  by  Bohm-Bawerk,  they 
immediately  qualify  the  conclusion  by  saying  that  'the  value  realised 
in exchange  (exchange-value)  is the  form  of appearance  of that  labour, 
and  only  that  labour,  which  is socially necessary  to  the  production of 
the  commodity  1n  question'  (45).  If value is realised in exchange  as 
exchange-value,  and  exchange-value is,  as  they  argued  a  moment  ago, 
price,  then  what  is to stop  us  from  concluding  that  value  1S  price? 
And  Slnce  prices are  expressed  in  money,  why  go  to  the  trouble  of 
formulating  a  theory  of labour-time at all?  (46).  This is  precisely 
the  conclusion  they  reach: 
There  is no  manifestation of value  in  terms  of its  substance 
abstract  labour,  nor  of its  measure,  socially  necessary 
labour-time.  The  only  form  in which  value  appears,  and  the 
only  way  it can  appear,  is in  terms  of  the  money-commodity 
(gold,  for  example)  and  its quantitative measure  (47). 
In  the  Mohun  and  Himmelweit  account  of the  labour  theory  of value,  the 
concepts  abstract  labour  and  socially  necessary  labour-time  are 
created  by  definition  and  without  reference  to  their  essential 
conditions.  Having  failed  to  supply  support  for  their  independent 
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real activity,  a  social reality'  (48).  Anything  which  is real  can  be 
explained,  and  in  being explained,  becomes  itself part  of  a  wider 
explanation  of something  else;  a  descriptive  term  like  'social'  can 
not  be  allowed  to  pass  for  explanation.  To  say abstract  labour  lS 
social  is a  truism.  What  is required  lS  an  explanation of value  and 
its essential conditions.  And  this in  turn  requires,  as  was  argued  In 
Chapter  Three,  a  particular conception of  how  the  social  organism  lS 
maintained.  The  charge  that labour-times  are  redundant  rests  on  an 
assumption  which,  for  reasons  which  shall be  explained  In  the  next 
part of this chapter,  is of dubious  merit,  viz.,  the  requirements  made 
of  any  theory  of  value  that it  provides  a  means  of  empirical 
measurement,  In  short,  that it provides  a  direct  account  of  the 
proportions  in  which  commodities  should  exchange.  The  logic of  Mohun 
and  Himmelweit's  argument,  however,  does  not  lead to  a  rejection  of 
this  requirement,  and  consequently  fails  to  provide  any  argument  In 
support  of  the  maintenance  of the  concepts  labour-time,  abstract 
labour  and  value  beyond  those  of  the  formal  definition  kind. 
Consequently,  they  fail  to  adequately  respond  to  the  charge  of 
redundancy,  a  failure  which  is partly the  responsibility  of  their 
failing  to challenge  the  empirical  measure  requirement. 
Elson,  arguing  that  such  a  requirement is alien to  the  intention  of 
Marx's  theory  of value,  rises to  the challenge set  by  the  charge  of 
redundancy  by  arguing  that  although  authors  such  as  Mohun  and 
Himmelweit  are correct  to  argue  that price is the  form  of value,  the 
form  through  which  the  substance  and  measure  of value  lS  expressed, 
their  failure  to provide  any  argument  supporting  their definition  of 
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Elson's contribution is important  in this respect  because it sets  out 
to  argue  on  behalf of the explanatory role of an  independent  value-
category.  As  can  be  shown,  however,  her  argument  possesses  an 
irremedial  flaw  in  the  separation of the  operations of  commensuration 
and  measure. 
With  the  exception of a  footnote  in Capital  in  which  he  refers  to  a 
passage  from  the  1859  work  in which  he  discusses  the  labour-money 
ideas  of John  Gray,  Marx  did  not  explicitly explain  why  values  are  not 
directly measurable  (49).  This  implication  however,  argues  Elson,  lS 
in  fact  carried  by  his whole  theory  of value.  The  difficulty with  the 
labour-money  proposal,  as  Marx  saw  it, was  that it assumed  that  labour 
was  universal  and  hence  social  from  the  outset,  without  of  course 
recognising  that  such  an  assumption  cannot  apply  to  systems  of 
commodity-production  where  productive activities in  such  social  forms 
are  conducted privately.  As  Marx  points out  in  a  passage  cited  also 
by  Elson:  'The  point  of departure is not  the  labour  of  individuals 
considered  as social labour,  but  on  the  contrary  the  particular  kinds 
of  labour  of private individuals'  (50).  As  we  shall  see,  however, 
this  does  not  stop her  from  denying  this basic  precondition  In  the 
context  of another  related problem,  that of the  'location'  of abstract 
labour.  But  for  the  moment  we  will concentrate on  her  conclusion.  If 
labour  lS  expended  privately in  the  production  of  commodities,  she 
argues,  'the labour-time that can  be  directly  measured  In  capitalist 
economies  In  terms  of  hours  quite  independent  of  prlce  lS  the 
particular  labour-time  of particular individuals:  labour-time  In  its 
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concludes,  cannot  be  the  measure  of value  because  value  corresponds  to 
labour  in its  'social  and  abstract aspect'  (52). 
Having  reached  this  conclusion,  she  now  has  to  address  a  further 
problem:  how  lS  this conclusion,  which  denies  that  labour-time can  be 
the  measure  of value,  be  made  consistent with  Marx's  often  repeated 
statement  that it is?  This  apparent  inconsistency,  she  argues,  can  be 
resolved  if  we  make  a  distinction  between  two  concepts  of  measure; 
immanent  measurement  and  external  measurement  (53).  Immanent  measure 
is  to  be  identified with  commensurability  (54).  It is a  property  or 
characteristic  of things which  are different in  every  other  respect, 
by  virtue  of which  they  can  be  compared.  This  could  otherwise  be 
described  as  a  realist concept  of measure.  It is dependent  upon  the 
identification of a  common  element  or  property  which  when  compared  In 
one  object  with  that  In  another  allows  the  comparison  of  the  two 
objects  to  take  place.  External  measurement  refers to  the  expression 
In  some  pre-selected  unit of that quality  which  lS  the  means  of 
comparison.  The  exact  medium  chosen  is often  a  matter  of  convention. 
Thus,  she  says, 
when  Marx  says  that labour-time is the  measure  of value,  he 
means  that  the  value of a  commodity  is measurable  as  pure 
quantity  because it is an  objectification of abstract  labour, 
i.e., of indifferent labour-time,  hours  of which  can  be  added 
to  or  subtracted  from  one  another  (55). 
And  later,  she  argues,  commodities  'are only  commensurable  insofar  as 
they  are  objectifications of the abstract aspect  of  labour'  (56). 
Labour-time  cannot  be  employed  as  an  external means  of  measurement, 
b  t  1  f  t Oo  She  explalons  this  restriction  u  on  y  as  a  means  0  commensura  l  n. 
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observe,  separate the  abstract  from  the  concrete aspect'  (57). 
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indissolubility of abstract  and  concrete  labour  requires  the  formation 
of  a  general  object of exchange  representing  the  former  alone,  and 
which  consequently  occupies  the  role of the  external,  conventional 
measure  of value;  'it is money,  and  not  labour-time,  which  functions 
as  the  social  standard  of measurement'  (58).  Here  there  1S  a 
separation of commensuration  and  measurement.  The  question,  as  we  saw 
earlier 1n  the  instance of Bailey,  must  always  arise  - what  makes  the 
objects  measured  and  the  measuring  medium  commensurate?  One  cannot 
measure  unless  the  object  measured  and  the  measurement  themselves 
share  a  characteristic  which  allows  the  operation  to  take  place. 
Society  may  have  solved  this problem  in  the  case of exchange  by  the 
development  of  money.  But  this need  for  a  practical  solution  does 
not  disguise  the  fact  that,  as  was  shown  in  the  previous chapter,  the 
formation  of  money  is a  necessary  result of the  development  of  the 
value-form  and  within it the  value-relation. 
The  separation of the  operations  of commensuration  and  measurement  not 
only  subordinates  the  primary  condition of social production  the 
distribution  of  productive  activities - to  the  formal  measure  of 
value,  but also excludes it from  the  hierarchy  of  explanation  which 
ultimately  leads  to  the  explanation of  precisely  such  a  formal 
measure.  And  in excluding it from  her  account  of Marx's  theory  of 
value  she  effectively collapses that explanatory  hierarchy.  Money  and 
value,  concrete  and  abstract  labour,  value  and  price,  each  collapses 
into  its  opposite,  expelling  the  very  possibility  of  explanation. 
This  can  be  seen  in her  account  of abstract labour. 
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labour,  differentiated simply  in  terms  of quantity,  duration.  It  1S 
not  an  assumption  that all work  is physiologically  identical.  Rather, 
it  draws  attention to  the  fact  that all work  takes  time  and  effort, 
irrespective  of  what  kind  of work  it is'  (59).  Abstract  labour  1S 
thus  defined  by  Elson  as  one  among  four  aspects  of  labour  1n  its 
transhistorical  sense  as  the  transformation of natural materials  into 
objects  for  human  use,  the  others  being  concrete,  private  and  social 
(60).  She  explains  further: 
Marx  specifically claims that this aspect of labour  'in  all 
situations ... must  necessarily  concern  mankind,  although  not 
to  the  same  degree  at different stages of development',  and 
offers a  brief discussion of the  way  it is of concern  1n  the 
case  of Robinson  Crusoe,  European  feudalism,  peasant  family 
production  and  communal  production  (61). 
In  all  societies work  takes  time  and  effort.  The  problem  faced  by 
each  society  is how  to distribute this  time  and  effort in  a  manner 
which  will  sustain it.  What  Marx  shows  in each  of the  examples  which 
he  glves  1n  Section  Four  of Chapter  One  of  Capital  1S  that  this 
distribution  takes place  under  two  kinds  of regulator,  that  in  which 
labour  is social  from  the  outset  and  thereby  regulated  according  to 
custom  (pre-capitalist or  pre-market  forms)  or  plan  (post-capitalist 
forms),  and  that in  which  labour is regulated  through  the  unconscious 
mechanism  of the  market,  in  which  case  labour is private in  the  first 
instance. 
In  the  case  of the  market  form  of  social  production,  labour-time 
cannot  assert itself until  labour  exists in  a  social-form.  According 
to  Marx,  it becomes  social by  taking  the  form  of  abstract  labour, 
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exchange  of  equivalents.  The  quality of being  equal  labour  lS  the 
specific  form  taken  by  socl"al  labour,  d  h"  h  an  w lC  IS  consequently 
measured  ln  units  of social labour-time,  ln  societies  which  are 
founded  on  private production  and  in  which  the  products of such  labour 
are  compelled  to take  the  form  of commodities.  In  treating  abstract 
labour  as  a  transhistorical category,  Elson  must  inevitably  encounter 
difficulty  ln  explaining the specificity of the  form  of  commodity-
production  itself other  than  with  a  tautology:  'The  social  character 
of  labour is established precisely  through  the  representation of  the 
abstract  aspect  of labour'  (62).  In short,  the  social  character  of 
labour is established through  the social character of labour! 
Commodities  can  thus  be  defined  as  immanently  commensurable  without 
recourse  to  labour-time as  the  measure  of value  because all labour  lS 
social  and  abstract  from  the  outset.  Consequently,  she  denies  the 
precondition  of  commodity  exchange,  viz.,  private  production,  and 
paradoxically  opts  for  a  labour-money  explanation of the  measure  of 
value  in  which  the  money-commodity  lS  simply  a  pragmatically 
constructed representation of the  immanent  equivalence of  commodities 
and  labour.  And,  since  commodities  are  immanently  equivalent,  subject 
only  to  quantitative measurement  in their exchange  with  money,  the 
only  relevant  category  required  for  the  understanding  of  the  whole 
process is price: 
Marx's  claim  that exchange  of  commodities  entails  their 
equivalence  does  not  derive  from  an  ahistorical  and  formal 
concept  of  exchange,  but  from  observation  of  a  specific 
capitalist process of exchange,  in  which  go~ds  actual~y  are 
socially  commensurated,  the  visible expresslon  of  WhICh  lS 
their prices  (63). 
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theory  of  value  and  that position adopted  by  Steedman  In  which  he 
claims  that  the  argument  for  the  redundancy  of Marx's  value-magnitude 
analysis  'involves  no  denial  of Marx's  statements  concerning  the  "form 
of 
on' 
value",  abstract social labour,  "the  universal  equivalent"  and 
(64).  Like  Mohun  and  Himmelweit,  and  now  Steedman,  Elson 
so 
can 
provide  no  more  than  a  definition of abstract  labour  as  homogeneous 
labour  (65).  She  cannot  explain  why  labour  must  be  homogeneous  in  an 
economy  founded  on  commodity-production  and  cannot  as  a  consequence 
connect  the  two-fold  nature of commodity-producing  labour  to  Marx's 
explanation  of the  magnitude  of value.  Ultimately  the  logic of  this 
position  leads  to  a  denial of the  role of the  market  as  a  regulator  of 
production.  If,  in  commodity-producing  economies,  the  market  does  not 
regulate  production,  what  does?  What  other means  does  society  possess 
of  measuring  its productive activities,  other  than  In  labour-time? 
Marx  emphasised  a  point  which  Aristotle already  knew,  that  money  of 
itself cannot  measure  things which  are different unless  they  are first 
reduced  to  some  single  uniform  substance,  of  which  they  represent 
greater or lesser  amounts.  Aristotle  found  this  problem  unresolvable; 
Marx  calls  it  universal  labour-time.  But  since  he  only  spoke  of 
abstract  labour  in relation to exchange,  his explanation of  exchange-
ratios  appeared  to contain  a  circular argument.  The  two  positions 
which  have  been  examined,  however,  appear  to offer little hope  of  a 
solution.  In  the  explanation of Marx's  law  of value  offered  by  R.  L. 
Meek,  the  qualitative  analysis of the  social  form  of  commodity-
producing  labour  appears  to  be  undermined  by  quantitative 
inconsistency;  In  short,  the  theory  of abstract  labour  seems  to  make 
233 assumptions  about  the  homogeneity  of  productive  activities  which 
cannot  be  sustained  on  examination of actual  exchange-relations.  The 
second  position,  represented  in this excursus  by  the  work  of Mohun  and 
Himmelweit  and  Elson,  inverts the  order of priorities,  but  in order  to 
avoid  the  charge of circularity severs  the  quantitative  relationship 
between  productive activities and  exchange-ratios,  or at the  very  best 
posits  money  as  of primary  explanatory  importance,  obscuring  the 
actual  process  of quantitative determination. 
The  central  argument  of the circularity critique is  that  1n  uS1ng 
exchange  to  explain  the  form  in  which  labour  determines  exchange-
values,  Marx  contradicted  the  sense  of the  labour  theory  of value.  In 
employing  exchange  1n  this way,  so  the  charge  concludes,  Marx's 
procedure  was  tantamount  to  an  admission  that  exchange  created  value, 
not  production. 
VI.  The  Circularity Critique  - Some  Conclusions 
It would  perhaps  be  useful  to conclude  this chapter  by  making  a  small 
number  of observations  on  the circularity critique,  and  by  reference 
to  the matter of its concerns,  indicate some  important characteristics 
of  the  Marxian  law  of value  which  identify its unique  nature  amongst 
theories  of  value  1n  general  and  verS10ns  of the  labour  theory  of 
value  in particular. 
It  1S  possible to appreciate  some  of the difficulties which  many 
advocate  the  circularity critique have  with  Marx's  account  of 
who 
the 
labour  theory  of value.  To  some,  its operation  requires  something 
which  the  laws  of logic will  simply  not  allow.  For  some  others,  it is 
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more  familiar  prices  1n  accordance  with  which  commodities  customarily 
exchange.  To  those  of an  even  more  prosaic intent,  they  cannot  see 
how  a  producer  can  'price'  his  products  in  terms  of  quantities  of 
labour.  In  the  face  of these objections,  the  labour  theory  of  value 
appears  to  be  doubtlessly  an  elegant  piece of theory,  but  in  the 
regretted  absence  of any  practical application,  it must  remain  nothing 
more  than  that. 
What  these  objections  share  1n  common  is  a  fundamental 
misunderstanding  of the  purpose  of the  labour  theory of value  and  of 
the  theoretical  environment  in  which  it operates.  But  more  than  that, 
what  they  misunderstand  is the  very  nature  of the  market  form  of 
economy  itself. 
To  take  the  first objection in more  detail.  It is argued,  probably  1n 
the  first  instance  by  Bohm-Bawerk,  but  repeated  on  a  number  of 
occasions  since,  that  Marx  commits  a  logical blunder  when  he  explains 
the  reduction of concrete  labour  to  abstract  labour  by  reference  to 
exchange,  an  act  which  post-dates  the  separate  acts  of  private 
production  (66).  Clearly,  in terms  of a  single  producer,  there  would 
appear  to  be  something of a  conundrum  here.  If the  producer  is to  put 
his  product  onto  the  market,  he  needs  to give it  a  pr1ce  or  an 
exchange-value  1n  accordance  with  which  it will  exchange  for  other 
products.  If he  tries to  'value'  it by  the  amount  of time  he  spent  on 
its  production,  he  immediately  comes  up  against  the  problem  of 
differences  of skill,  intensity,  circumstances,  etc.  How  then  can  he 
put  his  product  on  the  market  at a  value,  when  that  value  1S  not 
established until  the  product  actually appears  in  the  market? 
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of  exchange.  The  first concept  of exchange  is that  which  confronts 
every  individual producer,  who  having  spent  his  time  in production  has 
now  to  find  a  buyer  for  that  product.  Rubin  refers to this concept  of 
exchange  as  a  'particular  phase'  In  the  complete  system  of 
reproduction  (67).  The  second  concept  of exchange  is much  wider.  It 
encompasses  that concept  which  regards  exchange  as  a  particular  form 
of  social  reproduction.  As  Rubin  puts it,  'it  stamps  the  whole 
process  of  reproduction  with its specific  mark  and  represents  a 
particular  social  form  of the  social process  of  production'  (68). 
Thus  when  we  speak  of exchange,  as Marx  did,  as  the  means  by  which 
individual,  private concrete  labours  are  reduced  to  social,  abstract 
labour,  Rubin  would  suggest  that  we  think  of it in  terms  of the  wider 
concept  of exchange  which  takes  us  into the  realm  of the  value-form  as 
we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter.  Here  the  problems  of  the  temporal 
order  of  determination  between  production  and  exchange  are  avoided 
because  the  wider  concept  of exchange  allows  a  concept of  production 
as  production  for  exchange,  In other words,  a  particular  socially 
located concept  of production: 
As  soon  as  exchange  really  became  the  dominant  form  of  the 
production  process,  it also stamped its mark  on  the  phase  of 
direct  production.  In  other  words,  since  today  is  not  the 
first  day  of production,  since  a  person  produces  after  he 
has  entered into  the  act of exchange,  and  before it also,  the 
process  of direct production also  assumes  determined  social 
characteristics,  which  correspond to  the  organisation  of 
commodity  production  based  on  exchange  (69). 
The  subjects of analysis  are not,  therefore,  the particular phases  of 
production  and  exchange,  regarded  as  separate,  temporally  ordered 
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social  production. 
This  conception is reinforced  by  Marx  in his  second  chapter of Capital 
which  lS  devoted  to  a  wider  examination  of  exchange  (70).  This 
chapter  lS  particularly useful  because it not  only  shows  how  Marx 
conceived  of  the  two  different notions of  exchange,  but  ln  this 
chapter  he  also  shows  why  it is important  to  make  this  distinction, 
and  how  the  wider concept of exchange  is linked  to  production.  By 
examining  this chapter it is possible to  begin  to  piece  together  the 
materials  required  to  fully  formulate  a  solution to  the  problem  of how 
production  and  exchange  are  linked. 
Marx  narrates  this link,  almost  in  the  form  of a  fable,  much  like 
those  used  by  the Classical political economists  to illustrate a  point 
or  develop  a  theory.  The  difference  between  them  ought  to  become 
clear. 
The  starting-point  for  understanding  the  relationship  between 
production  and  exchange  is the  identification of the  point  at  which 
use-values  become  commodities.  At  first glance,  the  answer  ought  to 
be  where  products  are  exchanged.  But  Marx  is adamant  on  this  point. 
Straightforward  barter  does  not  of itself involve  an  exchange  of 
commodities  and  therefore  there  can  be  no  value  to  think  of  or 
quantities of labour  or  any  of the  other  elements of the  labour  theory 
of value: 
The  direct  barter  of  products attains  the  form 
relative  expression  of  value  in one  respect,  but 
another.  That  form  is x  Commodity  A = y  Commodity 
form  of direct barter is x  use  value  A = Y use  value 
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of  the 
not  ln 
B.  The 
B (71) The  decisive  factor  in transforming  the  mere  exchange  of  use-values 
into  the  exchange  of commodities  is a  social  one.  The  first step  lS 
taken  when  the  object  no  longer  forms  a  use-value  for its owner.  It 
has  become  superfluous  to his wants  and  can  therefore  be  of use  to  him 
in  another  way;  it can  become  exchangeable  and  it is therefore  simply 
a  matter of development  before objects are specifically produced  with 
a  view  to  exchange: 
From  that  moment  the distinction  becomes  firmly  established 
between  the  utility  of  an  object  for  the  purpose  of 
consumption,  and  its utility  for  the  purposes  of  exchange. 
Its use-value  becomes  distinguished  from  its  exchange-value. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  quantitative proportion  in which  the 
articles  are  exchangeable  becomes  dependent  on  their 
production  itself.  Custom  stamps  them  as  values  with 
definite magnitudes  (72). 
At  that point,  production  acquires  determined  social  characteristics. 
In  Rubin's  terms,  exchange  has  stamped  a  particular  character  on 
production  and  has  given it a  specific social imprint.  The  question 
that  now  has  to  be  satisfactorily answered  is to  what  extent  and  In 
what  ways  lS  the quantitative dimension  of value  woven  into  this 
'social'  conception of exchange? 
On  the  surface,  Marx  appears  to suggest,  in  the  citation  from  the 
French  edition  of Capital  and  indeed  elsewhere,  that  exchange,  by 
making  the  appropriate reductions effectively determines  the  exchange-
ratios.  After  what  we  already  know  of Marx's  opinion  of  Bailey  and 
th  thO  lOt  would  be  strange  to  find  Marx  himself  o  ers  on  lS  score, 
offering  the  same  theory.  But  this proposition is not  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  Marx's  contention that  'value'  is produced  and  that 
commodities  are  'valued'  according  to  how  much  labour  is required  to 
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Rubin  picks  up  this argument  and  eloquently  portrays  the  position  of 
the  producer  1n  a  market  economy: 
Even.  thou~h the  commodity  producer is still in his  workshop 
and  1n  a  glven  moment  does  not  enter  into exchange  with  other 
members  of  society,  he  already  feels  the  pressure  of  all 
those  persons  who  enter  the  market  as  his  buyers, 
competitors,  people  who  buy  from  his competitors,  etc.,  1n 
the  last  analysis,  the  pressure of all members  of  society 
(73). 
And  as  a  consequence  of this all-round  ongo1ng  system of reproduction, 
even  directly  1n  the  process  of  production  itself,  the  producer 
appears  as  a  commodity  producer,  his  labour  has  acquired  the  character 
of abstract  labour  and  his product  the character of a  value  (74).  As 
Rubin  himself points out,  however,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  confuse 
this  development  within  production  of  certain  determined  social 
characteristics  with  a  completely  corresponding set of properties  1n 
exchange  (75). 
The  Classical political economists  compressed  the  immediate  form  and 
content  of  value  into  each  other  so  that  there  was  a  perfectly 
symmetrical  relationship  between  production  and  value  and  hence 
production  and  exchange-value.  In  this  way  their  theoretical 
endeavours  might  be  characterised as  an  attempt  to explain  immediate 
prices.  But,  as  we  saw  in the earlier  chapters,  this  conception 
19nores  the  process by  which  the  homogeneity  of labour  implied  in such 
a  theory  1S  brought  about.  It has  to  be  remembered  that  1n  a 
commodity-producing  society,  individuals  produce  independently  of each 
other  and  only  from  an  economic  viewpoint  meet  when  they  enter  into 
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not  only  make  little sense  1n  terms  of how  products  are  actually  made 
but  would  violate  the  very  condition which  defines  the  commodity 
economy,  1.e.  private production  and  exchange.  This  is not  to  say, 
however,  that  the  producer  is unconscious  of the  presence  of  other 
producers  or  of the  fact  that his  primary  aim  is the  realisation  of 
exchange-value.  Indeed,  he  operates with  the  precisely  in mind,  and 
may  very  well  accord  some  'value'  to his product stated in  terms  of  a 
quantity  of money  and  thereby  in  a  limited sense  include his  labour  ln 
the  labour of society: 
But  this inclusion of the  labour  of the  individual into  the 
working  mechanism  of the entire society is only  preliminary 
and  surmised:  it is still subject  to  very  rough  verification 
in  the  process  of exchange,  verification  which  can  give 
positive  or  negative  results  for  the  given  commodity 
producer.  Thus  the  working  activity of commodity  producers 
ln  the  phase  of production is directly private  and  concrete 
labour,  and  is is social labour  only  indirectly,  or  latently, 
as  Marx  put it (76). 
This  description  encompasses  one  of Marx's  most  innovative  and  also 
most  neglected  ideas.  In it is expressed  the  fundamental  quality  of 
uncertainty  which  characterises the  market  economy.  If the  individual 
producer  could  not  only  predict  the  value  at which  his  product  would 
sell but  also  guarantee  making  a  sale in the  first instance,  it  would 
surely  not  be  a  market  economy  which  we  would  be  discussing  (77). 
In  its unexchanged  state,  the  commodity  is only  latently a  value  and  a 
product  of  abstract  labour.  It is only  validated as  such  by  being 
exchanged  for  some  other  product  and  in  being  exchanged it 1S  subject 
to  the  pressure  exerted by  the  mass  of commodities  of  its  class. 
Consequently,  regardless of how  much  labour  the  individual  had  to  put 
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of  commodity  is worth  by  reference  to  the  socially necessary  labour-
time  on  average  required  to  produce  them.  The  individual  producer  who 
takes less time  will benefit,  he  who  takes  longer will  suffer. 
In  his presentation,  Rubin  goes  on  to explain  how  abstract  labour  1S 
quantitatively  determined  (78).  It would  be  useful  to  conclude  by 
making  some  comments  on  the  relationship  between  'latent'  and 
'actualised'  value as this is not  pursued  in  any  great detail  by  Rubin 
(79). 
Marx's  most  fertile comments  on  this relationship are contained in  the 
Grundrisse,  a  preparatory  work  unavailable  to  Rubin.  The  work 
consists  of a  number  of notebooks  arranged  in Chapters  on  Money  and 
Capital.  The  Chapter  on  Money  contains  an  exploration  of  the 
relationship  between  value  and  money  and  their social  preconditions. 
Marx  pegs  much  of this exploration,  as  we  saw  1n  the  third chapter,  on 
consideration  of  the  views  and  opinions  of  a  strand  of  French 
Socialism,  associated  with  Proudhon  and  Darimon,  disparagingly 
regarded  as  the  'time-chitters'.  The  essence  of the  argument  advanced 
by  Proudhon  et  al.  was  that the  modern  development  of  money  had 
distorted  the  natural relationships  between  people  1n  such  a  manner 
that  money  itself had  ascended  into a  position  from  which  it  governed 
human  affairs.  The  way  to  resolve this problem  was  to  reduce  money 
down  to  Slze  by  turning it into a  simple  commodity.  This,  they 
concluded,  would  be  achieved if the  producer,  1n  return  for  his 
labour,  received 
labour-time,  he 
a  'time-chit'  specifying  how 
was  entitled  to.  These 
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much  'value',  1.e., 
humble  time-chits, representing  a  pre-determined claim on  society's product,  would  then 
be  used  in  exchange  for  other  commodities. 
Marx  immediately  seized  upon  the  contradiction  inherent  1n  this 
proposal.  The  labour  of the  individual is  specific.  It  1S  not 
immediately  social  labour.  The  time-chit as  a  general  object  of 
exchange,  however,  has  to  count  as  general  labour  because it will  be 
given  in  exchange  for  every  other  kind  of labour.  The  proposal  breaks 
down  precisely  because it fails  to  address  how  incommensurables  can  be 
made  commensurate.  The  problems  inherent  in  the  time-chit  proposal 
are  only  the  general  problems  inherent  in  a  society  regulated  by  the 
exchange  of  products.  Exchange  is brought  about  because  of  the 
development  of  the  division of labour  to  a  point  where  producers 
operate  independently  of each  other.  Once  producers  come  to  depend 
upon  the  exchange-value of their commodities,  they  already  come  to 
think  of them  in  those  terms  from  the outset,  hence  existing  stocks 
and  work-in-progress  can  be  valued.  But  one  over-riding 
dominates  these  procedures: 
Every  moment,  in  calculating,  accounting  etc.,  that  we 
transform  commodities  into value  symbols,  we  fix  them  as  mere 
exchange  values,  making  abstraction  from  the  matter  they  are 
composed  of and  all their natural qualities.  On  paper,  1n 
the  head,  this  metamorphosis  proceeds  by  means  of  mere 
abstraction;  but  in  the  real  exchange  process  a  real 
mediation is required,  a  means  to  accomplish  this abstraction 
(80). 
fact 
What  is expressed  in  the  mind  1S  the  latent value  of the  commodities, 
1n  effect,  the  unrealised  or  potential value.  Thus  before  exchange 
takes  place,  the  product  adopts  the  character of a  value  and  for  its 
owner  represents  the  currency  of his participation in  society.  By 
being  exchanged,  the  value  of  the  commodity  is  realised,  both 
242 quantitatively,  as  socially necessary  labour-time  and  qualitatively, 
as  universal  social labour. 
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35.  Meek,  1973,  169. 
36.  One  recent  attempt  to  rescue  the  theory  of abstract  labour  from 
circularity  has  argued  that  Marx  and  Rubin  both  failed  'to 
adequately  address  the  question  of the  historical  necessity  of 
value,  and  so  raises a  serious  dimensionality  problem  that  reduces 
the  labour  theory  of  value  to  a  tautology'.  The  author's 
proffered  view  1S  that the  'ontology  of  abstract  labour  being 
advanced  herein asserts that,  to the  contrary,  it is through  the 
development  of capitalist relations of production  that  labour 
becomes  the  substance  of value,  i.e.,  a  real social  phenomenon'. 
Gleicher,  1983,  113.  The  author  agrees  with  Meek  that  abstract 
labour  is  to  be  sought  in  production  itself  as  a  material-
technical  activity;  he  disagrees with  Meek  in  that  where  the 
latter  identifies  abstract  labour  with  commodity-production, 
Gleicher  identifies it with capitalist production.  The  or1g1n  of 
capital,  is,  of course,  problematic  for  this position,  but it  1S 
worth  recalling what  Marx  has  to say  on  the  subject: 
To  develop  the  concept  of Capital it is  necessary  to 
begin  not  with  labour  but  with  value,  and  precisely, 
with  exchange-value  in  an  already  developed  movement  of 
circulation.  It  is  just as  impossible  to  make  the 
transition  directly  from  labour  to capital as it is  to 
go  from  the  different human  races directly to  the  banker 
or  from  nature  to  the  steam  engine.  Marx,  1973,  259. 
37.  Meek,  1973,  7. 
38.  Ibid,  311. 
247 39.  Cf.  Pilling,  1972;  Elson,  1979. 
40.  Mohun  and  Himmelweit,  1978,  233. 
41.  Loc  Cit. 
42.  Loc  Cit. 
43.  Ibid,  225. 
44 .  I bid,  233. 
45.  Loc  Cit. 
46.  Cf.  Shaik,  1979,  299. 
47.  Mohun  and  Himmelweit,  1978,  234. 
48 .  I bid,  235. 
49.  Elson,  1979,  135. 
50.  Ibid,  136. 
51.  Loc  Cit. 
52.  Lac  Cit. 
53.  Lac  Cit. 
54.  Ibid,  137. 
55.  Ibid,  137-8. 
56.  Ibid,  138. 
248 57.  Loc  Cit. 
58.  Loc  Cit. 
59.  Ibid,  148. 
60.  Loc  Cit. 
61.  Loc  Cit. 
62.  Ibid,  149. 
63.  Ibid,  153. 
64.  Steedman,  1977,  20. 
65.  'All  summations  of labour-times are  summat10ns  of  quantities  of 
abstract  labour'  because:  'The  very  fact  that  these  different 
labour-times  expended  in  a  capitalist economy,  are  added  together 
means  that  they  are  treated as  abstract labour-time'.  Ibid,  19. 
The  problem  for  Steedman's  argument  1S  that labour  only  becomes 
abstract  because,  before  labour  can  be  distributed  according  to 
labour-time,  it  must  first  become  social and  it  only  becomes 
social  1n  the  exchange  of commodities  which  is,  of  course,  the 
means  by  which  labour is regulated  1n  an  economy  founded  on  the 
private  production of commodities.  This  explanation is,  however, 
omitted  from  Steedman's account. 
66.  See  Note  19  above. 
67.  At  first  glance,  exchange  seems  to  be  a  separate  phase  1n  the 
process of reproduction.  We  can  see  that  a  process  takes  place  in 
249 direct  production  and  is then  followed  by  the  phase  of  exchange. 
Here,  exchange  is separate  from  production  and  counterposed  to 
it.  Rubin,  1975,  122. 
68.  Ibid,  122-3. 
69.  Ibid,  123. 
70.  Marx  examines,  it will  be  remembered,  the specific  structure  of 
exchange  and  its composition  in  Section  Three  of Chapter  One  of 
Capital  which  analyses  the  value-form. 
71.  Marx,  1977,  91. 
72.  Loc  Cit. 
73.  Rubin,  1972,  149. 
74.  Ibid,  150. 
75.  Expressed  ln  one  way,  this confusion  besets  Meek's  account  of 
Marx's  theory  of value,  particularly his  insistence that  concrete 
labour  becomes  historically  more  abstracted  as  the  economy 
develops.  In  other  words,  Meek  finds  that  labour,  directly  ln 
production is to  be  classed as abstract  and  undifferentiated. 
76.  Loc  Cit. 
77.  Indeed,  Rubin  proceeds  to  compare  the  social  articulation  of 
labour  ln  a  market  economy  with  that of a  socialist  economy  ln 
which  the part played  by  the  individual  producer  is already  framed 
within  the social  from  the outset.  Cf.  Rubin,  1972,  152. 
250 78.  Ibid,  151-8. 
79.  Probably  the  main  reason  for  this is that Marx  only  discussed  the 
question  ln  any  great detail in  the  Grundrisse,  which  as  we  know 
was  unavailable to  Rubin.  In  Capital,  these detailed  discussions 
are  omitted,  but  they  are  an  important  component  of the  complete 
theory  of  value  because,  as  we  saw,  they  draw  out  the  absolute 
necessity  and  singular  importance  of the  value-form. 
80.  Marx.  1973,  142. 
251 CONCLUSION 
The  objective of the  preceding  considerations  has  been  to  explore  a 
number  of problems  within  the  labour  theory  of value.  Those  problems 
did  not  arise with  Marx.  They  have  been  shown  to  have  existed in  the 
prlor  theoretical  contributions  made  by  the  Classical  political 
economists,  particularly  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo.  Those 
problems,  the  nature  of value;  the specification of its substance;  its 
measurement,  and  manner  of expression  have  then  been  explored  and 
shown  to  be  solvable  in  an  account  of the  labour  theory  of value  which 
gives  full  expression  to the  role of the  value-form,  a  role  first 
identified  and  analysed  by  Marx.  Furthermore,  it has  been  shown  that 
much  of  the  criticism  of  the  labour  theory  of  value  has  been 
misconceived  precisely  because of the  absence  of a  systematic  account 
of  the  value-form  or  an  appreciation of the  role  which  it  plays. 
Where  the  value-form  has  been  considered  by  earlier work  it has  been 
necessary,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  to  expand  upon  its comments  where 
it  appears  to  be  theoretically  limited and  to reject certain  of  its 
conclusions  where  they  would  appear  to  come  into  contradiction  with 
what  was  described at the outset  as  the  fundamental  sense  and  concept 
of the  labour  theory  of value. 
It  has  also  been  shown  that certain  problems  arising  from  the  manner 
ln  which  value is expressed,  such  as  the  circularity claim  made  by 
Bohm-Bawerk,  can  be  resolved within  the  framework  of the  fundamental 
principle  precisely  by  means  of the  value-form.  Such  criticisms  of 
the  labour  theory  of value  can  then  be  shown  to  be  based  on  the  more 
primitive theoretical efforts of the  Classical school,  leaving  Marx's 
unique  contribution effectively untouched.  Indeed,  it has  been  the case  that  much  of the criticism levelled at Marx  has  ar1sen  precisely 
because  of  the  critics'  failure  to  fully  explore  the  distinction 
between  Marx  and  his predecessors.  This  has  historically  provoked  a 
specific  response  from  commentators  sympathetic  to  Marx  which  has 
typically  sought  to  distinguish Marx  from  the  Classical school  1n  the 
basis of perceived  inadequacies  within  the latter's account. 
This  strategy  has  identified a  number  of pertinent  contrasts  which 
serve  to distance  Marx  from  the  target of traditional  criticisms  of 
the  labour  theory  of value.  In  particular,  this work  of recovery  has 
pointed  to  Marx's  qualitative analysis with its emphases  on  the  social 
and  historical attributes of economic  phenomena  in  contradistinction 
to  the  largely  quantitative  and  arguably  flat,  two-dimensional 
conceptions  of  the  Classical  school  of political  economy.  Whilst, 
however,  this  work  has  to  some  extent  been  successful  1n  restating 
some  of the  important  methodological characteristics of Marxist  theory 
1n  opposition  to  critiques  based  on  alternative  methodological 
positions,  this  work  has  not  been  extended  deeply  enough  into 
political  economy  and,  in particular,  value  theory.  It 1S  therefore 
understandable  that  debates  about  the  nature  and  importance  of  value 
theory  over  the  last ten  years  have  seemed  confused,  particularly when 
it has  been  suggested that value-theory  be  dropped  altogether.  As  has 
been  shown,  this casual attitude is not  new.  Earlier generations  of 
commentators  on  the  debates of previous  periods  in  turn  recommended 
the  disbanding  of  efforts  to  explain  value  in  the  face  of  what 
appeared  to  be  insuperable  problems.  The  work  of  R.  L.  Meek  was  a 
case  in  point.  What  was  absent  from  Meek's  account  of  the  labour 
theory  of value  was  a  fully  worked-out  explanation  of the  role of  the 
253 value-form  and  its relationship to  the  other  dimensions of the 
phenomenon. 
In  summary,  the  value-form  encompasses  the  following  phenomena: 
value 
1.  Value  is the  form  taken  by  social  labour  in  economies  based  on  the 
production  and  exchange  of social products  as  commodities. 
2.  Exchange-value  1S  the  necessary  form  taken  by  value  1n  order  to 
equate  naturally different products. 
3.  The  money-form  of value  is the  necessary  form  taken  by  exchange-
value  in  order to objectively represent social labour  as  a  general 
object of exchange  which  measures,  through  the  exchange-relation, 
the  values of all commodities. 
This  account  can  be  clearly distinguished  from  both  the  Ricardian 
'invariable  measure  of  value'  and  the  implicit  theory  of  money 
contained  within  the  labour  money  proposals of the  French  and  English 
Utopian  socialists.  Ricardo's  formulation  of the  invariable  measure 
of  value  idea was  made  as  a  response  to  the  need  to  find  a  commodity 
whose  own  value  was  fixed  and  which  therefore could  be  used  to measure 
the  values  and  changes  in  value  of other  commodities.  As  Sraffa  has 
argued,  what  really  underlies this  formulation  is the  real  problem  of 
value  and  the  identification of its substance  and  measure.  If Ricardo 
had  been  able  to  fully  articulate a  concept  of the  substance of value, 
he  would  have  been  able to  formulate  the  problem of  commensurability 
and  subsequently  approach  the question of how  this 1S  expressed  and 
thence  the  role  of  the  value-form.  Ricardo's  failure  can  be 
attributed both  to  a  lack of the  appropriate methodological  framework 
254 Marx  described  Ricardo's  approach  as  limited  by  its  analytical 
method  - and  to  a  simple  neglect  of some  basic  problems.  The  'labour-
money'  idea fails  for  similar theoretical reasons.  Defining  a  p1ece 
of  paper  to  represent  a  quantum  of labour-time  which  may  be  used  to 
exchange  for  other  cJmmodities  19nores  the  problem  of  labour-
heterogeneity  and  correspondingly  the  problem  of commensuration.  The 
equivalence  of commodities is established in  the  system  of exchange  in 
which  one  commodity  1S  historically selected  to  function  as  the 
general  representation of homogeneous  labour.  This  process,  however, 
is precisely  what  has  to  be  explained.  It cannot  be  assumed  from  the 
outset,  which  is what  the  labour-money  theory  does. 
The  a1m  of this study  has  been  to clarify and  explain.  There  are, 
however,  a  number  of vitally important  areas  which  the  study  has  not 
covered  but  which  would  need  to  be  for  this project to  move  forward. 
The  study  has  only  made  passing  reference  to  the  methodological 
character  of  Marx's  thought.  Whilst  this has  been  sufficient  to 
account  for  the  use  of certain categories within  the  labour  theory  of 
value,  the  wider  development  of Marxist  thought  requ1res  a  full 
explication  of the  categories of dialectics and  essentialism as  they 
apply  to  the  study of history  and  the  explanation  of social phenomena. 
In  developing  Marx's  distinctions  between  value  and  use-value, 
concrete  and  abstract labour,  and  the  relative and  equivalent  forms  of 
value,  implicit  reference  was  made  to  the  contradictory  or 
oppositional  nature  of these  relationships,  and  moreover  the  role 
d  1  t  f  re  'h1"gher'  played  by  such contradictions in the  eve  opmen  0  mo 
forms  of  value.  It  would  appear  that as yet  there  has  been  no 
systematic  account  of  the  notion of  contradiction  within  Marxist 
255 thought.  Without  a  full,  sustainable account  of  the  nature  and 
explanatory  status of the  term contradiction,  conclusions  as  to  the 
soundness  of  the  labour  theory  of value  as  developed  by  Marx  must 
remain  tentative  pending  such  an  account. 
It  1S  intended that the  present study  form  the  basis of further  work 
on  the  development  of Marx's  theory  of the  forms  of  value,  most 
notably  capital  - to which  the  greater part of his mature  work  was 
devoted  to  developing  an  understanding.  That  understanding,  and  the 
conclusions  which  can  be  developed  from  it regarding  the  course  of 
contemporary  econom1C  development,  have  all  but  disappeared  from 
rational  thought,  which  has  found  itself without  focus  or  direction. 
The  purpose  of rational  thought  can  once  aga1n  begin  to  be  fulfilled 
by  taking  up  the  wrongly  discarded  tools of  analysis  towards  the 
development  of which  Marx  was  a  major  contributor. 
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